Consumer Misperceptions, Product Liability Law and Product Safety

  • Lee Jong-In (Consumer Policy Research Department, Korea Consumer Protection Board)
  • Published : 2005.12.01

Abstract

This paper considered the impact of changing the product liability rule from consumer to producer liability on product safety under asymmetric information. In particular, it has been attempted to remove several constraints on antecedent studies. The main results of the study are as follows: under the misperception of the risk on a product, consumers may underestimate the probability of product failure. In this case, the accident rate can be lowered under the producer's liability rule. However, even under the asymmetric information, a consumer's estimation on the probability may be converged with the expected risk level, which could be called the 'rational expectation.' In this situation the probability of product failure can be lowered under the strict liability with contributory negligence. Additionally, it is possible to reduce the probability of product failure when a legal rule that imposes liability on cheapest cost avoider is admitted.

Keywords

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