• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.36
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• pp.43-74
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• 2013

This paper aims to analyse Han Wonjin's criticism centered on Kim Changhyup's theory of Jigak(知覺). In the early 18th century, Kim Changhyup whose position considered as the leader of Rakhak(洛學) circle was the central figure in the debate on the controversial subject of Jigak. Han Wonjin as an opinion leader of Hohak(湖學)'s legacy was required to argue with his counterpart in order to establish his circle's standpoint. The main issue they discussed was the relationship between Ji(智) and Jigak. Kim contends that Ji and Jigak belong to different categories, and that the substance-function(體用) relation cannot be applied to them. According to him, the relation between Ji and Jigak is that of Do(道) and Gi(器). Similarly, the relation between Sim(心) and Sung(性) is that of subject and object. He also maintains that Jigak is not the phenomenalized mode of Ji, but the innate capability that employs Sung as the source of morality and turns it into feelings. In contrast, Han argues that Ji, as a ontological foundation of Jigak, is what enables Jigak to be a moral activity. In criticizing Kim Changhyup, Han maintains that if one denies the relation between Ji and Jigak, then one would have to characterize Jigak as a blind function with no moral sense. If one admits Jigak can have moral contents on its own without the connection with Ji, then one would have to allow two moral foundation, which leads one's idea into heretical beliefs. Han holds that Jigak can a moral function only when it is grounded upon Ji. In conclusion, Han emphasizes Ji as the base of Jigak that enables Jigak to realize morality while Kim emphasizes the role of Jigak as the principal agent of moral activity.