• Strategy21
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• 통권43호
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• pp.175-199
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• 2018

Recent marine territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have come to us as a great threat. China, which has recently established the China Coast Guard and has rapidly developed maritime security forces, is trying to overcome the various conflict countries with its power. Japan is also strengthening intensively its maritime security forces. Since Korea, China, and Japan are geographically neighboring and sharing maritime space in Northeast Asia, there is no conflict between maritime jurisdiction and territorial rights among the countries. The struggle for initiative in the ocean is fierce among the three coastal nations in Northeast Asia. therefore, Korea needs more thorough preparation and response to protect the marine sovereignty. As the superpowers of China and Japan are confronted and the United States is involved in the balance of power in strategic purposes, the East Asian sea area is a place where tension and conflict environment exist. China's illegal fishing boats are constantly invading our waters, and they even threaten the lives of our police officers. The issue of delimiting maritime boundaries between Korea and China has yet to be solved, and is underway in both countries, and there is a possibility that the exploration activities of the continental shelf resources may collide as the agreement on the continental shelf will expire between Korea and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts in the maritime jurisdictions of the three countries in Korea, China and Japan are leading to the enhancement of maritime security forces to secure deterrence rather than military confrontation. In the situation where the unresolved sovereignty and jurisdiction conflicts of Korea, China and Japan continue, and the competition for the strengthening of the maritime powers of China and Japan becomes fierce, there is a urgent need for stabilization and enhancement of the maritime forces in our country. It is necessary to establish a new long-term strategy for enhancing the maritime security force and to carry out it. It is expected that the Korean Coast Guard, which once said that it was a model for the establishment of China's Coast Guard as a powerful force for the enforcement of the maritime law, firmly establishes itself as a key force to protect our oceans with the Navy and keeps our maritime sovereignty firmly.

• The Korean Journal of Ecology
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• 제25권1호
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• pp.59-62
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• 2002

Dokdo, which is located in the middle of the East Sea, is a small island tilth a total area of 0.186 $\textrm{km}^2$. However, this small island, with its mild oceanic climate, has rich bio-resources and picturesque natural surroundings. Dokdo in the crystaline waters and In the central area of the deep sea is a treasury of algaes (sea oak, sea mustard, gulf weed, laver, agar-agar, etc.), molluscs (squid, ear shell, conch, etc.) and fishes (Alaska pollack, anchovy, saucy, herring, etc.). On the other hand, there are a lot of grasses and various kinds of grasses on the land of Dokdo. And a lot of back-tailed gulls (about 20,000 Individuals) live on this island. There have been disputes on the sovereignty over Dokdo between Korea and Japan. Japan has claimed sovereignty over Dokdo since Japan incorporated the island into Japanese territory in 1905 when it occupied the Korean Peninsula by force. Korea governed Dokdo not only before 1905 but also after its liberation in 1945. The Korean government, while heavily financing building facilities like pleas and quays, is endeavoring to preserve the natural surroundings of this island.

• 한국지역지리학회지
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.282-300
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• 2013

본 연구는 최근에 독도의 한일 간 영유권 논쟁이 심화된 것은 1953년부터 한국이 실효적 지배를 하는 독도에 대한 우리 정부의 영유권 행사와 강화에 직결된 독도개발정책 추진의 잘못에서도 그 원인이 있다고 보았다. 이러한 내부적 시각에서 1950년대 이후 2012년 7월 말까지의 정부의 독도개발정책을 성찰적으로 검토해 보고, 그간의 독도 개발정책과 우리 사회에서 제안된 상이한 개발방향에 대한 문제점의 논의를 바탕으로 미래의 바람직한 개발 대안을 모색하고 제안해 보고자 하였다. 역대 정부들은 거의 대부분 독도문제가 한일 간 선린외교관계의 형성과 유지에 걸림돌이 되는 것을 원치 않아 독도 영유권 강화에 필수적인 유인도 개발정책추진에 매우 소극적이었다. 오늘날 독도가 국제사회에서 한국의 독도(Dokdo island)로 인정받지 못하고, 대체로 리앙쿠르 암석(Liancourt rocks)으로 표기되고 있는 것은 우리 정부가 독도를 다수 한국인이 거주(정주)할 수 있는 가치 있는 유인도(island)로 적극적으로 개발하지 않았기 때문이기도 하다. 따라서 본 연구는 UN이 채택하고 있는 지속가능한 개발론 관점에서 독도의 미래 개발 대안으로서, 생태어업, 생태관광 및 동해 연구기능을 가진 소규모의 '독도 생태마을' 조성을 제안하였다. 독도 생태마을 안이 미래에 독도에 대한 우리의 영토주권과 실효적 지배를 강화하기 위한 새로운 독도개발정책의 논의와 수립에 실마리가 되었으면 한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.