• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.421-433
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• 2021

The present multidisciplinary study, which is a nexus of engineering and political science, investigates how the modernization of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNWs) affects the IAEA safeguards system based on the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. To this end, this study examines the characteristics of modernized NSNWs using Monte Carlo techniques. The results thus obtained show that 10 kt NSNWs with a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of 10 m can destroy the target as effectively as a 500 kt weapon with a CEP of 100 m. The IAEA safeguards system shows that the Significant Quantity (SQ) of 1 of plutonium is 8 kg, a parameter that was established when strategic nuclear weapons were dominant. However, the results of this study indicate that in recent years, low-yield nuclear weapons such as NSNWs have been more strategically interesting than strategic nuclear weapons as NSNWs require less plutonium than strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, we would like to conclude that reducing the SQ of plutonium can result in more robust safeguards and non-proliferation strategies.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.1-14
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• 1992

As North Korea signed 'the Korea Peninsula Non-Nuclearization Joint Declaration' at the end of last year as well as full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA in Jan.30 1992, her nuclear activity was incorporated into the international monitoring system and opportunities were arranged to .obstruct her nuclear weapon development and nuclear material diversion, which have been international issues up to recent years. However, achieving goals of the Joint Declaration and safeguards agreement should presuppose North Korea's sincerity toward the abandonment of nuclear weapon development. In this study, first of all, her nuclear policy, current situation of nuclear development and the capability of nuclear development are analyzed. Also, based on the analysis. attempts have been made to find methods of effective performance of the South-North Korea mutual nuclear inspection and the suggested methods are as follows; 1) Analysis of the limits of IAEA inspection and suggestion of its supplementary strategies 2) Securing and training professional inspectors for the South-North mutual inspection 3) Establishment of the verification technology to detect nuclear material diversion.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.69-96
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• 2019

This paper is written to suggest several recommendations for South Korea to deter and defend North Korean nuclear threat, when North Korea does not seem to give up its nuclear weapons and the US's extended deterrence including the nuclear umbrella could remain uncertain. For this purpose, it explains key options regarding nuclear deterrence and defense by non-nuclear weapon state. It evaluates the current status of South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat and provides some recommendations to improve the preparedness. As a result, this paper concluded that South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat was not that reliable. The preparedness has weakened since the South Korean effort to denuclearize North Korea through negotiations in 2018. In this sense, South Korea could have serious problems in protecting its people from North Korean nuclear threat if the US promise of extended deterrence is not implemented. South Korea should focus on its decapitation operation to North Korean highest leaders in case of North Korean nuclear attack based on a minimal deterrence concept. It should be prepared to conduct preventive strikes instead of preemptive strikes due to North Korea's development of solid fuel ballistic missiles. It should integrate its Ballistic Missile Defense with that of the US forces in Korea. South Korea should make a sincere effort for nuclear civil defense including construction of nuclear shelters.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.79-112
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• 2010

The Beijing Convention of 2010 taken together effectively establishes a new broader and stronger civil aviation security framework. This adoption would significantly advance cooperation in prevent of the full range of unlawful acting relation to civil aviation and the prosecution and punishment of offenders. First, the Beijing Convention of 2010 will require parties to criminalize a number of new and emerging threats to the safety of civil aviation, including using aircraft as a weapon and organizing, directing and financing acts of terrorism. These new treaties reflect the international community's shared effort to prevent acts of terrorism against civil aviation and to prosecute and punish those who would commit them. Second, this convention will also require States to criminalize the transport of biological, chemical, nuclear weapons and related material. These provisions reflect the nexus between non-proliferation and terrorism and ensure that the international community will act to combat both. Third, this Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services. As a substitute, International Humanitarian Law will be applied in a case. Moreover, the National Jurisdiction and the application of the law will be extended farther. The treaty promotes cooperation between States while emphasizing the human rights and fair treatment of terrorist suspects.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.83-90
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• 2020

The Graphite Isotope Ratio Method (GIRM) can verify non-proliferation of nuclear weapon by estimating the total plutonium production in a graphite-moderated reactor. Using the reactor, plutonium is generated and accumulated through the ²³⁸U neutron capture reaction, and impurities in the graphite are converted to nuclides due to the nuclear reaction. Therefore, the amount of plutonium production and concentration of the impurities are correlated. However, the plutonium production cannot be predicted using only the absolute concentration of the impurities. It can only be predicted when the initial concentration of the impurities is obtained because the concentration, at a certain time, depends on it. Nevertheless, the ratios of the isotopes in an element are known regardless of the impurity of an element in the graphite moderator. Thus, the correlation between the isotope ratio and amount of plutonium produced helps predict plutonium production in a graphite-moderated reactor. Boron, Lithium, Chlorine, Titanium, and Uranium are known as indicator elements in the GIRM. To assess whether the correlation between the indicator isotope and amount of plutonium produced is independent of the initial concentration of the impurities, four different impurity compositions of graphite were used. ¹⁰B/¹¹B, ³⁶Cl/³⁵Cl, ⁴⁸Ti/⁴⁹Ti, and ²³⁵U/²³⁸U had a consistent correlation with the cumulative plutonium production, regardless of the initial impurity concentration of the graphite, because these isotopes were not generated through the nuclear reaction of other elements. On the other hand, the correlation between ⁶Li/⁷Li and plutonium production depended on the initial concentration of the impurities in graphite. Although ⁷Li can be produced through the neutron capture reaction of ⁶Li, the (n, α) reaction of ¹⁰B was the major source of ⁷Li. Therefore, the initial concentration of ¹⁰B affected the production of ⁷Li, making Li unsuitable as an indicator element for the GIRM.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.273-302
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• 2015

The term "peaceful uses of outer space" in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty appears in official government statements and multilateral outer space related treaties. However, the examination of the state practice leads to the conclusion that this term is still without an authoritative definition. As far as the meaning of 'peaceful use' in international law is concerned the same phrases in the UN Charter, the 1963 Treaty of Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1956 Statute of IAEA, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 United Nations Conference of the Human Environment were analysed As far as the meaning of 'peaceful uses of outer space' is concerned the same phrases the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques(ENMOD) were studied. According to Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space treaty, states shall not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies repeats in Article III much of the Outer Space Treaty. This article prohibits the threat or use of force or any other hostile act on the moon and the use of the moon to commit such an act in relation to the earth or to space objects. This adds IN principle nothing to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty relating to military space activities. The 1977 ENMOD refers to peaceful purposes in the preamble and in Article III. As far as the UN Resolutions are concerned, the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exp1oration and Use of Outer Space, the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space(NPS) were studied. And as far the Soft Laws are concerned the 2008 Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT), the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Prolifiration(HCoC) and 2012 Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities(ICoC) were studied.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.261-284
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• 2018

The current international legal system does not provide a safeguard against the militarization and the weaponization of outer space. Although the term "peaceful use of outer space" in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty(OST) appears in official government statements or in multilateral space treaties, it is still without an authoritative definition in reviewing national practices. The ambiguous ban on weapons in Article IV of the OST allows countries to loophole on the deployment of other weapons other than nuclear weapons. Meanwhile "Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT)" to Conference on Disarmament (CD) commissioned by the UN General Assembly's Special Session jointly submitted by China and Russia in 2008 and later revised in 2014, attempting to define and prohibit the proliferation of weapons in outer space and provided definitions of prohibited weapons, are opposed by the US on the grounds that currently there is no arms race in outer space. Some experts support a hard law approach in which binding laws aimed at ultimately creating integrated and binding legal instruments in all aspects of the use of outer space should be adopted to regulate the military use of space. However as a temporary measure the soft law guidelines should be developed for the non liquiet, a situation where there is no applicable law. The soft law could be used to create support for the declaration of the treaties and to create international customary law. For example, the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space that regulates the activities of the state in the exploration and use of the universe, and the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space will illustrated. While substantial portions of the former was codified later in the 1967 OST, the latter which, although written in somewhat mandatory terms, have been consistently complied with by states, have arguably become part of customary international law. On November 12, 1974, the General Assembly reaffirmed that the development of international law may be reflected inter alia, by declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly which may to that extent be taken into consideration by the International Court of Justice.