• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.66
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• pp.119-148
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• 2015

Generally, the liability for breach is defined as the civil liability that arises from the conduct of violation of a contract. There are two notable principles governing liability for breach that have fundamental impacts on the unified Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter Chinese Contract Law) in the remedies. In China, during the drafting of the Contract Law, there was a great debate as to whether damages for breach of contract ought to follow the fault principle or to follow the strict liability principle. Ultimately the Chinese Contract Law follows the model of the CISG on this point, namely, it follows the strict liability principle (article 107) with an exemption cause of force majeure. Under Chinese Contract Law, it is interpreted as strict liability in principle. Strict Liability is a notion introduced into Chinese Contract Law from the Anglo-Saxon Law. The strict liability or no fault doctrine, on the contrary, allows a party to claim damages if the other party fails to fulfill his contractual obligations regardless of the fault of the failing party. Pursuant to the strict liability doctrine, if the performance of a contract is due, any non-performance will constitute a breach and the fault on the party in breach is irrelevant. This paper reviews problems of legal character or legal ground of contractual liability in Chinese contract law. Specifically, focusing on the interpretation of Chinese contract law sections and analysis of three cases related contractual liability in freight agency, the paper proposes some implications of structural features of Chinese contract law and international commercial transactions.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.3-32
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• 2020

Under the Korean case law, physicians are obliged to disclose or inform the risk associated with a specific treatment to their patients before they perform the treatment. If they fail to do this, they are liable to compensate pain and sufferings. If the patient can establish that he or she would not have consented at all to the treatment had he or she been informed, the physicians are liable to compensate all the loss incurred by the treatment. In this article, the author examines the legitimacy of this case law from the perspective of legal doctrine as well as its practical affect on the medical practice and the furtherance of self-determination of the patient. The fundamental findings are as follows: The case law that has physicians who failed to inform treatment risk compensate pain and sufferings for the infringement of the right of self-determination seems to be a disguised and reduced compensation of all the loss based on the possible malpractice, which cannot be justified in view of the general principles of tort liability. It is necessary to adhere to the requirements of causation and imputation between the failure to inform treatment risk and the specific patient's consent to the treatment. If this causation and imputation is established, all the loss should be compensated. Otherwise, there shall be no liability. The so-called hypothetical consent defence shall be regarded as a part of causation between the failure to inform and the consent. The suggested approach can preserve the essence of physician-patient relationship and fit for the very logic of informed consent better.