• Title/Summary/Keyword: the military junta

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Aftereffects of The Military Coup of 1961 in Korea - The Transformation of the Asia Foundation's Projects in the early 1960s - (5.16 군사정변과 아시아재단 사업방향의 전환 - 1961년 박정희의 샌프란시스코 방문을 중심으로 -)

  • 안진수
    • 한국학연구
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    • no.54
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    • pp.167-193
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    • 2019
  • This paper examines the programs and practices of the Asia Foundation during the politically tumultuous period of the early 1960s. Since its opening of branch office in Korea, the Asia Foundation expanded the scope of its activities that catered to the "local" needs of the country. Yet, the military coup in 1961 led by Park Chung Hee created a serious challenge to the organization, forcing it to look for a breakthrough. An opportunity presented itself in late 1961 when Park planned a visit to the US to hold a summit meeting with the US president Kennedy. The Asia Foundation seized an opportunity, by hosting a banquet reception for Park who made a stopover in San Francisco. The entire process of preparation enabled the foundation to develop close rapport with the key players in the military junta. Furthermore, it gained an invaluable insight into the junta's policy agendas, member dynamics as well as what the despot Park disfavors. The successful hosting turned the foundation into the most formidable philanthropic organizations in Korea. Concurrently, its program designs increasingly catered toward creating and serving the new administrative policies and programs of the military junta government. This "top-down" style of localization marks a new modus operadi, indicating a deeper collaboration between the foundation and South Korean government in the 1960s. Two programs stand out. They are : the diplomat training and law education. Both ended up strengthening the governing power of the Park administration.

Thailand in 2017: The Resurgence of "Sarit Model" and Thai-Style Democracy (2017년 타이: '싸릿모델'의 부활과 타이식 민주주의)

  • PARK, Eun-Hong
    • The Southeast Asian review
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    • v.28 no.2
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    • pp.213-247
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    • 2018
  • Thailand in 2017 the public sentiment has turned against the military government. The four pledges the military declared immediately after the 2014 coup, restoration of democracy, addressing of divisive politics, eradication of corruption, and stimulation of the economy have all failed. In the same year, however, Thai military junta began to recover it's diplomatic relationship with western countries including US and EU owing to promulgation of the new constitution endorsed by King Maha Vajiralongkorn and the lavish funeral of late King Bhumibol Adulyadej which was attended by huge number of condolence delegations from around the world including US Defense Secretary James Mattis. Since the 2014 coup, US has sanctioned the country under military junta led by General Prayuth Chan-o-cha for urging them back to the barracks. EU also joined this sanction measures. US signaled change in it's policy when General Prayuth got the chance to visit US and meet President Donal Trump in 2017. General Prayuth Chan-o-cha's military junta could start to restore it's reputation internationally. Domestically, he used absolute powers based on section 44 of the interim constitution, also guranteed in the new constitution. Oversea and national human rights groups have criticized that the interim constitution for permitting the NCPO, Thai military junta's official name, to carry out policies and actions without any effective oversight or accountability for human rights violations. On 1 December 2017, Thailand marked the one-year anniversary of King Maha Vajiralongkorn's accession to the throne as the country's new monarch, Rama X. In the first year of King Rama X's reign, arrests, prosecutions, and imprisonment under Article 112 of Thailand's Criminal Code (lese-majeste) have continued unabated in Thailand. NCPO has continued to abuse Article 112 to detain alleged violators and curb any form of discussion regarding the monarchy, particularly on social media. In this worsening human rights environment General Prayuth Chan-o-cha enforced continuously campaign like Thai-style democracy- an effort to promote largely autocratic 'Thainess' in such a way that freedom of expression is threatened. It is a resurgence of 'Sarit Model'. In the beginning of 2017 Thai military government raised the slogan of 'opportunity Thailand' in the context of 'Thailand 4.0' project which attempts to transform Thai economy based on industry-driven to innovation-driven for recovering robust growth. To consider freedom and liberty as a source of innovation, 'Thailand 4.0' led by 'Sarit Model' without democracy would be skeptical.

The Red-Shirted Groups' Ideology, Organization, and Action in the Post-Thaksin Era (포스트- 탁신 시대의 '붉은셔츠': 이념·조직·행동)

  • PARK, Eunhong
    • The Southeast Asian review
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    • v.23 no.1
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    • pp.89-126
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    • 2013
  • The Red shirts came to attract attention of the international community during April to May in 2010 by successfully organizing explosive popular demonstrations. The momentum was the military coup on September 9, 2006. The Red color was chosen amid movements against the new constitution instituted under the military junta. In discourse struggles, the Red shirts compared their resistance against the Democratic Party government lead by Abhisit Vejjajiva to that of phrai (commoner or serfs) against ammart (aristocrats or bureaucrats) under the pre-modern reign of sakdina. The Red shirts strongly accused Prem Tinsulanonda, the chief of the Privy Council, of being a mastermind of 2006 military coup, who symbolically represents the cohesion between the palace and the military. It has constituted an unprecedented defiance towards national taboo where the trinity of Nation, Religion, and King has been consecrated. The objective of this article is to review the Red Shirts' ideology, organizations and activities in terms of the modernized phrai's struggles for expanding counter-hegemony. While Antonio Gramsci focused on why socialist revolution had failed to materialize in capitalist Western Europe, I pay attention to why political liberalism has failed to wash away pre-modernity and take root in capitalist Thailand, applying the Gramscian concept of hegemony by contrasting 'hybrid ammart' with 'modernized phrai'.

An Experience of a Country in Transition and the Change of North Korea : An Adaptation of the 'Myanmar Model' (체제변동국가의 경험과 북한의 변화: '미얀마 모델'의 적용 가능성)

  • JANG, Jun Young
    • Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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    • v.22 no.2
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    • pp.305-330
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    • 2018
  • The purpose of this article is to examine whether Myanmar's experience in which dealing with the most exemplary change among rogue states or pariah state in the 21st century is feasible for North Korea's case. Recently, North Korea's willingness to dialogue, reform and open is similar to the precedent in which the Myanmar military junta dismantled its ruling system and turned over transition period through general elections in 2010 and 2015 each. The so-called 'Myanmar Model' refers to a country branded as a rogue state which has been under the international sanctions and pressure, and opening its political system and the market by choosing transformation. However, rapid changes in speed across the entire society after opening up are impossible because the political elite is only the leading role and implementation in the transition. In case of Myanmar, military culture has penetrated into society due to such a long-lasting military dictatorship, and even democratic bloc has become accustomed to authoritarian decision-making process. Furthermore, the "reserved area" of the old regime still exists in a deformed political structure that can not retrieve the interests of the military. Therefore there could not be achieved political development in term of qualification. North Korea also appears unlikely to achieve political and economic assessment in a short period of time, as civil society has not appeared due to its long dictatorship and very low economic development levels. Like Myanmar, North Korea is also likely to control the pace and direction of upcoming reforms and open, as the dictator or most powerful person chose to reform and open up. Therefore, if North Korea moves toward the 'Myanmar Model', there will be high expectations of new changes in the short term, but it could be delayed or stalled in the mid and long term.