• American Studies
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• v.44 no.1
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• pp.1-37
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• 2021

J.D. Salinger's 1951 novel, Catcher in the Rye, has generally been known as a story of a young rebel, Holden Caulfield, who tries to break away from reality in the fifties, a decade prevalent with the strict rule and faultfinding culture of what he is taught at school: to simplify and unify. This novel often refers to a journey of an outsider who commits to playing a catcher in the rye, a fantasy world of innocence, infinity, and youth. As the story unfolds, Holden's ontology is rendered to show how vulnerable his affective ontology is to the ideological reality of containment and conformity. This informs how Holden is a pathological character that reifies the performative crisis of the postwar US Cold War ideology. That said, this paper examines the extent to which this novel can be possibly read as a narrative of illness to expose Holden's pathological conditions of illness, hysteria, and psychosis. Thus, it looks at his medical symptoms whose pathogens I attempt to analyze in terms of his affective potential of being ontologically engaged to the historical context, or the political unconscious, of the postwar US in the early Cold War years.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.75-93
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• 2023

The game industry has grown not only by combining them with various technologies also introducing new types of business models such as P2P, F2P, and P2W. Furthermore, games which implemented X2E model with blockchain technology are recently in the spotlight of the public attention. As domestic game companies have also prospect the blockchain games feasible, they are seeking ways to expand their global market share by strengthening the X2E model. Hence, by carrying this new business model out, it is expected to diversify their global revenue stream, which was previously confined to Asia region. This study analyzed the case of companies that have implemented the P2E and C2E models in order to suggest the direction of development for the game platform in Web 3.0 era. The cases of P2E game platform, which constitute of Axie Infinity and Mir 4, encompass the compensation structure, the stabilization mechanism of the in-game token economy, and future strategies regarding blockchain gaming. Likewise, the platform structure, business model, and future growth potential was discussed in terms of C2E scheme, focusing on the ZEPETO and Roblox cases. Based on the above case analysis, this study attempted to provide information on the current limitations and development directions of the P2E and C2E platforms. The current limitations in legal and industrial aspects should be addressed to facilitate the blooming of blockchain and P2E game industry. In addition, the necessity of not only social support also improvement on the technology and social stigma of full-time creators is ought to be emphasized in an effort to encourage the development of C2E platforms.

• Biomolecules & Therapeutics
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• v.32 no.5
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• pp.601-610
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• 2024

Tofacitinib, a Janus kinase (JAK) inhibitor used to treat rheumatoid arthritis, is metabolized through hepatic cytochrome P450 (CYP), specifically CYP3A1/2 and CYP2C11. Prolonged administration of rheumatoid arthritis medications is generally associated with an increased risk of renal toxicity. Loganin (LGN), an iridoid glycoside, has hepatorenal regenerative properties. This study investigates the potential of LGN to mitigate acute kidney injury (AKI) and its effects on the pharmacokinetics of tofacitinib in rats with cisplatin-induced AKI. Both intravenous and oral administration of tofacitinib to AKI rats significantly increased the area under the plasma concentration-time curve from time 0 to infinity (AUC) compared with control (CON) rats, an increase attributed to the decelerated non-renal clearance (CL_NR) and renal clearance (CL_R) of tofacitinib. Administration of LGN to AKI rats, however, protected kidneys from severe impairment, restoring the pharmacokinetic parameters (AUC, CL_NR, and CL_R) of tofacitinib to those observed in untreated CON rats, with partial recovery of kidney function, as evidenced by an increase in creatinine clearance. Possible interactions between drugs and natural components should be considered, especially when co-administering both a drug and a natural extract containing LGN or iridoid glycosides to patients with kidney injury.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.