The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences (한국통신학회논문지)

The Korean Institute of Commucations and Information Sciences (한국통신학회)
권호 표지
DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

The Effect on Social Welfare of Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rate

이동망 접속료 차등화가 사회후생에 미치는 효과에 관한 분석

  • Received : 2012.02.27
  • Accepted : 2012.05.07
  • Published : 2012.06.30
Download PDF
⟨ Previous Next ⟩

Abstract

The Effect of asymmetric interconnection charge is different between where the retail price of incumbent is regulated and that of incumbent is not regulated. When the retail price of incumbent is not regulated, the brand loyalty and the relative magnitude of each marginal cost determine the effect of consumer surplus. However, when the retail price of incombent is regulated, network substitution effect also plays a important role to the consumer surplus. The higher the brand loyalty, the lower the network substitution effect, or the higher the marginal cost of the entrant, the social welfare through the asymmetric interconnection charge is more increased. In the other cases, the consumer surplus might be decreased.

본 접속료 차등의 효과는 선발 네트워크 사업자의 소매가격이 규제되지 않는 경우와 규제된 경우에 차이가 있다. 선발사업자의 소매가격이 규제되지 않는 경우엔 브랜드 충성도와 양 사업자간 한계비용의 상대적 크기가 소비자 후생효과를 결정한다. 즉, 브랜드 충성도와 후발사업자의 상대적 비용이 크면 접속료 차등은 소비자 후생을 증가시킨다. 그러나 선발사업자의 소매요금이 규제된 경우엔 브랜드 충성도와 비용이외에도 망간 가입자 대체성이 중요한 역할을 한다. 접속료 차등으로 인해 사회후생이 증가할 수 있기 위해서는 선발사업자의 브랜드 충성도가 높거나 대체성이 적거나 후발사업자의 한계비용이 커야 한다. 그 이외에는 접속료 차등화의 증가는 소비자 후생을 오히려 감소시킨다는 것을 알 수 있다.

Keywords

References

  1. Laffont, J.-J., Rey, P., and Tirole, J. "Network Competition I: Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing."RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 29 (1998a), pp. 1-37. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555814
  2. Laffont, J.-J., Rey, P., and Tirole, J. "Network Competition II: Price Discrimination."RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 29 (1998b), pp. 38-56. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555815
  3. J.S. Gans and S.P. King, "Mobile Network Competition, Customer Ignorance and Fixed-To-Mobile Call Prices,"Information Economics and Policy, vol. 12, 2000, pp. 310-327.
  4. J. Calzada and T.M. Valletti, "Network Competition and Entry Deterrence,"The Economic J., vol. 118, 2008, pp. 1223-1244. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02167.x
  5. M. Armstrong, "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, vol. 108, no. 448, 1998, pp. 545-564. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00304
  6. Martin Peitz, "On access pricing in telecoms: theory and European practice," Telecommunication Policy, Vol. 27, 2003.
  7. Ovum. "Historical Mobile Termination Charge: Quarterly Data," 2008.
  8. R. Dewenter and J. Haucap, "The Effects of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates for Asymmetric Networks,"European J. Law and Economics, vol. 20, 2005, pp. 185-197. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-005-1736-z
  9. Tommaso Valletti, "Asymmetric Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates," Working paper, December 14, 2006.
  10. T.S. Gabrielsen and S. Vagstad, "Why is On-Net Traffic Cheaper Than Off-Net Traffic? Access Markup as a Collusive Device," European Economic Review, vol. 52, 2008, pp. 99-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.02.002