A Study on Jurisdiction under the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions

국제항공테러협약의 관할권 연구

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

본 논문은 5대 국제항공테러범죄협약, 다시 말해서 UN의 전문기구인 국제민간항공기구(ICAO)에서 제정된 1963년 도쿄협약, 1970 헤이그협약, 1971 몬트리올협약, 1988년 몬트리올 의정서 그리고 1991년 가소성폭약협약에 규정된 관할권조항의 내용과 그 문제점을 연구하였는데 국제항공테러 협약의 관할권을 연구하면서 얻은 결론을 다음과 같다. 첫째, 항공테러협약의 관할권규정에서 공통으로 발견되는 것은 어느 협약도 관할권의 우선순위를 명시하지 않고 있다는 점이다. 결국 하이재킹 된 항공기가 착륙한 국가와 항공기등록국간 관할권문제가 발생하는데 대부분의 경우 착륙국이 하이재커를 처벌하는 예가 많다. 둘째, 국제법상 전통적인 관할권이론에서 많은 이론이 제기되었던 소극적 국적주의(passive personality principle)가 국제항공테러협약의 제정 이후 각종 국제테러협약에서 점차적으로 발전되어가고 있는 경향을 볼 수 있다. 1973년의 뉴욕협약 제3조 1항, 1979년 인질협약 제5조 1항 (d) 그리고 1988년 로마협약 제6조 2항 (b)가 그 예이다. 또한 1979년 인질협약 제5조 1항 (c)와 1988년 로마협약 제6조 2항 (c)에서는 자국에게 작위 또는 부작위를 강요하기 위한 범행의 경우에도 그 대상국가가 관할권을 행사할 수 있도록하고 있다. 만일 장래에 국제항공테러협약이 개정이 될 경우에는 국제항공 테러범죄를 좀 더 효과적으로 억제하기 위하여 소극적 국적주의를 고려할 필요가 있다. 셋째, 헤이그협약이나 몬트리올협약은 범인의 국적주의를 부여하고 있지않으나 인질협약은 제5조 1항 (b)에 인질억류범의 국적국가에게 관할권을 부여하고 있다. 만일 A국가의 국민이 어떤 국가나 제3자의 작위나 부작위를 강요할 목적으로 B국가에서 인질을 억류했다면 A국가도 그자에 대한 관할권을 행사할 권리를 가진다는 것이다. 따라서 만일 국제항공테러협약이 개정이 될 때는 이 문제도 고려할 필요가 있다. 마지막으로 인질협약 제 5조 1항 (b)는 무국적자가 상주하는 국가에서 만약 그가 인질억류범죄를 행했고, 그 국가가 그렇게 하는 것이 적절하다고 고려하는 경우 그에 대하여 관할권을 행사할 권리를 부여한다. 이와 같은 목적에서 볼 때 무국적거주자를 국민과 동일하게 보고 있는데 헤이그협약이나 몬트리올협약에서는 없는 조항이다. 만일 국제항공테러협약이 개정이될 때는 이 문제도 함께 고려할 필요가 있다고 생각한다.