Analysis on Market Power in Power Transaction with Transmission Constraints

송전선 제약조건에 따른 전력거래에서의 시장지배력 연구

  • Lee, Gwang-Ho (Dept.of Electric Electronics Computer Engineering, Dankook University)
  • 이광호 (단국대학교 전기전자컴퓨터공학부)
  • Published : 2002.08.01

Abstract

As the electricity industry undergoes a process of fundamental restructuring, horizontal market power appears as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels by restricting output below competitive levels. In models for imperfect competition under the consideration of the transmission constraints, the Nash equilibrium has the form of a mixed strategy. In this paper, the models for analyzing imperfect competition are compared using the solution of pure and mixed equilibria. The relation between market power and the capacity of a transmission line is investigated by imperfect competition analysis methods: Cournot, Bertrand, and Supply Curve model.

Keywords

References

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