Ocean and Polar Research

Korea Institute of Ocean Science & Technology (한국해양과학기술원)
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A Theoretical Framework for Analysis of Selt-Organizing and Self-Governing Common-Pool Resources (CPRs)

공유자원의 자율 조직화와 자율 관리 분석을 위한 이론적 틀

  • Park, Seong-Kowae (Faculty of Marine Business and Economics, Pukyong National University)
  • 박성쾌 (부경대학교 해양산업경영학부)
  • Published : 2006.12.31
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Abstract

This study has the purpose of providing a framework for analyzing problems of institutional choice, illustrating the complex configuration of variables that must be addressed when individuals in field settings attempt to fashion rules to improve their individual and joint outcomes. The reason for presenting this complex array of variables (i.e., situational variables) as a framework rather than as a model is precisely because one cannot encompass this degree of complexity within a single model. The results of this study imply that it is important for researchers and government officials to understand that appropriators have a certain amount of ability to transform the status quo rules to the alternative rules.

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References

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