• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.183-215
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• 2007

The purpose of this paper is to study of WTO regulations related FTA such as Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT) 1994 and General Agreement on Trade in Service(GATS). In this study, the First introduced FTA rules of WTO in the chapter 2. The WTO agreement includes the "General Agreement on Tariffs an Trade(GATT) 1994". This instrument, known as "GATT 1994", is based on upon the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade referred to as "GATT 1947". The Second analyzed the relations between FTA and Article XXIV of GATT 1994 in the chapter 3. The Article XXIV of GATT 1994 is an agreement between the distinctive members for liberalizing trade. The Article XXIV of GATT 1994 is consist of three parts such as customs unions, free-trade area, and interim agreements that WTO is referred to as "Regional Trade Agreement(RTA)". There is a difference between the customs unions and the free-trade area. In the customs unions rules, the members should have the same tarifficatio and the same trade provision against non-members, but in the free-trade are a rules, the member is not necessary to have the same tarifficatio and the same trade provision against non-members. But, the both rules have a liberalization of trade in a common as a revoking tariffs and the government regulations for interfering with trade. In this case, however, the both rules include an inconsistency ele ment under WTO rules such as Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment(MFN) and National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation(NTITR). This study reviewed neither inconsistency nor consistency on the both rules with the RTA of WTO under Article XXIV of GATT 1994. The Third analyzed the relations between FTA and Article V of GATS under WTO in the chapter 4. The GATS is a rule of WTO for the growing importance of trade in services for the growth and development of the world conomy. The GATS is a new rule rather than GATT's rule for concerning goods trade. The Article V of GATS under WTO is a rule that makes based on upon the Article XXIV of GATT. Therefore, If it is to be examined the Article V of GATS, it should be referred to a and an interpretation of the text of the Article XXIV of GATT. However, the Article V of GATS is on the undeveloped stage compare to the Article XXIV of GATT. Because, the statistics of WTO showed that the RTAs under the Article XXIV of GATT have 150 cases completed between nations, but the RTAs under the Article IV of GATS have 10 cases completed between nations. The Forth examined the interpretation of FTA rules under WTO in the chapter 5. Concerning the consistency issue of customs unions and free-trade area under the Article XXIV of GATT, the working parties in customs unions and in free-trade area have been reviewed the consistency is sue which had been not if to GATT. However, the parties finished to get up with one accord the both that are a consistency of argument and an inconsistency of argument with the interpretation of the Article XXIV of GATT. The interpretation of the Article XXIV of GATT has been raised as the issues when EEC by Rome Treaty established in 1957. However, the consistency is sue only agreed 6 working parties out of 69 working parties finished the reviewing of the interpretation up to the end of 1994. Also the consistency issue concerned with the special privilege measure of the customs unions and tree-trade area under the Article XXIV of GATT discussed only 3 cases between working parties up to now and did not accepted as an issue for working parties' report. In conclusion in the chapter 6, this study raised the issues of WTO that are a conference of a new round under WTO and the issues of clarity between FTA rule and WTO regulation.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.55-75
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• 1992

At the outset of import liberalization, most economists expected a significant drop in the prices of domestic goods that faced foreign competition. However, it is now generally acknowledge that a significant drop in prices of those goods has not occurred. A common claim is that the prices did not drop significantly because the major importers of many imported goods were also the domestic producers of competing goods. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effect of importation by domestic firms that produce competing goods, to identify the factors that facilitate such business practices, and to formulate a policy that could improve the welfare. We proved that importation by competing domestic firms definitely raises the prices of both imported and domestic goods compared to the situation where foreign goods are imported by non-producers, ceteris paribus. The intuition behind this result is that since a producer-importer is essentially a cartel, its overall profit maximization requires reduced competition between the products that it sells. On the other hand, if a producer-importer is more efficient at distrinbution than a simple importer, the comparison between the two cases is a priori indeterminate. We also find that the industries in which domestic producers are actively involved in importing competing goods are the ones in which the distribution channels are tightly controlled by importer-producers. This finding suggests that exclusive dealing contracts, which work as an entry barrier, may be the source of importing by domestic producers. We argue that in a country such as Korea, where financial market is highly incomplete, tight control of the distribution channels by oligopolistic manufacturers is likely to be an effective entry barrier that leads to importing by domestic producers of similar goods. We further argue that seemingly superior distribution costs of importer-producers is likely to be a result of market foreclosure which would disappear once the entry barrier of exclusive dealing contracts is removed. Above findings suggest that market imperfections are the source of importation by domestic competitors, which in turn constitutes a market imperfection in itself and reduces consumer welfare. As potential remedies, we considered three alternatives; direct price control by the government over the imported goods sold by major domestic producers, regulation of trade itself between major producers, and regulation of exclusive dealing contracts. For reasons both theoretical and pratical, we find that the last alternative is the most attrative. Prohibiting exclusive contracts between manufacturers and dealers in industries where exclusive dealing contracts are a significant entry barrier is expected to break up the importer-producer cartel and improve the welfare.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.91-118
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• 2009

In the Republic of Korea, Regional Airlines from Jeju Air and Hansung Airlines have recently entered the domestic market to compete with the existing Legacy Airlines. In addition many of newly established regional low cost carriers like Air Busan, JeanAir, Easter Airline, are preparing to enter the jungle market. These circumstantial changes have come about as transportation competitiveness are getting weak in the market due to simultaneous expansion of surface modes such as a new opening of high-speed rail and extension of highways. The jumbled market entry by regional low cost carriers makes an enormous influence not only in managing transport network of existing carriers but also for the domestic policy of aviation authorities. It is too early to judge whether they would succeed or not. It is necessary to analyze the network operation of these regional carriers launching domestic routes and preparing to launch short distance international routes under the rapid changing market circumstances such as introduction of KTX or decrease in domestic routes by Legacy Airlines. Many regional airlines are to launch the routes connecting Korea-China-Japan, if they could ensure long-haul international routes successfully, it would follow that the difference between Legacy Airlines and Regional Airlines would decrease more and more, which would result in appearance of the $3^{rd}$or $4^{th}$Legacy Airlines The purpose of this study is to analyze the introduction of low cost carriers by regions and economic regional carrier network for non-scheduled air transportation market by taking a look at the regional airlines transportation network in the early stage of the domestic air transport market. For this purpose, cost and profit structure and management effect of transportation cost will be analyzed by comparing the presently operated routes of regional airlines with those of Legacy Airlines. And also demonstrative analysis demanded by the actual market will be achieved through surveys from experts, the actual airlines and travel agencies to build up transportation network.