• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.31-68
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• 1990

The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.43-50
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• 2012

This study sets out to examine how a brand image that matches the advertising model has a positive impact on brand attitude and price fairness perceptions. We reviewed the constructs on the basis of previous studies and each of the concepts has been redefined. One such concept, "image congruence," refers to the harmony, fitness, and matching quality of images. For example, how well celebrity advertising model is matches the brand image shows image congruence. Results are summarized as follows: First, the congruence of brand image and sports advertising model has no significant impact on brand attitude certainty and persistence. Second, the individual's brand attitude certainty and brand attitude persistence has a positive impact on the perceptions of price fairness. Third, the congruence of brand image and sports advertising model has a positive impact on the perceptions of price fairness. The first and the third results suggest that the positive impact on the price fairness perceptions is temporary but it has insignificant effects on the formation of brand attitude causing ongoing purchases. In other words, in order to influence consumers' long-term confidence on the brand, improving the quality of products or services has to precede promotional strategies such as advertising. When an advertising model is inappropriate for the brand image, consumers perceive product price changes as a negative issue in the short term. However, in the long term, attitude formation such as consumers' repurchase intentions and word of mouth will be not affected. The second result suggests that an already existing positive brand attitude can contribute more positively to change the perceptions of price fairness. In particular, attitude persistence has greater influence than attitude certainty on the price fairness. It suggests that persistence issues such as the trading period and the frequency of transactions must be managed and controlled because they are more important than the certainty issues such as strength of belief or trust. For example, when a commercial model for expensive sporting goods matches up with the brand image, consumer feels less pressure on the price changes. However, it does not determine the consumer's repeated purchases or sustainable transactions and it also has no absolute impact on the brand trust. In other words, consumer brand attitude should be recognized and approached as a routine strategy in view of the result that it is of great value as a causal variable in the process of consumer decision-making.

• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.80-88
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• 2010

There has been considerable research examining the relationship between stockholders equity and various marketing strategies. These include studies linking stock price performance to advertising, customer service metrics, new product introductions, research and development, celebrity endorsers, brand perception, brand extensions, brand evaluation, company name changes, and sports sponsorships. Another facet of marketing investments which has received heightened scrutiny for its purported influence on stockholder equity is television advertisement embedded within specific sporting events such as the Super Bowl. Research indicates that firms which advertise in Super Bowls experience stock price gains. Given this reported relationship between advertising investment and increased shareholder value, for both general and special events, it is surprising that relatively little research attention has been paid to investigating the relationship between advertising in the Olympic Games and its subsequent impact on stockholder equity. While attention has been directed at examining the effectiveness of sponsoring the Olympic Games, much less focus has been placed on the financial soundness of advertising during the telecasts of these Games. Notable exceptions to this include Peters (2008), Pfanner (2008), Saini (2008), and Keller Fay Group (2009). This paper presents a study of Olympic advertisers who ran TV ads on NBC in the American telecasts of the 2000, 2004, and 2008 Summer Olympic Games. Five hypothesis were tested: H1: The stock prices of firms which advertised on American telecasts of the 2008, 2004 and 2000 Olympics (referred to as O-Stocks), will outperform the S&P 500 during this same period of time (i.e., the Monday before the Games through to the Friday after the Games). H2: O-Stocks will outperform the S&P 500 during the medium term, that is, for the period of the Monday before the Games through to the end of each Olympic calendar year (December 31st of 2000, 2004, and 2008 respectively). H3: O-Stocks will outperform the S&P 500 in the longer term, that is, for the period of the Monday before the Games through to the midpoint of the following years (June 30th of 2001, 2005, and 2009 respectively). H4: There will be no difference in the performance of these O-Stocks vs. the S&P 500 in the Non-Olympic time control periods (i.e. three months earlier for each of the Olympic years). H5: The annual revenue of firms which advertised on American telecasts of the 2008, 2004 and 2000 Olympics will be higher for those years than the revenue for those same firms in the years preceding those three Olympics respectively. In this study, we recorded stock prices of those companies that advertised during the Olympics for the last three Summer Olympic Games (i.e. Beijing in 2008, Athens in 2004, and Sydney in 2000). We identified these advertisers using Google searches as well as with the help of the television network (i.e., NBC) that hosted the Games. NBC held the American broadcast rights to all three Olympic Games studied. We used Internet sources to verify the parent companies of the brands that were advertised each year. Stock prices of these parent companies were found using Yahoo! Finance. Only companies that were publicly held and traded were used in the study. We identified changes in Olympic advertisers' stock prices over the four-week period that included the Monday before through the Friday after the Games. In total, there were 117 advertisers of the Games on telecasts which were broadcast in the U.S. for 2008, 2004, and 2000 Olympics. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of those advertisers, by industry sector. Results indicate the stock of the firms that advertised (O-Stocks) out-performed the S&P 500 during the period of interest and under-performed the S&P 500 during the earlier control periods. These same O-Stocks also outperformed the S&P 500 from the start of these Games through to the end of each Olympic year, and for six months beyond that. Price pressure linkage, signaling theory, high involvement viewers, and corporate activation strategies are believed to contribute to these positive results. Implications for advertisers and researchers are discussed, as are study limitations and future research directions.