• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.291-322
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• 2018

This research aims to cast light upon security characteristics of the Peace Line, which have been underestimated. To understand maritime order and maritime security policy of the Republic of Korea between 1950 and 1970, it is necessary to analyze the Peace Line as line of defence and to investigate its character This research begins with analyzation of historical facts and investigation on security characteristics of the Peace Line. It goes further to examination of legal justification of the Peace Line, which was one of international legal issues of the period, principally regarding its security characteristics. As results of the study, it could be said that the security characteristics of the Peace Line was the line of defensive waters, which set its goal mainly to prevent infiltration of communist spies. The Peace Line had practical effect as it functioned as a base line of the ROK Navy to take anti-spy operation. At the early phase of the Korea-Japan Negotiation, the Korea delegation interpreted significance of the Peace Line passively. After abrogation of Clark Line, the delegation, however, became positive to maintain the Peace Line and its security characteristics. Security characteristics of the Peace Line was recognized again, as it became the base line of special maritime zone which was made in 1972. Through analysis on international law, it is concluded that the Peace Line was fair as a part of the right of self-defense against indirect aggression. North Korea attempted indirect aggression mainly from sea way, and these might undermine peace and cause urgent and unjust damage on the ROK. Thus the ROK's action of anti-spy operation through the Peace Line can be justifiable as considering the right of self-defence. Also the Peace Line accorded with principles of necessity, immediacy and proportionality. As it was argued on the above, the Peace Line as line of defence was one of the most significant factor in the ROK's maritime security history from the Hot war against communist forces to Cold war period after Korean War and must not be underestimated.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• 제24권3호
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• pp.55-83
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• 2018

This paper is written to identify the opportunities and risks of the declaration of the end of the Korean War with North Korea. The declaration has been seriously discussed in the course of negotiation for the denuclearization of North Korea especially in 2018. For this purpose, this paper revisits the concepts of related terms such as peace, peace regime, peace agreement and declaration of the end of war. It assesses the background and intention of North Korean request for the declaration. Then, it analyzes opportunities and risks regarding South Korea, if it agrees on the declaration. As a result, this paper found that declaration of the end of the Korean War could provide South Korea with opportunities such as a progress on the North Korean denuclearization, contribution to the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and improvement on South Korea and North Korea relations. At the same time, the declaration could bring risks such as the dismantlement of the United Nations Command, demands of the withdrawal of US forces in Korea, a possible stop of North Korean denuclearization process and the weakening of South Korean peoples' awareness on North Korean threats. South Korea need to heed more on the risks than the opportunities, because the national security should be handled with caution.

• Public Diplomacy: Theory and Practice
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• 제2권2호
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• pp.27-52
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• 2022

Objectives: The neighboring countries of South Korea and Japan in Northeast Asia have interacted in both positive and negative ways, at times as close partners and other times adversaries, throughout their long and thorny history of extensive dynamics. The controversial dispute over Dokdo is one of the most critical issues evoking harsh tensions and arguments asserting wholly opposite claims. Dokdo is a small island between two coastal states, but significant in terms of territorial, botanical, and marine resources, and thus ownership of the island has become a point of conflict accompanied by a troubled history. But why has Dokdo been a source of conflicts and how should the controversial Dokdo issue be addressed in a way that fosters positive influence and co-prosperity? Methods: This study provides comprehensive and critical insights from a wealth of previous research and strategic suggestions for the Korean government. It utilizes the three perspectives of historical documents and political context, international regulations and legal frames, and public diplomacy. Furthermore, it applies these resources to negotiation theories and strategies to propose reasonable solutions. Results: This study suggests that it is important for Korea and Japan to try to build mutual trust through more active communication and interaction in order to understand each other before attempting to create a formal resolution via negotiation. In addition to these efforts, Korea needs to be ready for the inevitable need to take decisive action in terms of negotiation, using analytic and efficient strategies. The study proposes three solutions: 1) Strong Action Strategy, 2) International Legal Strategy, and 3) Public Diplomacy Strategy. Conclusions: From the perspective of public diplomacy, the Dokdo issue needs to be converted from a symbol of conflicts between Korea and Japan into a symbol of peace and co-prosperity. In addition to promoting a positive relationship between the two states, it can also contribute to the security environment of the Northeast Asian region and global peace.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• 통권8호
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• pp.1-48
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• 2010

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the Untied Nations' efforts for peace on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. The Untied Nation tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the end of 1950. Once the CCF's entry into the war had been confirmed, the war situation moved to a new phase, and the UN forces, which had guided the war in an effort to destroy the NKP A forces, and to punish North Korea, had to set up new guidelines to cope with the new situation. Accordingly, in late November, 1950, the UN forces camp, mainly the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United Nations Command, discussed various options, such as an expansion of the war up to the Chinese territory, a cease fire along the 38th Parallel, or a forced and inevitable evacuation. The Korean delegation to the UN insisted that "the unification of Korea should be achieved only by victory in the war. The Chinese intervention in the war is a Challenge to the UN in the same way as the North Korean invasion. The UN participation in the war was to repulse the invasion. With the same spirit we should drive back the Chinese Communists." The Korean delegation also emphasized to the friendly nations the political objective and will of unification, and that a cease fire at a threshold of unification might return us to the status quo ante bellum, and would be contrary to the Korean nation's desire. At that time, particularly, the US strongly considered the employment of nuclear weapons as one of the new strategies to cope with the Chinese invasion. The international effects of these casual remarks were realized almost at once. The British Prime Minister who had not wanted the expansion of war in the Far East, especially from the view point of the interest of NATO's security, visited Washington. so the conference had a very important meaning for the UN forces' new strategy. On the other hand, at the UN, on the 5th of December, the very day Truman and Attlee agreed to seek a cease-fire under UN auspices, a group of thirteen Asian and Arab states proposed to ask China and North Korea not to cross the 38th Parallel, and sounded out both sides about a cease fire along the 38th Parallel. The United States and the United Kingdom gave their assent, but China and North Korea gave no direct response. The CCF, who were securing the initiative of operation, were not agreeable with the proposal of the UN forces. The Untied Nation has tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the December of 1950 and January of 1951. The Untied Nations' has achieved great results to negotiate for the peace plan on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. It's the results considering both the operation situation and political opinions.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.114-139
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• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• 제13권2호
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• pp.133-141
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• 2013

After Presidential Declaration of Korea's Rights in the Surrounding Seas(Lee, Seung-Man Line), Japanese government objected to the Korean government's Declaration of the Peace Line. Japan didn't agree with Korean's ownership of Dokdo and has tried to develop the Dokdo issue into an international dispute and solved it by resorting the International Court of Justice(ICJ) since 1954. As mentioned before, ICJ doesn'thave the right of compulsory jurisdiction of ownership of Dokdo between Korea and Japan. Therefore, we don'thave to agree with Japan's suggestion of bringing a case to ICJ to solve the Dokdo issue. It is not the best way to maintain the international peace judging by ICJ as well. When Japan try to institute case unilaterally, We should remember that it is possible to give the expanding jurisdiction to the ICJ. It is the best way that solving the dispute of Dokdo is to establish the sovereignty over Dokdo while strengthen the control the Dokdo effectively. In conclusion, no matter how Japan claims ownership of Dokdo, it cannot be subject to negotiation.

• 한국학연구
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• 제50호
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• pp.157-186
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• 2018

The study examines the process of resuming diplomatic relations and establishing a diplomatic system in the early 17th century. It focused on the discontinuity and continuity of the policy toward Japan in the end of King Seonjo's period and in the early days of Gwanghaegun. This is a studies on serial process of the restoration of peace after the Japanese Invasion of Korea. The process began with the Peace Negotiation, and led to the Resuming Diplastic Relations by dispatching Joseon Emissions to Japan in 1607. The Gwang'hae-gun regime agreed with Japan to sign on the Gi'yu-year agreement in 1609 and by doing so formed a platform for future Joseon-Japan diplomatic talks arranged through the Dae'ma-do/對馬島 island. Then, the Joseon government reinforced the principle of 'banning' Japanese envoys from approaching the Joseon capital, limiting the activities of the Japanese emissaries in Joseon territory to the Wae'gwan facility of the Dong'rae area. These actions of the Joseon government outlined the format for future diplomatic contacts with the Japanese in the dynasty's latter half period. At the time, when the Joseon people was facing Japanese presence in the south part of the Korean peninsula and the 'Jurchen' barbarians' in the north, Gwang'hae-gun considered 'maintaining relationships' with Japan and 'protecting the country' from the Jurchen threat as two top-level priorities for the Joseon defense. In order to do that, he had to establish Japan, which invaded Joseon for seven years in the 1590s, as a diplomatic partner to exchange talks with. He had to mitigate the anti-Japanese sentiment of the country's population, and intermediate clashing opinions in the policy discussion process. In the meantime, in order to deal with problems surfacing everywhere, Gwang'hae-gun maintained a stance of prioritizing the pursuit of public interest and amicable relationships, and not an ideological and principle-based one. It was quite a departure from the government's policy of the late 17th century.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• 제33권2호
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• pp.443-469
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• 2018

In the sixty year since the first launch of Sputnik 1, it has become impossible to consider economic, political, or scientific human life in the communication field without reference to outer space. But, there is a growing groundswell of public opinion aimed at preventing arms race in space. Therefore it is necessary to establish some institution or mechanism such a code of conduct, international law. But every nation has a different posture on the grounds of national interest, or different levels of space development, the conditions required for the successful negotiation of a comprehensive treaty are not yet ripe. It is hoped that by beginning with soft measures (TCBM, Code of Conduct) for which it is easier to secure voluntary participation it may be possible to build up to a comprehensive treaty. The participation of the Space powers (US, Russia, China) in a dialogue of mutual exchange and shared information would contribute to international peace and give a long term benefit to humankind. It is also necessary to promote partnership through regional and bilateral cooperation. We should guide and shape opinion so that more nations ratify and sign existing international legal covenants in order to contribute to the efficency of Space law. International law needs to enforce PAROS and Space Security.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• 제2권1호
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• pp.69-92
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• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.