• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.144
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• pp.257-283
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is primarily to examine models of collective decision-formation and decision-making. The goal is to propose a model of decision-formation and decision-making that is appropriate for a democratic society. Habermas distinguishes these models of decision-formation and decision-making by liberal, republican, and deliberative political models according to their justification types. Axel Honneth, on the other hand, is divided into three models of liberalism, proceduralism, and republicanism. I want to divide the model of possible decision-making in democratic society into three, that is, the model based on force, the model based on procedure, and the republican model. This distinction will identify the characteristics of each decision-making model and this confirmation will help us find the best decision-making model for a democratic society. In the end, I will combine the republican model with the procedural model. For this synthesis, I will also propose three conditions in modern society. I will argue that the three conditions of collective intelligence, active freedom, and horizontal networks are necessary.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.23-51
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• 2014

Christine M. Korsgaard believes that constructivism can respond to moral skepticism without depending upon moral realism. The purpose of this paper is to examine Korsgaard's kantian constructivism and her positions on moral realism. According to Korsgaard moral realism cannot answer normative questions in that it sees the function of moral concepts as describing the reality and so accepts the model of applied knowledge for action. In contrast Korsgaard insists that constructivism is better at justifying normativity since it regards moral concepts as representing the solutions to practical problems and so shows that moral principles are necessarily involved in the practical problems of agency. Korsgaard's constructivism has antirealistic elements such as pure proceduralism, the constitutive model to exclude ontological, metaphysical meanings, and the account of human beings as the sources of values. In spite of those antirealistic elements it is difficult to jump to a conclusion that Korsgaard's constructivism is antirealism. Korsgaard, in the early book, The Sources of Normativity, says that kantian constructivism has something to do with a form of realism, or procedural moral realism. And in the following books she argues that constructivism is compatible with realism although she pays attention to the practical implications of constructivism and then sets aside its ontological relevance. That is, Korsgaard does not want that her constructivism results in antirealism. Korsgaard's realism, however, is too weak to be called as realism. There is, also, a question why one would rather take a constructivist approach if one holds on to realism.