Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회논문지)

The Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회)
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Control-Ownership Disparity and Executive Compensation

지배주주의 소유지배괴리도가 경영자 보상에 미치는 영향

  • Cho, Young-Gon (Department of International Trade and Business, Sangmyung University)
  • Received : 2013.07.30
  • Accepted : 2013.11.07
  • Published : 2013.11.30
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Abstract

Using longitudinal data of 575 sample from 122 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2008, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on executive compensation. The empirical study finds that controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity is negatively related to the level of executive compensation and moderate negatively the relation between firm performance and executive compensation. This finding suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights lead to decreased executive compensation in order to relieve the concerns of stakeholder about the potential agency costs of controlling shareholder, and have, on the other hand, entrenchment effects on the decision of executive compensation by decreasing its sensitivity on firm performance.

본 연구는 지배주주의 소유지배괴리도가 경영자 보수에 미치는 영향을 규명하기 위해 2001년부터 2008까지 공정위가 상호출자제한 기업집단으로 발표한 기업집단 소속 122개 기업 575건을 대상으로 실증분석을 시하였다. 실증분석 결과, 첫째, 지배주주의 소유지배괴리도와 경영자 보상 (등기임원 1인당 현금보상) 간에는 부(-)의 유의적인 관계가 존재하였다. 둘째, 지배주주의 소유지배괴리도는 경영성과와 경영자 보상 간의 민감도에 부(-)의 유의적인 영향을 미쳤다. 본 결과는 지배주주가 소유지분을 초과하여 지배권을 가질수록 지배주주의 대리인 비용에 대한 이해관계자의 우려를 완화시키기 위해 경영자 보상 수준을 낮추는 반면 경영성과에 대한 경영자 보상의 민감도를 약화시키는 것으로 나타났다.

Keywords

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