Multi-fidelity uncertainty quantification of high Reynolds number turbulent flow around a rectangular 5:1 Cylinder
-
- Wind and Structures
- /
- 제34권1호
- /
- pp.127-136
- /
- 2022
In this work a multi-fidelity non-intrusive polynomial chaos (MF-NIPC) has been applied to a structural wind engineering problem in architectural design for the first time. In architectural design it is important to design structures that are safe in a range of wind directions and speeds. For this reason, the computational models used to design buildings and bridges must account for the uncertainties associated with the interaction between the structure and wind. In order to use the numerical simulations for the design, the numerical models must be validated by experi-mental data, and uncertainties contained in the experiments should also be taken into account. Uncertainty Quantifi-cation has been increasingly used for CFD simulations to consider such uncertainties. Typically, CFD simulations are computationally expensive, motivating the increased interest in multi-fidelity methods due to their ability to lev-erage limited data sets of high-fidelity data with evaluations of more computationally inexpensive models. Previous-ly, the multi-fidelity framework has been applied to CFD simulations for the purposes of optimization, rather than for the statistical assessment of candidate design. In this paper MF-NIPC method is applied to flow around a rectan-gular 5:1 cylinder, which has been thoroughly investigated for architectural design. The purpose of UQ is validation of numerical simulation results with experimental data, therefore the radius of curvature of the rectangular cylinder corners and the angle of attack are considered to be random variables, which are known to contain uncertainties when wind tunnel tests are carried out. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulations are solved by a solver that employs the Finite Element Method (FEM) for two turbulence modeling approaches of the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations: Unsteady Reynolds Averaged Navier Stokes (URANS) and the Large Eddy simulation (LES). The results of the uncertainty analysis with CFD are compared to experimental data in terms of time-averaged pressure coefficients and bulk parameters. In addition, the accuracy and efficiency of the multi-fidelity framework is demonstrated through a comparison with the results of the high-fidelity model.
다양한 종류의 박테리아에서부터 사람의 세포에 이르기까지 환경적인 스트레스나 병에 의한 스트레스 혹은 스트레스가 없는 상황에서도 열충격반응(heat shock response) 유도되어진다. 열충격반응에 노출된 세포에서는 모든 단백질의 발현이 정지되는 반면, 열충격단백질(heat shock proteins: HSPs)은 발현되어 스트레스로부터 세포를 보호한다. HSF1(heat shock factor 1)이라는 HSPs 유도단백질은 열충격반응시 단량체형태에서 삼중체의 형태로 구조변화를 일으켜 heat shock element(HSE)라고 불리우는 HSP gene의 발현 promoter에 특이적으로 결합하게 되어 HSPs를 발현시킨다. Human HSF1(hHSF1)은 다섯 개의 시스테인 잔기를 가지고 있는데 이 시스테인의 thiol(-SH)기는 강한 친전자성을 띔으로 급격히 산화되거나 질산화된다. 이러한 고찰은 시스테인 잔기가 산화 환원 의존적인 황산기/이황화결합 전환을 통해 구조적인 변화를 가져온다는 사실을 의미하고 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 여러 가지 산화환원제를 이용하여 HSF1에 존재하는 다섯 개의 시스테인 잔기의 역할과 삼량체 형성에 관여하는 잔기에 대하여 알아보고자 하였다. 또한 이황화결합을 통한 삼량체형성의 구조적변화의 관점에서 HSF1의 구조 변화와 DNA 결합력과의 상관관계에 관하여도 알아보고자 하였다. 본 연구결과로 HSF1의 DNA binding domain은 삼량체를 형성하는 구조적인 변화를 통해서 DNA에 대한 결합력이 증가되는 것을 알 수 있었는데 이것은 삼량체가 됨으로서 HSF1의 내부에 위치해 있던 DNA binding domain이 외부로 노출 되어져 DNA에 쉽게 결합할 수 있게 된다는 사실을 시사한다.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70