• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.87-114
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• 2014

The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) is a set of rules on the issuance and use of letters of credit. Historically, the commercial parties, particularly banks, have developed the techniques and methods for handling letters of credit in international trade finance. This practice has been standardized by the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) by publishing the UCP in 1933 and subsequently updating it throughout the years. The ICC has developed and moulded the UCP by regular revisions, the current version being the UCP600. This latest version, called the UCP600, formally commenced on 1 July 2007. During the revision process, notice was taken of the considerable work that had been completed in creating the International Standard Banking Practice for the Examination of Documents under Documentary Credits (ISBP), ICC Publication 745. This publication has evolved into a necessary companion to the UCP for determining compliance of documents with the terms of letters of credit. It is the expectation of the Drafting Group and the Banking Commission that the application of the principles contained in the ISBP, including subsequent revisions thereof, will continue during the time UCP 600 is in force. This paper focuses on documents including various certificates, Packing List, Weight List, Beneficiary's Certificate, Analysiis, Inspection, Health, Phytosanitary, Quantity and Quality Certificates, Courier Receipts, Shipping Advice etc. and suggests some implications in the field.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.101-118
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• 1993

Generally there is no law and liability system which applies particulary to commercial space ventures. There are several international treaties and national statutes which deal with space ventures, but their impact on the liability of commercial space ventures has not been significant. Every state law in the United States will impose both tort and contract liability on those responsible for injuries or losses caused by defective products or by services performed negligently. As with the providers of other products and services, those who participate in commercial space ventures have exposure to liability in both tort and contract which is limited to the extent of the resulting damage The manufacturer of a small and cheap component which caused a satellite to fail to reach orbit or to operate nominally has the same exposure to liability as the provider of launch vehicle or the manufacturer of satellite into which the component was incorporaded. Considering the enormity of losses which may result from launch failure or satellite failure, those participated in commercial space ventures will do their best to limit their exposure to liability by contract to the extent permitted by law. In most states of the United States, contracts which limit or disclaim the liability are enforceable with respect to claims for losses or damage to property if they are drafted in compliance with the requirements of the applicable law. In California an attempt to disclaim the liability for one's own negligence will be enforceable only if the contract states explicitly that the parties intend to have the disclaimer apply to negligence claims. Most state laws of the United States will refuse to enforce contracts which attempt to disclaim the liability for gross negligence on public policy grounds. However, the public policy which favoured disclaiming the liability as to gross negligence for providers of launch services was pronounced by the United States Congress in the 1988 Amendments to the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act. To extend the disclaimer of liability to remote purchasers, the contract of resale should state expressly that the disclaimer applies for the benefit of all contractors and subcontractors who participated in producing the product. This situation may occur when the purchaser of a satellite which has failed to reach orbit has not contracted directly with the provider of launch services. Contracts for launch services usually contain cross-waiver of liability clauses by which each participant in the launch agrees to be responsible for it's own loss and to waive any claims which it may have against other participants. The crosswaiver of liability clause may apply to the participants in the launch who are parties to the launch services agreement, but not apply to their subcontractors. The role of insurance in responding to many risks has been critical in assisting commercial space ventures grow. Today traditional property and liability insurance, such as pre-launch, launch and in-orbit insurance and third party liability insurance, have become mandatory parts of most space projects. The manufacture and pre-launch insurance covers direct physical loss or damage to the satellite, its apogee kick moter and including its related launch equipment from commencement of loading operations at the manufacture's plant until lift off. The launch and early orbit insurance covers the satellite for physical loss or damage from attachment of risk through to commissioning and for some period of initial operation between 180 days and 12 months after launch. The in-orbit insurance covers physical loss of or damage to the satellite occuring during or caused by an event during the policy period. The third party liability insurance covers the satellite owner' s liability exposure at the launch site and liability arising out of the launch and operation in orbit. In conclusion, the liability in commercial space ventures extends to any organization which participates in providing products and services used in the venture. Accordingly, it is essential for any organization participating in commercial space ventures to contractually disclaim its liability to the extent permitted by law. To achieve the effective disclaimers, it is necessary to determine the applicable law and to understand the requirements of the law which will govern the terms of the contract. A great deal of funds have been used in R&D for commercial space ventures to increase reliability, safety and success. However, the historical reliability of launches and success for commercial space ventures have proved to be slightly lower than we would have wished for. Space insurance has played an important role in reducing the high risks present in commercial space ventures.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.83-118
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• 2009

Clean Development Mechanism(CDM) projects under the Kyoto Protocol have two objectives. One is to assist the Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments in cost-effective ways by allowing them to implement emission reduction projects in Non-Annex I countries and receive CERs, which will offset their reduction commitments. The other is to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and technology transfers through investments by Annex I countries. However, in reality, it is said that the former objective is achievable but the latter is not. In this light, this article suggests sustainability appraisal criteria applicable for Korea. Among various methodologies, we used the 'multi-attributes utility theory(MAUT)'; one of the 'multi-criteria analysis (MCA)' methodologies judged to be the most practical and relevant. Based on the guidelines of the MAUT methodology, we identified sustainability criteria that meet the guidelines. We took two tracks, the first to find the preferences of Korean experts, and the other to check foreign cases. In all, 37 preliminary criteria were suggested to Korean experts and each criterion was scored, from between 1 and 3, in terms of relevance, possibility of real improvement, easiness of data collection, and preferences. We combined foreign cases and the results of a survey conducted in Korea and selected 12 core criteria and 10 additional criteria. After that, all the criteria were converted into indicators. The indicators were applied to a CDM project for case study. We chose the "Sihwa Tidal Power Project", which is currently the biggest tidal power plant in the world. Twelve core indicators and 3 additional indicators were applied. In order to weight each indicator, the 'analytical hierarchy process (AHP)' was used. A total of 30 experts were asked to suggest weights and 21 answered. Among them, only 14 respondents were proven to meet the consistency ratio. We analyzed the 14 responses through Expert Choice and the CDM project was scored (+)53.082. In addition, sensitivity analysis was undertaken with the result of (+)44.667 to (+)65.522. As a result of this study, it was proven that this project would contribute to the sustainable development of Korea.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.39-57
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• 2012

Analysis of the economic impact on Korean bioindustry companies was approached after Korea access to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter 'the Protocol') enters into force. Cost analysis of the economic impact is based on the size of bioindustry market, dependency ratio on genetic resources abroad, ABS (Access and Benefit Sharing) ratio for royalty ratio. Korean bioindustry companies would have had to pay extra ABS cost around 1.3-6.0 billion won for using genetic resources abroad, if the Protocol had entered into force in 2009. And this cost is estimated to be around 13.6 - 63.9 billion won in 2015. All ABS costs account only about less than 0.01% of total Korean bioindustry volume of target years. These show us that joining the Protocol will not significantly impact the bioindustry market in Korea. If the Protocol enters into force, genetic resources users have to pay PIC (Prior Informed Consent) and MAT (Mutually Agreed Terms) cost before accessing the genetic resources outside of their country, regardless of the accession status of the country. This ABS costs and terms on provided genetic resources will be determined by compliance between genetic resources users and providers. As a genetic resources provider, Korean bioindustry companies will have advantage over technology transfer agreements, royalties, licensing agreements, and taxes on profits from patents including traditional knowledge. Also, Korean bioindustry companies are expected to get various socio-economic benefits such as patent litigation and regulatory proceedings as a genetic resources provider. Considering the advantages and disadvantages of the Protocol that Korean bioindustry companies will face together, the socio-economic impact of the Nagoya Protocol on Korean bioindustry companies is negligible regardless of the accession status of Korea to the Nagoya Protocol.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.19
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• pp.224-242
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• 2003

The author believes that the main task of study in international trade usage and practice is the management of transactional risks involved in international sale of goods. They are foreign exchange risks, transportation risks, credit risk, risk of miscommunication, etc. In most cases, these risks are more serious and enormous than those involved in domestic sales. Historically, the merchant adventurers organized the voyage abroad, secured trade finance, and went around the ocean with their own or consigned cargo until around the $mid-19^{th}$ century. They did business faceto-face at the trade fair or the open port where they maintained the local offices, so-called "Trading House"(商館). Thererfore, the transactional risks might have been one-sided either with the seller or the buyer. The bottomry seemed a typical arrangement for risk sharing among the interested parties to the adventure. In this way, such organizational arrangements coped with or bore the transactional risks. With the advent of ocean liner services and wireless communication across the national border in the $19^{th}$ century, the business of merchant adventurers developed toward the clear division of labor; sales by mercantile agents, and ocean transportation by the steam ship companies. The international banking helped the process to be accelerated. Then, bills of lading backed up by the statute made it possible to conduct documentary sales with a foreign partner in different country. Thus, FOB terms including ocean freight and CIF terms emerged gradually as standard trade terms in which transactional risks were allocated through negotiation between the seller and the buyer located in different countries. Both of them did not have to go abroad with their cargo. Instead, documentation in compliance with the terms of the contract(plus an L/C in some cases) must by 'strictly' fulfilled. In other words, the set of contractual documents must be tendered in advance of the arrival of the goods at port of discharge. Trust or reliance is placed on such contractual paper documents. However, the container transport services introduced as international intermodal transport since the late 1960s frequently caused the earlier arrival of the goods at the destination before the presentation of the set of paper documents, which may take 5 to 10% of the amount of transaction. In addition, the size of the container vessel required the speedy transport documentation before sailing from the port of loading. In these circumstances, computerized processing of transport related documents became essential for inexpensive transaction cost and uninterrupted distribution of the goods. Such computerization does not stop at the phase of transportation but extends to cover the whole process of international trade, transforming the documentary sales into less-paper trade and further into paperless trade, i.e., EDI or E-Commerce. Now we face the other side of the coin, which is data security and paperless transfer of legal rights and obligations. Unfortunately, these issues are not effectively covered by a set of contracts only. Obviously, EDI or E-Commerce is based on the common business process and harmonized system of various data codes as well as the standard message formats. This essential feature of E-Commerce needs effective coordination of different divisions of business and tight control over credit arrangements in addition to the standard contract of sales. In a few word, information does not alway invite "trust". Credit flows from people, or close organizational tie-ups. It is our common understanding that, without well-orchestrated organizational arrangements made by leading companies, E-Commerce does not work well for paperless trade. With such arrangements well in place, participating E-business members do not need to seriously care for credit risk. Finally, it is also clear that E-International Commerce must be linked up with a set of government EDIs such as NACCS, Port EDI, JETRAS, etc, in Japan. Therefore, there is still a long way before us to go for E-Commerce in practice, not on the top of information manager's desk.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.53-75
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• 1993

This article is concerned with the comment on "Some New Problems of International Aviation Security-Considerations Forcused on its Legal Aspects". Ever since 1970, in addition to the problem of failure to accept the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, there has been also the problem of parties to them, failing to comply with their obligations under the respective treaties, in the form especially of nominal penalties or the lack of any effort to prosecute after blank refusals to extradite. There have also been cases of prolonged detention of aircraft, passengers and hostages. In this regard, all three conventions contain identical clauses which submit disputes between two or more contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of the respective conventions to arbitration or failing agreement on the organization of the arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. To the extent to which contracting States have not contracted out of this undertaking, as I fear they are expressly allowed to do, this promision can be used by contracting States to ensure compliance. But to date, this avenue does not appear to have been used. From this point of view, it may be worth mentioning that there appears to be an alarming trend towards the view that the defeat of terrorism is such an overriding imperative that all means of doing so become, in international law, automatically lawful. In addition, in as far as aviation security is concerned, as in fact it has long been suggested, what is required is the "application of the strictest security measures by all concerned."In this regard, mention should be made of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Intereference. ICAO has, moreover, compiled, for restricted distribution, a Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which is highly useful. In this regard, it may well be argued that, unless States members of ICAO notify the ICAO Council of their inability to comply with opecific standards in Annex 17 or any of the related Annexes in accordance with Article 38 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, their failure to do so can involve State responsibility and, if damage were to insure, their liability. The same applies to breaches of any other treaty obligation. I hope to demonstrate that although modes of international violence may change, their underlying characteristics remain broadly similar, necessitating not simply the adoption of an adequate body of domestic legislation, firm in its content and fairly administered, but also an international network of communication, of cooperation and of coordination of policies. Afurther legal instrument is now being developed by the Legal Committee of ICAO with respect to unlawful acts at International airports. These instruments, however, are not very effective, because of the absence of universal acceptance and the deficiency I have already pointed out. Therefore, States, airports and international airlines have to concentrate on prevention. If the development of policies is important at the international level, it is equally important in the domestic setting. For example, the recent experiences of France have prompted many changes in the State's legislation and in its policies towards terrorism, with higher penalties for terrorist offences and incentives which encourage accused terrorists to pass informations to the authorities. And our government has to tighten furthermore security measures. Particularly, in the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescence to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. The general opinion is that the legal oystem could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the sovereign rights of states, and the human rights of the individuals. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co - ordinated measures.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Crop Science Conference
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• 2017.06a
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• pp.51-52
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• 2017

"Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture" means any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture. "Genetic material" means any material of plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative propagating material, containing functional units of heredity. (Internal Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, ITPGRFA). The "Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (shortly Nagoya Protocol)" is a supplementary agreement to the Convention on Biological Diversity. It provides a transparent legal framework for the effective implementation of one of the three objectives of the CBD: the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The Nagoya Protocol on ABS was adopted on 29 October 2010 in Nagoya, Japan and entered into force on 12 October 2014, 90 days after the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification. Its objective is the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, thereby contributing to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. The Nagoya Protocol will create greater legal certainty and transparency for both providers and users of genetic resources by; (a) Establishing more predictable conditions for access to genetic resources and (b) Helping to ensure benefit-sharing when genetic resources leave the country providing the genetic resources. By helping to ensure benefit-sharing, the Nagoya Protocol creates incentives to conserve and sustainably use genetic resources, and therefore enhances the contribution of biodiversity to development and human well-being. The Nagoya Protocol's success will require effective implementation at the domestic level. A range of tools and mechanisms provided by the Nagoya Protocol will assist contracting Parties including; (a) Establishing national focal points (NFPs) and competent national authorities (CNAs) to serve as contact points for information, grant access or cooperate on issues of compliance, (b) An Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House to share information, such as domestic regulatory ABS requirements or information on NFPs and CNAs, (c) Capacity-building to support key aspects of implementation. Based on a country's self-assessment of national needs and priorities, this can include capacity to develop domestic ABS legislation to implement the Nagoya Protocol, to negotiate MAT and to develop in-country research capability and institutions, (d) Awareness-raising, (e) Technology Transfer, (f) Targeted financial support for capacity-building and development initiatives through the Nagoya Protocol's financial mechanism, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Nagoya Protocol). The Rural Development Administration (RDA) leading to conduct management agricultural genetic resources following the 'ACT ON THE PRESERVATION, MANAGEMENT AND USE OF AGRO-FISHERY BIO-RESOURCES' established on 2007. According to $2^{nd}$ clause of Article 14 (Designation, Operation, etc. of Agencies Responsible for Agro-Fishery Bioresources) of the act, the duties endowed are, (a) Matters concerning securing, preservation, management, and use of agro-fishery bioresources; (b) Establishment of an integrated information system for agro-fishery bioresources; (c) Matters concerning medium and long-term preservation of, and research on, agro-fishery bioresources; (d) Matters concerning international cooperation for agro-fishery bioresources and other relevant matters. As the result the RDA manage about 246,000 accessions of plant genetic resources under the national management system at the end of 2016.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.