• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.371-387
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• 2010

On the one hand Aristotle seems to insist that practical acts are intrinsically good. On the other hand his doctrine of certain connected concepts is such that as a consequence practical acts must be considered good due to their being means to eudaimonia. This Aristotelian dilemma challenged by commenters. Cooper bases his attack on a consideration of Aristotle's account of deliberations. Deliberation is not just concerned with means in a strictly causal sense, but with things that contribute to the end. And these may also be constituent parts of complex ends or particular things that a given end may be seen to consist in. The difference between energeia and kinesis implies the distinction between praxis and poiesis. In kinesis such as 'building a house' and 'trying to save a child from drowning' we cannot sever, logically, 'the act' from the intended act-result, since no act will be left once that logical operation has been performed. The definition of poiesis relies on the possibility of such severance. But the fact that an act is kinesis has no implications whatever for the question whether it is a praxis or poiesis.