• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.59 no.4
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• pp.163-189
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• 2007

This study explores actual conditions and experiences on the rigor of social welfare qualitative researchers in Korea by using a qualitative inquiry. To examine the actual conditions on the rigor, this study analyzes 2,112 articles published in 8 Korean social work journals from 1979 to 2006. And to explores the experiences of social welfare qualitative researcher on the rigor, this study analyzes the experiences of qualitative research by using individual interviews and focus group interviews. The characteristics of social welfare qualitative research in Korea tend to enlarge according to the needs by doctoral candidates, coexist with post-positivism and constructivism. The analysis of both quantitative and qualitative results show that the rigor of social welfare qualitative research is very important to secure the validity and control the quality of qualitative research. Based on these results, this study introduced concrete tasks related to secure the rigor of social welfare qualitative research in Korea.

• 기호학연구
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• no.54
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• pp.7-36
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• 2018

Michael Polanyi's idea of tacit knowledge came from the realization that scientific objectivity and critical philosophy had become too restrictive for philosophy, especially in the realm of meaning, which is beyond positivistic proof and contains more non-critical elements than critical ones. In social life, people still share certain kinds of knowledge and beliefs which they obtain without making or learning those explicitly. Contemplating the role and significance of tacit knowledge, he called for a post-critical philosophy that integrates the realm of meaning and thereby appreciates the intertwined nature of tacit and explicit knowledge. Polanyi's position towards skepticism and doubt shows similarities with Charles S. Peirce's thinking about the relationship between belief and doubt. Although Peirce's semeiotics stands firmly in the tradition of critical philosophy, he affirms that doubt cannot be a constant state of mind and only belief can form a basis for a specific way of life. Polanyi's approach differs from Peirce's by focusing on the impossibility of scientific knowledge based solely on principles and precision, and his emphasis on the crucial role of the community of scientists. Nevertheless, the deeper implications of Peirce's contemplations on belief and doubt have myriad ramifications on the philosophy of science as well as the sociology of science.