• 제목/요약/키워드: the third hedging middle states

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An Inquiry into Dynamics of Global Power Politics in the changing world order after the war in Ukraine

  • Jae-kwan Kim
    • 분석과 대안
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    • 제7권3호
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    • pp.1-26
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    • 2023
  • This article will analyze and forecast important variables and dynamics in global power politics after the war in Ukraine. It tries to use several perspectives to analyze international relations, particularly liberal internationalism and structural realism. In short, core variables are as follows; First, how is the US-led liberal international order and globalization being adjusted? Second, how will the U.S.-China strategic competition, which is the biggest and structural variable, cause changes in the international order in the future? The third variable, how stable are Sino-Russia relations in the context of a structuring U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle? Fourth, to what extent will third middle hedging states outside the U.S. and China be able to exercise strategic autonomy in the face of multipolarization? To summarize, the first of these four variables is the largest basic variable at the global political and economic level in terms of its impact on the international community, and it has been led by the United States. The second variable, in terms of actors, seems to be the most influential structural variable in global competition, and the US-China strategic competition is likely to be a long game. Thus the world will not be able to escape the influence of the competition between the two global powers. For South Korea, this second variable is probably the biggest external variable and dilemma. The third variable, the stability of Sino-Russia relations, determines balance of global power in the 21st century. The U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle, as seen in the current war in Ukraine, will operate as the greatest power variable in not only global power competition but also changes in the international order. Just as the U.S. is eager for a Sino-Russia fragmentation strategy, such as a Tito-style wedge policy to manage balance of power in the early years of the Cold War, it needs a reverse Kissinger strategy to reset the U.S.-Russia relationship, in order to push for a Sino-Russia splitting in the 21st century. But with the war in Ukraine, it seems that this fragmentation strategy has already been broken. In the context of Northeast Asia, whether or not the stability of Sino-Russia relations depends not only on the United States, but also on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the fourth variable is a dependent variable that emerged as a result of the interaction of the above three variables, but simultaneously it remains to be seen that this variable is likely to act as the most dynamic and independent variable that can promote multilateralism, multipolarization, and pan-regionalism of the global international community in the future. Taking into account these four variables together, we can make an outlook on the change in the international order.