• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
• /
• v.1 no.1
• /
• pp.179-199
• /
• 2006

The objective of the study which it analyzes the result which goes made to the equity investor venture company IPOs stock of Korean venture capitalists. The sample company is the venture business 101 which IPO time venture capitalists invest in period KOSDAQ market from 1997 July 1st to 2006 June 30th for 9 years. The result of the study was as follows. First, it is found that syndication investing venture capitalists than the sale investing venture capitalists has desirable investment act which relax non-symmetry information between the publicly held company and the investor. The study support to Bygrave(1987), Lerner(1994) and so on. Second, The venture capitalists under postscript investing the venture business compared to under investing shows IPO excess benefit rate initially more highly from the venture business and the investor whom already invests early stage prove to use the manned it exaggerates the value of the venture business which venture capitalists oneself invests from postscript phase through the high position characteristic At last, it is discovered that the investment equity ratio of venture capitalists effect of sound (-) postscript investor IPO result which analyzed. It is showed that venture capitalists will remain more lowly excess benefit rate as the equity ratio which the venture capitalists invests at the venture business will be high.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
• /
• v.17 no.1
• /
• pp.1-12
• /
• 2022

This paper examines the influence of the portion of lead investors and investors' status on the investment performance of venture syndication. According to existing literature, multiple investors in VC syndicates can positively impact investment performance by investing both tangible and intangible resources in target companies based on market influence or high visibility. On the other hand, the presence of multiple leaders can cause conflicts in formulating and implementing investment strategy or free-riding problems or increase entry barriers for potential investors, lowering additional investment from existing investors. Therefore, we hypothesize that the relationship between proportion of lead investors and investment performance is inverted-U shape. Moreover, we predict that the status of VCs in the syndication will moderate the relationship between proportion of lead investors and investment performance since high-status actors are less likely to cooperate with or yield power to others. We tested these hypotheses using 24,677 VC syndicated investment data from 1991 to 2005 and found solid supports for the hypotheses. The findings suggest that firms need to consider relationship-based power dynamics among investors within a syndication and design effective role setting and coordination systems.