• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.14 no.12
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• pp.33-40
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• 2009

We study Interpreted Systems, ATL, and ATEL to capture the notion of time, knowledge, and strategy which are important in the analysis of multi-agent systems and propose strategic constraints based on subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of game theory as one of the solutions for the issues of ATEL which an agent can access the current state of the whole system when making up his strategy even when he should be uncertain about the state, and no explicit representation of actions in ATEL models makes some natural situations harder to model. Also, we present strategic constraints-based Interpreted Systems for model checking of multi-agent systems.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.4A no.4
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• The Pure and Applied Mathematics
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.133-156
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• 2019

The aim of this paper is to model North Korea and USA relationship since past until now. To this end, we have used game theory. The weakness of the existing models is that they have a static nature and can't analyze the changes of processes, strategies and results. The dynamic system of strategic games of which we have used in this article is a proper method to solve this problem. We have shown that South Korea and China play an important role in resolving the crisis.

• Journal of the Chungcheong Mathematical Society
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.691-698
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• 2010

In this paper, we first introduce a new model of strategic Nash game with insatiability, and next give two social equilibrium existence theorems for general strategic games which are comparable with the previous results due to Arrow and Debreu, Debreu, and Chang in several aspects.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.1817-1836
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• 2020

Network convergence is considered as one of the key solutions to the problem of achieving future high-capacity and reliable communications. This approach overcomes the limitations of separate wireless technologies. Efficient interface selection is one of the most important issues in convergence networks. This paper solves the problem faced by users of selecting the most appropriate interface in the heterogeneous radio-access network (RAN) environment. Our proposed scheme combines a hierarchical evaluation of networks and game theory to solve the network-selection problem. Instead, of considering a fixed weight system while ranking the networks, the proposed scheme considers the service requirements, as well as static and dynamic network attributes. The best network is selected for a particular service request. To establish a hierarchy among the network-evaluation criteria for service requests, an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) is used. To determine the optimum network selection, the network hierarchy is combined with game theory. AHP attains the network hierarchy. The weights of different access networks for a service are calculated. It is performed by combining AHP scores considering user's experienced static network attributes and dynamic radio parameters. This paper provides a strategic game. In this game, the network scores of service requests for various RANs and the user's willingness to pay for these services are used to model a network-versus-user game. The Nash equilibria signify those access networks that are chosen by individual user and result maximum payoff. The examples for the interface selection illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.63-70
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• 2017

In AI research Go is regarded as the most challenging board game due to the positional evaluation difficulty and the huge branching factor. MCTS is an exciting breakthrough to overcome these problems. The idea behind AlphaGo was to estimate the winning rate of a given position and then to lead deeper search for finding the best promising move. In this paper, using non-strategic MCTS we verified the fact that most pro players regard the best first move as Tengen (Origin of heaven) in $9{\times}9$ Go is correct. We also compared the average winning rates of the most popular first moves.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.39 no.4
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• pp.260-270
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• 2013

This paper proposes a strategic portfolio model for managing performance of online games. The portfolio matrix is composed of two dimensions: financial performance and non-financial performance. Financial performance is measured by the conventional measure, average revenue per user (ARPU). In terms of non-financial performance, five non-financial key performance indicators (KPIs) that have been widely used in the online game industry are utilized: RU (Register User), VU (Visiting User), TS (Time Spent), ACU (Average Current User), MCU (Maximum Current User). Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is then employed to produce a single performance measure aggregating the five KPIs. DEA is a linear programming model for measuring the relative efficiency of decision making unit (DMUs) with multiple inputs and outputs. This study employs DEA as a tool for multiple criteria decision making (MCDM), in particular, the pure output model without inputs. Combining the two types of performance produces the online game portfolio matrix with four quadrants: Dark Horse, Stop Loss, Jack Pot, Luxury Goods. A case study of 39 online games provided by company 'N' is provided. The proposed portfolio model is expected to be fruitfully used for strategic decision making of online game companies.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.229-241
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• 2006

In this paper, we develop three stage non-cooperative game models to analyze the alliance strategies of companies in internet markets where network effects are present. Regardless of its market share, an internet company's strategic alliance appears to be a superior strategy. The analysis also identifies profit sharing structures in the internet market where a smaller and unknown company is enforced to split its own profits with a larger and well-known company. It is shown that the amount of profit sharing grows as the size of network effects becomes larger.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.76-87
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• 2008

As hardware performance rises, game users demand higher computer graphic, more convenient UI(User Interface), faster network, and smarter AI(Artificial Intelligence). At this time, however, AI development is accomplished by a co-development team or only one developer. For that reason, it's hard to verify that AI performance and basic game AI technology is lacking for developing high-level AI. Searching the merits and demerits of existing game AI platforms, we investigate main points to consider when designing game AI platforms in this paper. From this we suggest Darwin, a game platform, based on agent that developers embody AI easily and capable of proposing AI test with module that makes them find strategic position. And then evaluate achievement results through making agent used strategic module that Darwin offers.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.79-86
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• 2016

Monte-Carlo Tree Search(MCTS) is a best-first tree search algorithm and has been successfully applied to various games, especially to the game of Go. We evaluate the performance of MCTS playing against each other in the game of Tic-Tac-Toe. It reveals that the first player always has an overwhelming advantage to the second player; and we try to find out the reason why the first player is superior to the second player in spite of the fact that the best game result should be a draw. Since MCTS is a statistical algorithm based on the repeated random sampling, it cannot adequately tackle an urgent problem that needs a strategy, especially for the second player. For this, we propose a strategic MCTS(S-MCTS) and show that the S-MCTS player never loses a Tic-Tac-Toe game.