• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.40 no.2
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• pp.71-103
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• 2009

This study is designed to propose the ways of the multilateral cooperation system for effective management of fisheries resources in the various overlapping zones established by bilateral fisheries agreements between Korea, China and Japan in North East Asia as semi-enclosed sea. It is necessary to build multilateral fisheries cooperation between Korea, China and Japan in North East Asia because conservation & management of transboundary fish stocks could not be guaranted effectively by the management of fisheries resources in the area where piled up the current-fishing-pattern zone, as white zone and the various grey zone as middle zone, and the interim measures zone of bilateral fisheries agreements between Korea, China and Japan are piled up. Fisheries management in Korea, China and Japan by the bilateral fisheries agreements in North East Asia is faced with difficulties manage fisheries resources. International relationship on fisheries is maintained by bilateral fisheries agreements based on UNCLOS. However fisheries resources are over-exploited and the recovery of the fisheries resources is very slow because proper conservation and management of transboundary fish stocks which article 63(1) of UNCLOS defines have not prepared yet. Thus close cooperation among the coastal States for a proper conservation and management of transboundary fish stocks is necessary. Since the transboundary fish migrate within the EEZs of two or more coastal States, there is a need to manage the fish stocks in the region between Korea, China and Japan through a multi-lateral mechanism at ccircumference area of the current-fishing-pattern zone as white zone. Coastal States must guarantee sustainable maintenance of transboundary fish stocks through the regional cooperation for a proper conservation & management because one coastal State alone could not guarantee conservation and management of fish stocks. Thus there is a need to build multilateral fisheries cooperation between Korea, China and Japan in North East Asia. There are many successful instances including the Barents' sea for a proper conservation & management of transboundary fish stocks. The Barents' sea is one of the best research object to study the regional cooperation for a conservation & management of transboundary fish stocks in North East Asia. In conclusion, it is necessary to build a multilateral fisheries cooperation system between Korea, China and Japan in North East Asia to conserve and manage transboundary fish stocks effectively. It seems desirable that the range of the area to conserve and manage fish stocks should may be any partial area in the current-fishing-pattern zone and interim measures zone between Korea and China, Jeju middle zone between Korea and Japan, interim measures zone of bilateral fisheries agreements between China and Japan.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.31-39
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• 2011

This paper attempts to extend such analysis to the rather more difficult problem of optimal management of transnational fish stocks jointly owned by two countries. Transboundary fish such as Mackerel creates an incentive to harvest fish before a competitor does and leads to over-exploitation. This tendency is especially poignant for transnational stocks since, in the absence of an enforceable, international agreement, there is little or no reason for either government or the fishing industry to promote resource conservation and economic efficiency. In the current paper I examine a game theoretic setting in which cooperative management can provide more benefits than noncooperative management. A dynamic model of Mackerel fishery is combined with Nash's theory of two countries cooperative games. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation and noncooperation. A bioeconomic model was used to compare the economic yield of the optimal strategies for two countries, under joint maximization of net benefits in joint ocean. The results suggest as follows. First, the threat points represent the net benefits for two countries in absence of cooperation. The net benefits to Korea and China in threat points are 2,000 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,130 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$). Total benefits are 3,130 billion won. Second, if two countries cooperate one with another, they reach the solution payoffs such as Pareto efficient. The net benefits to Korea and China in Pareto efficient are 2,785 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,605 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$) or total benefits of 4,390 billion won : a gain of 1,260 billion won. Third, the different price effects under the two scenarios show that total benefit rise as price increases.