• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• 대한원격탐사학회지
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• 제39권6_2호
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• pp.1565-1576
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• 2023

천리안 해양위성 2호(Geostationary Ocean Color Imager-II, GOCI-II)에서 관측된 대기상층 복사휘도에서 해양환경 분석이 가한 원격반사도(remote-sensing reflectance, R_rs) 자료를 얻기 위해서 복사 전달 모델 기반의 대기 보정을 수행한다. 이 R_rs는 다시 엽록소, 총부유사, 용존유기물 농도 등의 다양한 해양환경변수 산출에 이용되고 있기 때문에 대기보정은 모든 해색 산출물의 정확도에 영향을 주는 중요한 알고리즘이다. 맑은 해역에서는 대기의 복사휘도가 청색 파장대의 해수 복사휘도보다 10배 이상 높다. 따라서 대기보정 과정에서 1%의 대기 복사휘도 추정 오차가 10% 이상의 R_rs 오차를 유발할 수 있으며, 이처럼 대기보정은 매우 높은 오차 민감도를 가진 알고리즘이다. 그 결과 대기보정 산출물인 R_rs의 품질 평가는 신뢰성 있는 해양 위성 기반 자료 분석을 위해 반드시 선행되어야 한다. 본 연구에서는 Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS) Bio-optical Archive and Storage System (SeaBASS)을 통해 데이터베이스화 된 현장 측정 R_rs 기반 통계적 신뢰성을 평가하는 Quality Assurance (QA) 알고리즘을 GOCI-II의 분광 특성에 맞게 수정 및 적용하였다. 이 방법은 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)의 해색위성 자료처리 시스템에 공식적으로 적용되어 서비스 중이며, R_rs의 품질 분석 점수(0~1점)를 제공할 뿐 아니라 해수의 유형(23 유형)도 구분해 준다. 실제로 검보정 초기 단계의 GOCI-II 자료에 QA를 적용한 결과, R_rs는 비교적 낮은 값인 0.625에서 가장 높은 빈도를 보여주었지만 추가적인 검보정을 통해 개선된 GOCI-II 대기보정 결과에 QA 알고리즘을 적용했을 시 기존보다 높은 0.875에서 가장 높은 빈도를 보여주었다. QA 알고리즘을 통한 해수 유형 분석 결과, 동해 및 남해 일부 그리고 북서태평양 해역은 주로 탁도가 낮은 case-I 해역이었으며 서해 연안 및 동중국해는 주로 탁도가 높은 case-II 해역으로 구분되었다. 이처럼 QA 알고리즘의 적용을 통해 대기보정 과정에서 오차가 크게 발생한 R_rs 자료를 객관적으로 판별하여 배제할 수 있으며 이는 배포자료 및 검보정의 신뢰도 향상으로 이어질 수 있다. 본 방법은 추후 GOCI-II의 대기보정 flag에 적용되어 사용자들이 양질의 R_rs 자료만을 적용할 수 있도록 도움을 줄 것이다.

• 한국대기환경학회지
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• 제31권4호
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• pp.330-344
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• 2015

Semi-continuous measurements of $PM_{2.5}$ mass, organic and elemental carbon were made for the period of January to October 2014, at six national air monitoring stations in Korea. OC and EC concentrations showed a clear seasonal variation with the highest in winter (January) and the lowest in summer (August). In winter, the high carbonaceous concentrations were likely influenced by increased fuel combustion from residential heating. OC and EC concentrations varied by monitoring stations with 5.9 and $1.7{\mu}g/m^3$ in Joongbu area, 4.2 and $1.2{\mu}g/m^3$ in Honam area, 4.0 and $1.3{\mu}g/m^3$ in Yeongnam area, 3.7 and $1.6{\mu}g/m^3$ in Seoul Metropolitan area, 3.0 and $0.8{\mu}g/m^3$ in Jeju Island, 2.9 and $0.7{\mu}g/m^3$ in Baengnyeong Island respectively. The concentrations of OC and EC comprised 9.6~ 15.5% and 2.4~ 4.7% of $PM_{2.5}$. Urban Joongbu area located adjacent to the intersection of several main roads showed the highest carbon concentration among six national air monitoring station. On the other hand, background Baengnyeong Island showed the lowest carbon concentration and the highest OC/EC ratio (4.5). During the haze episode, OC and EC were enhanced with increase in $PM_{2.5}$ about 1.3~ 3 and 1.3~ 4.0 times respectively. The concentrations of OC, EC in the Asian dust case are about 1~ 2.4 times greater than in the nondust case. The origins of air mass pathways arriving at Seoul, using the backward trajectory analysis, can be mostly classified into 6 groups (Sector I Northern Korea including the sea of Okhotsk, Sector II Northern China including Mongolia, Sector III Southern China, Sector IV South Pacific area, Sector V Japan, Sector VI Southern Korea area). When an air mass originating from northern China and Mongolia, the OC concentrations were the most elevated, with a higher OC/EC ratio (2.4~ 3.3), and accounting for 17% of $PM_{2.5}$ mass on average.