Journal of the Korea Convergence Society (한국융합학회논문지)

Korea Convergence Society (한국융합학회)
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An Equilibrium Analysis of the Constrained Mean-Price Sealed Bid Auction

제한적 평균가낙찰제 경매방식의 균형분석

  • Seo, Yong-Mo (Dept. of Humanities and Social Science, U1 University) ;
  • Rhee, Byungchae (Dept. of Economics, Chungnam National University)
  • 서용모 (유원대학교 교양융합학부) ;
  • 이병채 (충남대학교 경제학과)
  • Received : 2018.10.31
  • Accepted : 2019.01.20
  • Published : 2019.01.28
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Abstract

In Korea, the first-price sealed bid auction and the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction(buchal-je in Korean) have been used alternatively as procurement auctions. In this paper, we characterize the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction in the context of mechanism design. We consider the general ?-bidder case in which each bidder has private information. Under the assumptions of uniformly distributed valuations and linear strategies, we derive the equilibrium of the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction. Furthermore, we analyze the efficiency and the expected revenue of this auction mechanism in comparison with the first-price sealed bid auction. Finally, we conclude with the critical remarks on the practical intention of the government which uses this auction.

우리나라 정부 당국은 주로 최저가낙찰제도를 이용하여 조달을 시행해왔으나, 과거 일정 시기 동안은 제한적 평균가 낙찰제 경매방식(일명 부찰제)을 이용하여 시설공사부문 조달을 실시했다. 부찰제란 각 입찰자들이 서로 모르게 공급가격을 적어 내면 그 가격을 평균하여 그 평균값에 가장 가까우면서 평균값보다는 낮은 공급가격을 부른 사람이 승자가 되며, 그가 부른 가격에서 낙찰가가 결정되는 제도이다. 본 논문은 제한적 평균가낙찰제 경매방식을 자원배분기구설계(mechanism design)의 관점에서 정형화하고, 고려할 문제를 제시한다. 나아가 ?명의 일반적 상황 하에서 사적 정보를 가지고 있는 입찰자들의 전략을 일양 분포 가정과 선형전략의 가정을 도입하여 구하고, 이를 통해 부찰제 경매방식의 균형을 제시한다. 또한 이러한 균형전략을 최저가낙찰제도와 비교함으로써 우리나라에서 자주 사용되는 두 제도의 효율성과 기대수입의 측면을 살펴본다. 끝으로 부찰제를 실시하는 경매인(정부)의 현실적 목적성이 어느 정도 달성되고 있는가를 비판적으로 고찰한다.

Keywords

Table 1. Facility construction scale by the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction

OHHGBW_2019_v10n1_205_t0001.png 이미지

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