다품목단일입찰경매의 최적경매설계와 전체낙찰자기대이익

Optimal Auction Design and All the Winners' Expected Profit in the Multiple Unit Auction

This paper is concerned with the multiple unit auction under the following assumptions: 1) multiple identical objects are to be sold to the highest bidders, but a bidder may obtain at most one, 2) each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws his reservation value independently in the same distribution, 3) The greater a bidder's reservation value is, the more a bidder will bid for the object, and 4) a bidder will bid when his expected profit is more than zero. The purpose of this paper is to design the optimal auctions, in terms of the reserve price and entry fee, that can be applied in any types of multiple unit auctions under the above assumptions. Further, auctioneer's expected revenue and profit, and all the winners' expected profit are analyzed.