• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.42
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• pp.133-160
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• 2009

In International trade the buyer and seller are normally separated from on another not only by distance but also by differences in language and culture. It is rarely possible for the performance of obligations to be simultaneous and the performance of contracts therefore calls for trust in a situation in which the parties are unlikely to feel able to trust each other unless they have a longstanding and successful relationship. Thus the seller under an international contract of sale will not wish to surrender documents of title to goods to the buyer until he has at least an assurance of payment, and no buyer will wish to pay for goods until he has received them. A gap of distrust thus exists which is often bridged by the undertaking of an intermediary known and trusted by both parties who will undertake on his own liability to pay the seller the contract price in return for the documents of title and then pass the documents to the buyer in return for the reimbursement. This is a common explanation of the theory behind the documentary letter of credit in which the undertaking of a bank of international repute serves as a "guarantee" to each party that the other will perform his obligations. The independence principle, also referred to as the "autonomy principle", is at the core of letter of credit or bank guarantee law. This principle provides that the letter of credit or bank guarantee is independent of the underlying contractual commitment - that is, the transaction that the credit is intented to secure - between the applicant and the beneficiary ; the credit is also independent of the relationship between the bank and its customer, the applicant. The most important exception to the independence principle is the doctrine of fraud in the transaction. A strict interpretation of the rule that the guarantee is independent of the underlying transaction would lead to the conclusion that neither fraud nor manifest abuse of rights by the beneficiary would constitute an objection to payment. There is one major problem related to "Independent guarantees", namely abusive or unfair callings. The beneficiary may make an unfair calling under the guarantee. The countermeasure of beneficiary's unfair calling divided three cases. First, advance countermeasure namely by contract. In other words, when the formation of the contract, the parties must insert the Force Majeure Clause, Arbitration Clause to Contract, and clear statement to the condition for demand calling. Second, post countermeasure namely by court. Many countries, including the United States, authorize the courts to grant an order enjoining the issuer from paying or enjoining the beneficiary from receiving payment under the guaranty letter. Third, Export Insurance. For example, the Export Credit Guarantees Department is prepared, subject to certain conditions, to cover the risk of unfair calling. Of course, KEIC in Korea is cover the risk of the all things for guarantees. On international projects, contractor performance is usually guaranteed by either a standby letters of credit or Independent guarantee. These instruments will be care the parties.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.58
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• pp.215-236
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• 2013

It is quite true that the more Korean contractors receive overseas contracts, the more they need guarantees. The top market for them is the Middle East countries, consisting of more than the half of the total amount awarded last year and the trend is increasing as well. The problem, however, is that employers in these countries are reluctant to use international rules for guarantee such as URDG or ISP98 and easily make unfair callings. However, Korean contractors(applicants), especially small and medium sized enterprises(SMEs) tend to hurriedly enter a contract without looking into its contents as well as guarantees. They do not realize the importance of the guarantees until they receive callings from the employers(beneficiaries). Being independent from the underlying contracts, guarantee is the equivalent to cash in that it usually does not require any proof of demand when calling and the guarantor should make a payment within usually 5 business days after the request. It is often observed these days that several Korean SMEs go bankrupt due to liquidity risks after receiving unfair callings from employers in the Middle East countries. In retrospect, some cases could be obviated if contractors were a little more careful in checking the contents of a guarantee at the time of concluding a contract. For example, there is one case where the underlying contract includes a reduction clause in the Advance Payment bond and the guarantee does not have that clause. In the end, the Korean contractor had to take the whole burden of the bond amount though it had finished 81% of the project. Nobody could argue that contractors should take a full responsibility if they fail in their obligations. However, the employer's wrongful callings need to be prevented in the first place, if possible. As there shouldn't be a case where one party is at a disadvantage against the other like the case mentioned above, useful insight is being sought to minimize unfair calling risks for the benefit of the applicant. First, the applicant should carefully look into every detail of the potential guarantee before signing a contract, heeding especially that there is a reduction clause in the AP bond. Second, the governing principles for guarantee should be the ones that are internally used such as URDG758 that is objective in terms of callings given that, for example, it specifies that the requirement for a supporting statement when making a demand is a default rule. It is also recommended that the form of guarantees be the standard demand guarantee. Third, parties involved in issuing guarantees are advised to understand international rules for guarantee like URDG758 and ISP98 and to play a key role in guiding SME contractors in Korea so that they can protect themselves from possible wrongful callings, particularly from employers in the Middle East countries. I hope this study would give a wake-up call for Korean SMEs wishing to do business in the Middle East countries and remind them of the importance of guarantee itself and its governing principles.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.39
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• pp.59-85
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• 2008

An independent bank guarantee(aka an independent guarantee) is provided as an security on a principal obligor's performance of his obligation, and a guarantor should pay the guaranteed amount only upon a beneficiary's written demand. A standby letter of credit has been used in the United States, since it was construed that a bank should not issue a guarantee. There was wide misunderstanding that a standby letter of credit differs from an independent bank guarantee. However, a standby letter of credit is the same security as an independent bank guarantee, and in international business a standby letter of credit is not differentiated from a independent bank guarantee. An independent bank guarantee are independent from the underlying contract, unconditional, and irrevocable. And a guarantor should pay upon written demand without proving a principal obligor breaches the underlying contract. These features of an independent bank guarantee has been abused in international transactions. Thus it has been proposed that some exceptions to the features of an independent bank guarantee should be allowed. United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letter of Credit(1995) stipulates some exceptions to payment obligation. Export bond insurance, a part of export insurances, operated by the Korea Export Insurance Corporation under the Export Insurance Act, is used as a security for unfair calling by a beneficiary under an independent bank guarantee. Most of the export subsides by the government are prohibited under WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. However, as export insurance is allowed under the WTO, it operates a significant role in enhancing the export. In the event that export bond insurance is provided for a guarantor, an obligor who is subject to recourse by a guarantor, can be exempt from the recourse in case of unfair calling. The Korea Export Insurance Corporation, an insurer, bears unfair calling risk by a beneficiary. Generally it is understood that a demand shall be made before the expiry of an independent bank guarantee. However this is not absolutely true, it shall be decided by URDG, ISP98, the governing law.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.46
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• pp.133-158
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• 2010

Independent guarantee is a creation of the need from the both sides, i.e. the applicant (principal debtor) and the beneficiary (creditor). The former used to have to deposit cash in favor of the beneficiary in case of his default, which laid a burden on his liquidity while the latter still wanted to have the equivalent to cash. Independent guarantee satisfied the both parties by freeing the applicant of a deposit and maintaining the beneficiary's right at the same time. The fact that independent guarantee has three payment mechanisms is not widely known to the public. They are (i) payment on first demand, (ii) payment upon submission of third-party documents, (iii) payment upon submission of an arbitral or court decision. From the applicant's point of view, the order in his favor is (iii), followed by (ii) and (i). As there shouldn't be a case where one party is at a disadvantage against the other, useful insight is being sought for the benefit of the applicant. First, the applicant can offer his intention to provide a payment mechanism (ii) or (iii) rather than (i) if he must deliver it. Second, if the beneficiary still wants to have (i) and the applicant is in a position not to reject it, the latter should thoroughly check any provisions that may work against him later. Third, the applicant could use counterbalancing provisions in underlying contract to cope with protective clauses in the guarantees. Forth, the applicant should review the beneficiary's sincerity to prevent unfair calling risks. The applicant may use an ECA(Export Credit Agency) in his country to which he can transfer not only unfair calling risks, but also political risks. On the other hand, a bank needs to keep the following advice in mind. The foremost important thing for the bank not to forget is that it provides a guarantee as a service provider, not as a responsible party for the feasibility of the project, etc. Credit risk of the applicant should require the greatest attention when issuing a guarantee: the bank should look into the possibility that it can procure immediate reimbursement from its customers after payment to the beneficiary. Second, the applicant's ability to complete the project should be reviewed by checking its track records, techniques and reputation, etc. Third, the bank may also use an ECA to cover the beneficiary's unfair calling risks as well as political risks. In the case of Korea, as Korea Export Insurance Corporation(KEIC) can cover all the risks mentioned above, the bank could use its service called 'Export Bond Insurance.' What's better for the bank is that ECA cover can enhance the bank's asset quality by putting it zero on its risk weighted asset.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.47
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• pp.129-156
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• 2010

Since the 1970s, international construction employers have commonly requested first demand guarantees upon their contractors as a form of security for due performance of their works. Contractors prefer the greater protection offered by more traditional forms of security requiring presentation of an arbitral award or other evidence of the caller's entitlement to compensation. Many contractors nonetheless feel that they have no alternative but to provide these unconditional guarantees in order to compete. However, these unconditional first demand guarantees are controversial and have given rise to numerous disputes both in arbitration and litigation. Disputes arising from first demand guarantees can be broken down into a) applications to prevent a perceived fraudulent or otherwise unfair or improper calling of a guarantee, b) claims arising from such abusive calls and c) claims relating to the consequences of such calls even if the call itself may not be abusive as such. The contractors should carefully assess the risk of an abusive call being made bearing in mind the difficulties he may face in seeking to prevent such a call. He should also bear in mind the difficulties, delays and cost he is likely to encounter in seeking to recover any monies wrongfully called. One option would be to provide that the call can only be made once and to the extent that the employer's damages have been assessed or even incurred or even for the default to have been established by an arbitral tribunal or court. Another option would be to provide that any call be accompanied by a decision of a competent and impartial third party stating that the contractor is in breach. For example, such a requirement could be incorporated into a construction contract based on the FIDIC Conditions by submitting this decision to a Dispute Adjudication Board. Another option would be to provide for the "ICC Counter-Guarantee Scheme". In sum, there would appear to be room for compromise between the employer and the contractor in respect of first demand guarantees by conditioning the entitlement to call such guarantees to the determination of a competent and impartial third party.