The advent of the Internet and related Web technologies has created an easily accessible link between a firm and its customers, and has provided opportunities to a firm to use information technology to support supplementary after-sale services associated with a product or service. It has been widely recognized that supplementary services are an important source of customer value and of competitive advantage as the characteristics of the product itself. Many of these supplementary services are information-based and need not be co-located with the product, so more and more companies are delivering these services electronically. Net-based customer service, which is defined as an Internet-based computerized information system that delivers services to a customer, therefore, is the core infrastructure for supplementary service provision. The importance of net-based customer service in delivering supplementary after-sale services associated with product has been well documented. The strategic advantages of well-implemented net-based customer service are enhanced customer loyalty and higher lock-in of customers, and a resulting reduction in competition and the consequent increase in profits. However, not all customers utilize such net-based customer service. The digital divide is the phenomenon in our society that captures the observation that not all customers have equal access to computers. Socioeconomic factors such as race, gender, and education level are strongly related to Internet accessibility and ability to use. This is due to the differences in the ability to bear the cost of a computer, and the differences in self-efficacy in the use of a technology, among other reasons. This concept, applied to e-commerce, has been called the "e-commerce divide." High Internet penetration is not eradicating the digital divide and e-commerce divide as one would hope. Besides, to accommodate personalized support, a customer must often provide personal information to the firm. This personal information includes not only name and address, but also preferences information and perhaps valuation information. However, many recent studies show that consumers may not be willing to share information about themselves due to concerns about privacy online. Due to the e-commerce divide, and due to privacy and security concerns of the customer for sharing personal information with firms, limited numbers of customers adopt net-based customer service. The limited level of customer adoption of net-based customer service affects the firm profits and the customers' welfare. We use a game-theoretic model in which we model the net-based customer service system as a mechanism to enhance customers' loyalty. We model a market entry scenario where a firm (the incumbent) uses the net-based customer service system in inducing loyalty in its customer base. The firm sells one product through the traditional retailing channels and at a price set for these channels. Another firm (the entrant) enters the market, and having observed the price of the incumbent firm (and after deducing the loyalty levels in the customer base), chooses its price. The profits of the firms and the surplus of the two customers segments (the segment that utilizes net-based customer service and the segment that does not) are analyzed in the Stackelberg leader-follower model of competition between the firms. We find that an increase in adoption of net-based customer service by the customer base is not always desirable for firms. With low effectiveness in enhancing customer loyalty, firms prefer a high level of customer adoption of net-based customer service, because an increase in adoption rate decreases competition and increases profits. A firm in an industry where net-based customer service is highly effective loyalty mechanism, on the other hand, prefers a low level of adoption by customers.
Since the early 1980's, the Korean government has gradually been widening the Korean market to foreign consumer goods. This, combined with the increased purchasing power of the Korean consumers resulting from the continued economic growth of the country, has sparked a spectacular influx of foreign consumer goods into Korea, ranging from BMW's to chopsticks. Import of foreign consumer goods amounted to more than 6 billion dollars in 1989 and is continuing to grow at a rapid rate. The increased import of foreign consumer goods doubtlessly improved the overall welfare of the Korean consumers by providing them with a wider range of options to choose from, by lowering the prices of some of the consumer goods domestically produced, and also by forcing the producers of some Korean goods to face competition with better foreign goods, thus giving them an incentive to raise the quality of their products. However, it is agreed by most economists that this increase in general welfare has been much smaller than what they had expected at the outset. Consumer prices of most imported consumer goods are easily double the import price, and in some cases, more than treble the import prices. Further, there has not been a noticeable drop in the prices of domestically produced consumer goods. Much of the blame has been attributed to the distribution sector of Korea. The objective of this paper is to analyze the imported consumer goods distribution sector of Korea, focusing on the possible sources of the poor performance of that sector, and to make policy suggestions that could potentially increase the welfare. This paper differs from all the previous research by others on this subject in that it analyzes the imported consumer goods distribution sector of Korea as a vertical structure. The distribution sector of an imported consumer good is a vertical structure since it consists of an international market, an import stage, and domestic wholesale and retail markets, in that order vertically. Our study naturally includes the analysis of the vertical restraints as well as the analysis of the industrial organization of each horizontal stage in the vertical structure. Each horizontal component of the imported consumer goods distribution sector is basically a monopolistically competitive market differentiated by characteristics of goods and by the locations and the services of firms. Further, restrictive dealership and resale price maintenance are found to be widely in use. Our main findings are the follwing; First, most consumer goods are imported monopolistically or oligopolistically through restrictive dealership contracts between foreign producers and domestic importers. Such restrictive dealership gives importers market power in the domestic market and explains many of the large discrepancies betwen the consumer prices and the import prices of many goods. Korean anti - trust law does not cover the issues arising from the market power of an importer resulting from a restrictive dealership contract. Second, some major producers of Korean goods are also importers of foreign goods that are substitutes of their products. The import of substitutes by major domestic producers is anti - competitive because it tends to raise the prices of both domestic goods and foreign goods, and also because it reduces the incentive of the domestic producers to raise the quality of their products. Third, wholesalers and retailers widely use resale price maintenance as a price fixing mechanism, and while this is against the anti- trust law, it seldom gets noticed. Fourth, the high level of rents of real estate for commercial use works as an entry barrier to the distribution sector and results in reduced competition by the firms in that sector. Finally, there are information problems. Consumers have inferior information to firms about the quality of a foreign consumer good that they have not tried before. Such information asymmetry often enables firms to raise prices. In addition, information asymmetry between importers frequently delays the import of cheaper substitutes. In order to alleviate the problems indentified above, we suggest the following policy changes. The government should strengthen the anti - trust law and its enforcement to regulate restrictive import contracts, import of competing goods by major domestic producers, and RPM by wholesalers and retailers that is aimed at price fixing. In addition, the government should loosen its tight real estate policy to encourage investment in the distribution sector. Finally, we suggest that the import price revelation policy that has been in use for some items since 1990 be expanded to most imported consumer goods that are introduced for the first time to give consumer better information and be used only for the period of time needed to inform sufficient number of consumers.
Purpose: This study evaluated the manpower planning of dental technicians. Methods: Methods : Survey was conducted regarding subject's general characteristics, characteristics of dental technician's occupational view and working conditions, and reason to enter into branches of the public health enter. The survey sample consisted of 323 dental technicians (221 male/ 102 female). Survey was conducted for one month from August 1 to September 1 in 2010. Following results were obtained. Results: 1. Regarding general characteristics of the subjects, there was a slight male predilection with 68.4%. Subjects in their 40s occupied the highest proportion of 32.2%. Majority of subjects worked in the big cities (71.5%). Favored working places were dental laboratory (57.6%) and dental hospital or dental clinic (19.5%). Although no position is available in the public sector such as public health center or health care civil servant, 9.3% preferred working in the public health center. Public sector is more favored than 2-year technical colleges or dental supply and equipment companies. In respect to education, 57% of the subjects graduated college. 67.8% were married. Subjects who specialize in the porcelain or all-ceramic were 57.9%. With regard to current position, head of the dental laboratory was most common. 2. Following occupation characteristics were found. Economic reason took the highest proportion when deciding their occupation (39.9%) followed by gaining social experience (36.5%). Majority of the subjects (76.5%) wanted to work as dental technicians until their retirement. 71.5% pursuit to become a manager of the dental laboratory. 76.1% agreed on opening a dental technician position in the public health center. Regarding an authority to lead developing the dental technician position in the public sector, majority of the subject chose ministry of health and welfare (35.6%) and Korean dental technologist association (34.7%). Employment (average, 30%) and turnover rate (average, 36.5%) of dental technology college graduates ranged from 40% to 60%. Most important factors for the employment were practical experience (41.2%) and competency (34.4%). With regard to job satisfaction, so-so as 46.7% and satisfactory was 42.7% 3. In respect to the reason for opening a position in the public health center, 'It is needed to continue denture rogram for elderly patients' obtained the highest score (4.14 point). 'Institutional devices are required to open a position for dental technicians as a public healthcare provider' received high score (4.11 point). 4. Concerning the working conditions, 'professional knowledge is required' received the highest score (4.23) followed by 'too short maternity and parental leave' (4.21). 5. Relationship between general characteristics of the subjects and favor of working in the public health center was investigated. Significant differences were found according to the current and favored working area, favored occupation, education level, marital status, and specialty. Working in the public health center was favored by following subjects: working in mid- or small-sized cities (4.16 point, p<0.05); PhD degree-holder (4.59 point, p<0.01). 6. Among general characteristics of the subjects, significant difference of working conditions was found in the following factors: gender; working areas; favored working areas; favored working positions, and education level. Majority of subjects favored working in big cities and currently work in big cities although satisfaction was comparatively low (3.75 score). 7. Future plan to work in public health center was evaluated according to occupational characteristics. Subject's intention to work in the public healthcare center was significantly affected by opening of dental technician position, leading authority, average turnover rate, and factors affecting employment. Working in the public health care center was favored by the following subjects: Dental technicians who actively supported opening of the dental technician position (4.34 point, p<0.001); subjects who thought the Korean dental technologist association is responsible for the opening of positions in the public sector (4.26 point, p<0.001); and subjects who thought that attitude and character are important for the employment (p<0.001). 8. Concerning difference of working conditions according to the occupational characteristics, significant difference was demonstrated by factors such as a reason to choose to be a dental technician, work plan, pursuing position, responsible authority, average employment rate, and job satisfaction. High standard of working conditions was required in subjects who selected to be a dental technician for the leisure time after work (s.05 point, p<0.01), who planted to work until their marriage (4.25 point, p<0.001), and who pursuit to be a manager (3.98, p<0.05). 9. In respect to influence of general characteristics on the advancement to public health centers, the coefficient of determination (R2) was 0.068 and age affected the working condition with significant difference according to the pvalue. 10. Regarding influence of general characteristics on the advancement to public health centers, the coefficient of determination (R2) was 0.335 and work plan, opening of dental technician position in the public sector, and responsible authority had significant influence over the subject's intention to work in the public health center according to the p-value. 11. With regard to the influence of general characteristics on the advancement to public health centers, the coefficient of determination (R2) was 0.091 and reason to choose to be a dental technician, work plan, and responsible authority significantly affected subject's working conditions. Conclusion: Korean society is becoming a super-aged society according to several statistics. As aged population is rapidly increasing, national health insurance plans to cover denture for senior citizen over 75 years old from 2012. Therefore, dental technicians are urgently needed in the public health centers all over the nation. Many subjects in this study planed to work until their retirement and recognized dental technician's expertise. Ministry of health and welfare and Korean dental technologist association should co-operate each other to prepare foundation and institutional devices for dental technicians to advance into the public health center. This will improve oral health of the population. This study showed urgency of medical facilities and services which meets increasing number of aged population and welfare of the population.
The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.
Korean firms of all sizes, from virtually every industry, have used and are using the term "excessive competition" to describe the state of their industry and to call for government interventions. Moreover, the Korean government has frequently responded to such calls in various ways favorable to the firms, such as controlling entry, curbing capacity investments, or allowing collusion. Despite such interventions' impact on the overall efficiency on the Korean economy as well as on the wealth distribution among diverse groups of economic agents, the term "excessive competition", the basis for the interventions, has so far escaped rigorous scrutiny. The objective of this paper is to clarify the notion of "excessive competition" and "over-investment" which usually accompanies "excessive competition", and to examine the circumstances under which they might occur. We first survey the cases where the terms are most widely used and proceed to examine those cases to determine if competition is indeed excessive, and if so, what causes "excessive competition". Our main concern deals with the case in which the firms must make investment decisions that involve large sunk costs while facing uncertain demand. In order to analyze this case, we developed a two period model of capacity precommitment and the ensuing competition. In the first period, oligopolistic firms make capacity investments that are irreversible. Demand is uncertain in period 1 and only the distribution is known. Thus, firms must make investment decisions under uncertainty. In the second period, demand is realized, and the firms compete with quantity under realized demand and capacity constraints. In the above setting, we find that there is "no over-investment," en ante, and there is "no excessive competition," ex post. As measured by the information available in period 1, expected return from investment of a firm is non-negative, overall industry capacity does not exceed the socially optimal level, and competition in the second period yields an outcome that gives each operating firm a non-negative second period profit. Thus, neither "excessive competition" nor "over-investment" is possible. This result will generally hold true if there is no externality and if the industry is not a natural monopoly. We also extend this result by examining a model in which the government is an active participant in the game with a well defined preference. Analysis of this model shows that over-investment arises if the government cannot credibly precommit itself to non-intervention when ex post idle capacity occurs, due to socio-political reasons. Firms invest in capacities that exceed socially optimal levels in this case because they correctly expect that the government will find it optimal for itself to intervene once over-investment and ensuing financial problems for the firms occur. Such planned over-investment and ensuing government intervention are the generic problems under the current system. These problems are expected to be repeated in many industries in years to come, causing a significant loss of welfare in the long run. As a remedy to this problem, we recommend a non-intervention policy by the government which creates and utilizes uncertainty. Based upon an argument which is essentially the same as that of Kreps and Wilson in the context of a chain-store game, we show that maintaining a consistent non-intervention policy will deter a planned over-investment by firms in the long run. We believe that the results obtained in this paper has a direct bearing on the public policies relating to many industries including the petrochemical industry that is currently in the center of heated debates.
A commercial advertisement is not only a way of competition but also a medium of communication. Thus, it is under the constitutional protection of the freedom of business (article 15 of the Constitution) as well as the freedom of press [article 21 (1) of the Constitution]. In terms of the freedom of business or competition, it should be noted that an unfair advertising (false or misleading advertisement) can be regulated as an unfair competition, while any restraint on advertising other than unfair one might be doubted as an unjustifiable restraint of trade. In terms of the freedom of press or communication, it is important that article 21 (2) of the Constitution forbids any kind of (prior) censorship, and the Constitutional Court applies this restriction even to commercial advertising. In this article, the applicability of these schemes to advertising of the so-called learned professions, especially physician, are to be examined, and some proposals for the reformation of the current regulatory regime are to be made. Main arguments of this article can be summarized as follows: First, the current regime which requires advance review of physician advertising as prescribed in article 56 (2) no. 9 of Medical Act should be reformed. It does not mean that the current interpretation of article 21 of the Constitution is agreeable. Though a commercial advertising is a way of communication and can be protected by article 21 (1) of the Constitution, it should not be under the prohibition of censorship prescribed by article 21 (2) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court adopts the opposite view, however. It is doubtful that physician advertising needs some prior restraint, also. Of course, there exists severe informational asymmetry between physicians and patients and medical treatment might harm the life and health of patients irrevocably, so that medical treatment can be discerned from other services. It is civil and criminal liability for medical malpractice and duty to inform and not regulation on physician advertising, to address these differences or problems. Advance review should be abandoned and repelled, or substituted by more unproblematic way of regulation such as an accreditation of reviewed advertising or a self-regulation preformed by physician association independently from the Ministry of Health and Welfare or any other governmental agencies. Second, the substantive criteria for unfair physician advertising also should correspond that of unfair advertising in general. Some might argue that a learned profession, especially medical practice, is totally different from other businesses. It is performed under the professional ethics and should not persue commercial interest; medical practice in Korea is governed by the National Health Insurance system, the stability of which might be endangered when commercial competition in medical practice be allowed. Medical Act as well as the condition of medical practice market do not exclude competition between physicians. The fact is quite the opposite. Physicians are competing even though under the professional ethics and obligations and all the restrictions provided by the National Health Insurance system. In this situation, regulation on physician advertising might constitute unjustifiable restraint of competition, especially a kind of entry barrier for 'new physicians.'