• 한국경제지리학회지
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• 제14권4호
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• pp.453-466
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• 2011

이 논문의 목적은 1961년부터 2010년까지 한국의 경제발전 궤적을 고찰하는데 있다. 이 기간 동안 한국 경제의 고성장은 시기별로 다른 한국의 발전모델에 기인한다. 한국의 발전모델을 시기적으로 살펴보면, 1980년대 후반까지의 발전양식은'대량생산-대량수출'과'고생산성-저임금'의 결합을 통하여 구현된 수출지향형 산업화 모델에 초점을 두고 있다. 이후 1990년대 후반까지의 발전모델은'대량생산-대량수출'전략을 지속해 오면서'고생산성-고임금'의 결합에 기초하고 있으며, 2000년 이후의 발전모델은 한국의 금융위기를 극복하기 위하여'공공부문과 민각부문의 재편'및'시장화 전략과 사회 안전망의 점진적 확충'에 초점을 두고 있다. 이와 같은 발전모델은 첫째, 세계적 차원의 조절양식인 무역제도, 환율, 세계와 한국 간 산업관계, 개발도상국에 대한 차관 제도와 관계가 있으며, 둘째, 국가적 차원에서의 조절양식인 국가, 자본, 노동 간에 이루어지는 3각 관계의 변화와 관계가 있다. 그러므로 세계적-국내적 차원에서 조절양식은 한국의 수출지향형 자본축적 과정을 안정화시키는 데 있어서 중요한 게임의 규칙이 된다.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.2-12
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• 2017

Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites' behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader's expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders' rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power.