• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.30 no.10B
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• pp.669-675
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• 2005

In the mobile telecommunication industry, the effects of handset subsidies are revealed as two aspects. There are the activation of service and handset market and the acceleration of related technology development in the desirable aspect. On the other hand, the rise in service rates and the squandering of the related resources in the undesirable one. There have been a lot of researches that disclose the desirable or undesirable factors through the qualitative methods. However, the quantitative studies are rare. In this study, we consider the positive, from the increase of demand, and negative, from the increase of service rates, effects on consumers' benefit attendant handset subsidies. Then, we quantitatively compared between the positive and negative effects and analyze the direct effects of consumers' benefit of handset subsidies, and figured out that the direct effect is not expected to be positive.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.53-67
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• 2020

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study strategic trade policies under international process research and development (R&D) competition with or without market leaders for free trade and a subsidy regime and compare the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies on the equilibrium levels of firm profit and social welfare. Design/methodology - For the analysis, we use previous work by Haaland and Kind (2008) and construct a differentiated goods duopoly model, wherein two firms compete via quantity in a third-country market for free trade and the subsidy regime. We consider simultaneous-move quantity competition when the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously and sequential-move quantity competition when they choose their quantities sequentially. The results are compared to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004), who studied export subsidies. Findings - The following are the findings. First, the results of firm preference orderings regarding firm position from Dowrick (1986) and Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) may not hold in our model when the firms' strategies are strategic substitutes under free trade. Second, the preference rankings under Cournot competition for free trade and a subsidy regime are the same as those in the strategic trade policy of export subsidy. Third, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firm and government preferences regarding firm position are different from those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that Stackelberg leadership in a subsidy regime is advantageous when the goods are substitutes but is disadvantageous when the goods are complements. Moreover, the equilibrium level of firm profit is the highest in the Cournot-Nash play when the goods are substitutes in a subsidy regime. Fourth, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firms' and their respective governments' trade regime preferences are similar to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that a Stackelberg leader firm and government prefer free trade if the goods are substitutes and prefer a subsidy regime if the goods are complements. Furthermore, a Stackelberg follower firm and government strongly prefer a subsidy regime to free trade. Originality/value - By analyzing the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between them in international markets.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.725-743
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• 2018

Industrial groups (representing the polluters) and environmental non-governmental organizations (representing the victims) respond differently to various environmental policy instruments. As the affected group's power is large either politically or economically, it is unlikely that a single instrument will be actually selected despite being effective or efficient because of the high political costs associated with it. In this paper, we focus on the political role that energy subsidies play in creating a compromise between energy consuming polluters and victims of pollution. The use of a Dolbear (1967)'s triangle Edgeworth box model makes it possible to examine how policy selection affects the income distribution and welfare levels of two groups. The effects of a single policy instrument of either direct regulation or tax are compared with those of a policy mix that includes energy subsidies. We found that the addition of energy subsidies would increase the chance of compromise between polluters and victims.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.3-35
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• 2016

This paper analyses the new discipline on state-owned enterprises contained in the recently concluded Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, and evaluates various factors that influenced the shaping of its specific rules. The new discipline consolidates and strengthens related provisions in current trade regimes, reflects various aspects of trade disputes between China and the US, and adopts, as its general underlying rationale, the principle of competitive neutrality. The new discipline contains elements that may challenge the multilateral trade regime, and may serve as a role model in regulating state-owned enterprises, including subsidies in services trade in other on-going trade negotiations. The new regime makes us think hard about fundamental issues regarding enforcement of competition policy against state-owned enterprises, treatment of non-market economies, and how to deal with effects of subsidies in international trade, bringing competition issues back on the trade agenda.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Building Construction Conference
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• 2014.05a
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• pp.154-155
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• 2014

Small photovoltaic equipment spreads to the detached house owing to the support of government. This study analyzed the payback period of small photovoltaic equipment, and presented a plan of spreading PV equipment by electricity consumption according to the results. The results of payback period analysis showed that a household of 500kWh or above in the average monthly electricity consumption could produce an economic effect without the subsidies of government, and a household of 300kWh or above could secure economical efficiency in case of receiving the subsidies of government and municipality. However, it was shown that the economic effect was not large in case of a household of less than 250kWh. Therefore, the analysis showed that it would be necessary to be supported by additional subsidies or to develop a new supporting policy with regard to a household of less than 250kWh.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.99-109
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• 2004

This study analyzed the multivariate impacts of subsidies on the sustainability of fish stock using a dynamic bioeconomic modeling and fisheries resources economic approaches for understanding impacts of a subsidy on the sustainability of a fish stock. According to the results of analysis, the conclusion of former studies is true only there are imperfect control of fishing effort and enforcement under management rerime and under open access. However, if there are perfect control of effort and enforcement, the subsidies do not give any negative impacts on the sustainability of fish stock. Further, if even so-called bad subsidy is also provided necessarily in response to the condition of fishing industry and the characteristic of fishermen, it can give positive impacts on fishing income by which fishermen can improve their fishing condition.

• Journal of Information Technology and Architecture
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.137-145
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• 2013

Until recently, Korean government had supported Start-Up Investment Subsidies to the early stage of non-metropolitan manufacturing company for the purpose of promoting start-up and new job creation. As a result, for 4 years, there are total of 1.546 trillion won increase of sales and a total of 3,825 people have been hired including non-regular workers. In this paper, I suggest the performance of Start-Up Investment Subsidy and policy direction for improvement.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2021.10a
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• pp.567-569
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• 2021

The power battery supply chain in China currently lacks stable cooperation and effective information exchange. The competitive pressure brings about irregular recycling channels, reducing the operation and efficiency of the power battery supply chain. Besides, some regular power battery recycling enterprises fabricate data to obtain subsidies by taking advantage of the loopholes in the relevant policies of the state on recycling subsidies. Due to the high price of recycling in the black market, some regular enterprises resell the batteries recycled through regular channels, later purchasing the batteries with no utilization value to obtain the national recycling subsidies by cheating at the same time. Fig. 3 shows the present network structure of the tradi tional Chinese power battery closed-loop supply chain

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.74-85
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• 2013

We analyze the efficiency of congestion pricings and transit subsidies in the spatial micro-economic model based on a general equilibrium environment. In this setting, we decompose the total welfare change into component factors and identify the reason of the change in the efficiency caused by policy instruments; these component factors are divided into indirect factors and direct factors including of origin-destination and mode choices. We set up the model as adding mode choice to the standard format in the fashion of Anas and Kim (1996) and extend the methodology proposed by Yu and Rhee (2011) and Rhee (2012) for deriving theoretical and analytical solution. Most of welfare gain comes from the modal shift from car to bus. The relative efficiency of subsidies in relation to the first-best pricing is lower than it of congestion pricings although the change in bus share by subsidies is similar to it by congestion pricing. Subsidies give rise to more modal shift from a car to a bus for long-distance commuting than it caused by congestion pricings. As the increase of bus share for long-distance commuting leads to the increase of cross-commuters passing through CBD, the welfare gain by subsidies is lower than it by congestion pricings.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.250-260
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• 2022

The purpose of this study is to verify the impact of government subsidies and technological innovation on the business performance of Chinese cultural industry enterprises. Therefore, this study takes 238 listed cultural industry enterprises in China from 2015 to 2020 as the object, collects 1175 samples, and uses Stata16 software for empirical analysis. The analysis results are as follows. First, government subsidies have a positive impact on the business performance of Chinese cultural industry enterprises. Second, government subsidies have a positive impact on the scientific and technological innovation of Chinese cultural industry enterprises. Third, scientific and technological innovation has a positive impact on the business performance of Chinese cultural industry enterprises. Fourth, scientific and technological innovation plays a partially mediating role in the relationship between government subsidies and business performance of Chinese cultural industry enterprises. Based on the research results, measures to improve the business performance of cultural industry companies are as follows. First, establish a modern cultural industry market system. Second, the government should expand financial and tax support for cultural industry companies. Third, promote the integration of cultural industries with scientific and technological innovation.