• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.277-293
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• 2015

Mutual Savings Banks generally have weaker governance structure than other financial institutions, so the possibility of earnings management by owner-largest or managements of mutual savings banks is higher than other financial institutions. This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and quality of internal control of financial reporting. If the expropriation of minority shareholder hypothesis holds, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the weaker the internal control system by more likely the opportunistic earnings management by bank managers. On the other hand, under the convergence of interest hypothesis, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the stronger the internal control system by reduction in agency costs as owner-manager's holdings increases, and there a negative relationship is expected between internal control weakness and the holdings of the owner-largest shareholder. We find that mutual savings banks with higher owner-largest shareholder equity has significant positive relations with their internal control of financial reporting material weakness. This result suggests that the greater owner-largest shareholder equity, the more likely the opportunistic earnings management, so that decrease quality of internal control. This paper extends the literature on financial institutions corporate governance to verify whether governance system, especially, owner-largest and quality of internal control has significant positive relations.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.157-183
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• 2014

This paper examines how the concentration of ownership in firms influences the R&D investment decision and whether the type of a firm's management (i.e, the owner-manager or professional manger) differentiates the relationship between the ownership concentration and R&D investments by using data of Korean pharmaceutical companies between 2004 and 2008. The results show that the share of the largest shareholder and R&D investment have an inverted U-shaped relationship, and whether a CEO is an owner or a professional manager affects the curvature of the inverted U-shaped relationship. Specifically, when a firm's CEO is a professional manager and the share of his stock is small, increase in the CEO's share increases the R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because the increase in ownership reduces agency cost; However, when the share of his stock is large, the increase in CEO's share decreases R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because a professional manager gets concerned over excessive risk exposure more than an owner-manager does.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.239-270
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• 2017

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and the intensity of R&D expenditures of a firm by analyzing the panel data composed of 553 manufacturing firms in KSE(Korea Stock Exchange) and KOSDAQ listed firms for the period of 2007-2014. The major findings are as follows; (1) Regarding the relationship between CEO stockholding and R&D intensity, we find the inverted-U shape relationship in KOSDAQ firms, consistent with the theoretical discussion and empirical studies on U.S. firms. The result suggests that management stockholding reduces agency problem at the R&D margin. On the contrary, the insignificant result in KSE firms seems to be due to the scant stockholding of most 'non-owner' CEOs. (2) Regarding the relationship between the largest shareholder's portion and R&D intensity, KSE firms exhibit negatively significant relationship, suggesting the existence of serious agency problem between the largest shareholder and the minor shareholders. This agency problem seems to be alleviated in KOSDAQ firms mainly because the founders with technology expertise are still in charge of the business. (3) Foreign investors seem to fail in effectively encouraging R&D expenditures in either KSE or KOSDAQ listed firms. This study contributes to the existing literature by showing for the first time that ownership structure affects R&D activities in different ways between KSE and KOSDAQ firms.