미국학 (American Studies)

서울대학교 미국학연구소 (Seoul National University American Studies Institute)
권호 표지

Congressional Control of Bureaucracy in the United States: Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Control Mechanisms

  • 투고 : 2020.05.29
  • 심사 : 2020.06.27
  • 발행 : 2020.06.30

⟨ 이전 논문 다음 논문 ⟩

초록

The U.S. Congress has been known to effectively control the bureaucracy. On one hand, Congress adjusts the degree of discretion provided to the bureaucracy when making agencies or legislation: ex ante control. On the other hand, it also performs the oversight activities to punish or correct undesirable behaviors of bureaucrats: ex post control. While the dynamics of each control mechanism is widely examined theoretically, few have attempted to empirically investigate this with a special attention to partisan politics in Congress. I attempt to fill this gap by measuring the two types of control mechanisms, testing theoretical assertions, and analyzing the dynamics under the two control mechanisms.

키워드

참고문헌

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