• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.34 no.6
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• pp.17-27
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• 2019

This paper introduces the 5G spectrum auction in Germany that occurred last summer and ended overheatedly after an extraordinarily long period. We describe the context of the latest German spectrum auction and trace the participants' bidding behavior. This case details the trend of the 5G spectrum auction and the factors that affect the spectrum auction as follows: First, it is determined that investment obligations that force network installations can be a financial burden to mobile network operators (MNOs) and require a careful approach. Second, excess demands can cause auction overheating and the spectrum supply volume needs to be determined by a proper demand forecast and investment incentive. Third, 'Set-Aside' for local usage aids in developing the vertical industry; however it limits the spectrum supply for mobiles and leads to higher bidding prices. Fourth, a modified adoption of a typical spectrum auction can alleviate MNO's financial burdens to secure the broadband spectrum. Finally, competition to secure the necessary bandwidth in the situation of limited spectrum supply may delay the process of the spectrum auction, causing it overheated.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.69-76
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• 2002

Becoming Internet is public, various services using Web are created. Internet auction is not exceptional but make rapid progress. Internet auction system damages user because its security is not perfect and faultless. In this paper, we propose a design of internet auction system providing more secure and convenient environment.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.678-686
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• 2004

This paper presents a new method to securely conduct online sealed-bid auctions with a single auctioneer server The sealed-bid auctions have several vulnerable security problems when they are performed on the Internet. One of such problems is the trust establishment between an auctioneer and bidders who participate in an auction. Several online sealed-bid auction methods have been developed to address this trust problem. The proposed method solves the security problems that would happen in the sealed-bid auction using a blind signature scheme and a contract signature protocol. It prevents the auctioneer from illegally manipulating the bidders' bidding information, repudiating the reception of some bid, manipulating the auction period, and illegally adding or deleting bids. In addition, it keeps the bidders from modifying the bidding information after issuing their bid and doing intentional mistake to invalidate their own bid. The method can be easily implemented using the multiagent architecture.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.17-33
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• 2003

The explosive growth of the internet-based transactions requires not only a secure payment system but also an appropriate trust measuring methodology and secure transaction protocols to guarantee the minimal risk for the transacting entities involved in specific transactions. Especially, in internet auction systems where either buyers or sellers or both can be more than one in one transaction, providing those systems that make sure no one transacting entity takes a major risk becomes critical. In this paper, an improved trust measuring method using a relationship-based internet community for an auction system is proposed. The proposed system incorporates fuzzy set and calculation concepts to help build trust matrices and models, which is used to measure the level of risk involved in a specific auction trade concerned. Also, to optimize the auction trade process in terms of cost and time, the proposed system recommends a differentiated trade protocol according to the risk level involved in each auction trade. To test the appropriateness of the proposed trusted auction system, a prototype system has been developed under a Windows-NT environment.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.3-15
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• 2002

In this paper, we propose an efficient and secure sealed-bid auction protocol with two servers, a seller S and a third party A . The proposed scheme uses the idea of the conditional oblivious transfer protocol proposed by Crescenzo-Ostrovskey-Rajagopalan. A server A is not a trusted third party, but is assumed not to collude with a server S. In the proposed auction protocol, barring collusion between A and S, neither party gains any information about the bids, and moreover, the outcome of the auction will be correct. And the computational complexity of our auction protocol is considerably efficient and the communication overhead is similar to that of Naor-Pinkas-Sumner's scheme.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.2196-2207
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• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.12
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• Proceedings of the Korea Institutes of Information Security and Cryptology Conference
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• 2003.12a
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• pp.518-522
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• 2003

We propose a new auction protocol scheme that uses the publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme. Unlike the existing scheme where a verifiable encryption scheme is employed when there is a dispute between a bidder and the auctioneer, the proposed scheme essentially removes the potential of a dispute. In addition, it has a robust registration phase and any entities participating in or observing the auction can verify the correctness of the auction process. The manager does not directly chooses the private key for the bidders, but only verifies the correctness between the private key and the public key, thereby improving the security, such as a bid submission of a malicious manager using the private key of a bidder.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.9
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• pp.4197-4219
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• 2017

Cloud computing is a new service to provide dynamic, scalable virtual resource services via the Internet. Cloud market is available to multiple cloud computing resource providers and users communicate with each other and participate in market transactions. However, since cloud computing is facing with more and more security issues, how to complete the allocation process effectively and securely become a problem urgently to be solved. In this paper, we firstly analyze the cloud resource allocation problem and propose a mathematic model based on combinatorial double auction. Secondly, we introduce a trust evaluation mechanism into our model and combine genetic algorithm with simulated annealing algorithm to increase the efficiency and security of cloud service. Finally, by doing the overall simulation, we prove that our model is highly effective in the allocation of cloud resources.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.247-258
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• 2013

A new secure network communication technique that has been designed for mobile wireless services, is presented in this paper. Its network services are mobile, distributed, seamless, and secure. We focus on the security of the scheme and achieve anonymity and reliability by using cryptographic techniques like blind signature and the electronic coin. The question we address in this paper is, "What is the best way to protect the privacy and anonymity of users of mobile wireless networks, especially in practical applications like e-commerce?" The new scheme is a flexible solution that answers this question. It efficiently protects user's privacy and anonymity in mobile wireless networks and supports various applications. It is employed to implement a secure e-auction as an example, in order to show its advantages in practical network applications.