Korean Journal of Logic (논리연구)

Korean Association for Logic (한국논리학회)
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Moore's Paradox and Self-Reference

무어의 역설과 자기-지시

  • Received : 2016.09.06
  • Accepted : 2016.10.18
  • Published : 2016.10.31
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Abstract

Asserting a sentence of the form "p but I do not believe that p" sounds inappropriate, and even absurd or contradictory. The problem that Moore's paradox raises is to explain why asserting such a sentence is absurd despite the fact that there is apparently no logical contradiction in it. Many of the influential accounts of Moore's paradox try to locate its source in the nature of belief or in the nature of assertion. In this paper, I argue that these accounts are not satisfactory, and develop and defend a novel account. According to this account, the source of Moore's paradox should be located in self-reference. Self-reference is constituted by a certain disposition to form second-order beliefs. A subject who is ready to assert "p but I do not believe p" fails to conform to the disposition that is constitutive of self-reference, while at the same time referring to the relevant individual with "I."

"p이지만 나는 p라고 믿지 않는다"와 같은 문장은 어떤 상황에서도 자연스럽게 발화될 수 있을 것 같지 않고, 심지어는 부조리하고 모순되게 들리기까지 한다. 무어의 역설이 제기하는 문제는 왜 이런 문장이 아무런 형식적인 모순이 없음에도 불구하고 이를 발화하는 것이 부조리하게 들리는지를 설명하는 것이다. 무어의 역설에 대한 기존의 견해는 주로 믿음이나 주장(assertion)의 성격에서 그 부조리성의 근원을 찾으려 한다. 필자는 본 논문에서 기존의 견해들이 무어의 역설을 만족스럽게 설명하지 못함을 주장하고, 이에 대한 새로운 설명을 제안한다. 이 제안에 따르면 무어의 역설의 근원은 "자기-지시"에 있다. 자기-지시는 주체가 어떤 특정한 방식으로 믿음을 형성하는 성향에 의해 부분적으로 구성되는데, 무어의 역설은 주체가 자신을 "나"로 지시하는 동시에 어떤 사람을 "나"로 지시하기 위해 만족시켜야할 조건을 만족시키지 못하는 데에서 발생한다.

Keywords

References

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