• Title/Summary/Keyword: public key replacement attack

Search Result 4, Processing Time 0.02 seconds

Cryptanalysis and Improvement of an Efficient Certificateless Signature Scheme

  • Li, Jiguo;Huang, Xinyi;Mu, Yi;Wu, Wei
    • Journal of Communications and Networks
    • /
    • v.10 no.1
    • /
    • pp.10-17
    • /
    • 2008
  • In traditional digital signature schemes, certificates signed by a trusted party are required to ensure the authenticity of the public key. In Asiacrypt 2003, the concept of certificateless signature scheme was introduced. The advantage of certificateless public key cryptography successfully eliminates the necessity of certificates in the traditional public key cryptography and simultaneously solves the inherent key escrow problem suffered in identity-based cryptography. Recently, Yap et al. proposed an efficient certificateless signature scheme and claimed that their scheme is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model. In this paper, we show that the certificateless signature scheme proposed by Yap et al. is insecure against public key replacement attacks. Furthermore, we propose an improved certificateless signature scheme, which is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model and provide the security proof of the proposed scheme.

Security Analysis of Two Certificateless Signature Schemes (두 인증서 없는 서명 기법들에 관한 안전성 분석)

  • Lee, Ju-Hee;Shim, Kyung-Ah;Lee, Hyang-Sook
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
    • /
    • v.19 no.6
    • /
    • pp.17-22
    • /
    • 2009
  • Certificateless cryptography eliminates the need of certificacates in the public key crytosystems and solves the inherent key escrow problem in identity-based cryptosystems. This paper demonstrates that two certificateless signature schemes proposed by Guo et al. and Wang et al. respectively are insecure against key replacement attacks by a type I adversary. We show that the adversary who can replace a signer's public key can forge signatures under the replaced public key. We then make a suggestion to prevent the attacks.

Analysis of Certificateless Signcryption Schemes and Construction of a Secure and Efficient Pairing-free one based on ECC

  • Cao, Liling;Ge, Wancheng
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
    • /
    • v.12 no.9
    • /
    • pp.4527-4547
    • /
    • 2018
  • Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that provides authentication (signing) and confidentiality (encrypting) simultaneously at a lower computational cost and communication overhead. With the proposition of certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC), certificateless signcryption (CLSC) scheme has gradually become a research hotspot and attracted extensive attentions. However, many of previous CLSC schemes are constructed based on time-consuming pairing operation, which is impractical for mobile devices with limited computation ability and battery capacity. Although researchers have proposed pairing-free CLSC schemes to solve the issue of efficiency, many of them are in fact still insecure. Therefore, the challenging problem is to keep the balance between efficiency and security in CLSC schemes. In this paper, several existing CLSC schemes are cryptanalyzed and a new CLSC scheme without pairing based on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) is presented. The proposed CLSC scheme is provably secure against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) and existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA) resting on Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption and discrete logarithm problem in the random oracle model. Furthermore, the proposed scheme resists the ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack, public key replacement (PKR) attack, malicious but passive KGC (MPK) attack, and presents efficient computational overhead compared with the existing related CLSC schemes.

Secure Key Exchange Protocols against Leakage of Long-tenn Private Keys for Financial Security Servers (금융 보안 서버의 개인키 유출 사고에 안전한 키 교환 프로토콜)

  • Kim, Seon-Jong;Kwon, Jeong-Ok
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
    • /
    • v.19 no.3
    • /
    • pp.119-131
    • /
    • 2009
  • The world's widely used key exchange protocols are open cryptographic communication protocols, such as TLS/SSL, whereas in the financial field in Korea, key exchange protocols developed by industrial classification group have been used that are based on PKI(Public Key Infrastructure) which is suitable for the financial environments of Korea. However, the key exchange protocols are not only vulnerable to client impersonation attacks and known-key attacks, but also do not provide forward secrecy. Especially, an attacker with the private keys of the financial security server can easily get an old session-key that can decrypt the encrypted messages between the clients and the server. The exposure of the server's private keys by internal management problems, etc, results in a huge problem, such as exposure of a lot of private information and financial information of clients. In this paper, we analyze the weaknesses of the cryptographic communication protocols in use in Korea. We then propose two key exchange protocols which reduce the replacement cost of protocols and are also secure against client impersonation attacks and session-key and private key reveal attacks. The forward secrecy of the second protocol is reduced to the HDH(Hash Diffie-Hellman) problem.