• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.564-579
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• 2022

The use of on-premises technology in the business environment to create a competitive advantage is ushering in a new era known as digital transformation. As the foundation of digital transformation of enterprises, information technology still has a paradoxical effect on enterprises. This paper documents the effect of investments in IT on a firm's long-term profitability performance measures as return on assets (ROA), as well as tests whether the earlier entrant and the later entrant are different in IT investment performance. Using a sample of China's public firms IT investment data between 2016 and 2019, the result indicates that IT investment in firms have a positive effect on firm performance in full sample, but not in the financial industry firms. When it comes to the different investment time, the result shows no significant difference between the earlier entrant firm and the later entrant firm in the full sample, but not in the case of software industry sample. This should help alleviate the concerns that some have expressed about the viability of digital transformation given the highly publicized IT investment and implementation problems at some firms.

• Proceedings of the Korea Technology Innovation Society Conference
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• 2002.11a
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• pp.45-57
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• 2002

Since a new entrant in the telecommunications market requires time in order to construct its own network, a requirement on the incumbent operator to implement carrier selection and pre-selection can enable a new entrant to immediately attract customers and earn revenue. Carrier selection can normally be accomplished in two ways, on a call-by-call basis or through carrel pre-selection. Call-by-call selection allows customers to choose a new entrant rather than the incumbent carrier using a specific code designated to the new carrier each time a call is made. Carrier Pre-Selection, on the other hand, allows customers directly connect to the network of one provider to have access automatically to another company's services when they pick up the phone to make certain types of calls. The carrier pre-selection option is generally considered to be a second regulatory step following the implementation of the call-by-call carrier selection option. Carrier pre-selection with the ability to override on a call-by-call basis for long distance, international, local, and fixed-to-mobile calls has now been implemented in many EU countries. This paper attempts to identify the issues in introducing CPS and to draw policy implications from other countries' experiences.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.39-62
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• 2010

As an engineered product, a software package has multiple dimensions that must be designed judiciously to enhance its competitive viability. Functionality, reliability and price are three such common dimensions. However, many software products are sold as bundles of individual components and the competitive impact of bundling has received less attention in the research literature. In this paper, we examine the implications of software vendors using bundling as an element of competitive strategy. A game theoretic model of the actions of an incumbent and a new entrant is developed and the impact on vendor and consumer welfare is analyzed. Numerical experiments with the model show that (i) increasing bundle size is an effective strategy for the incumbent to increase its payoff at the cost of the entrant's payoff and consumer surplus, especially when the entrant's quality is low (ii) in the presence of bundling, the entrant can still increase its own payoff and consumer surplus at the cost of the incumbent's payoff, by increasing product quality up to the level that best segments market demand with the incumbent and (iii) an increase in bundle size by the incumbent, or an increase in quality by the entrant, can both result in an increase of total surplus. Similar results are observed in a related case where the entrant offers free software bundles. Our results provide insights into how software vendors may strategically use bundling and quality as additional product dimensions in order to stay competitive in the market. These results also inform the competing vendors of the impact of bundling related public policy actions on their respective payoffs.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.61-69
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• 2001

This paper presents a two stage game model which examines the effect of learning-by-doing and spillover. Increases in the firm’s cumulative experience lower its unit cost in future period. However, the firm’s rival also enjoys the experience via spillover. Unlike previous theoretical research model, a cost asymmetric market entry game model is developed between the incumbent firm and new entrant. Mathematical results show that the incumbent firm exploits the learning curve to gain future cost advantage, and that the diffusion of learning to the new entrant induces the incumbent firm to choose decreasing output strategically. As a main result, we show that the relative magnitude between the learning and spillover rate determines the market share ratio of competing firms.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.165-181
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• 1991

This paper presents a developmental approach undertaken by Asiana Airlines to implement computerized reservation system (CRS), Asiana Airlines is a new entrant into the once monopolized airline business in Korea. As a new entrant, it was absolutely necessary to develop CRS fast to begin the business in a relatively short period of time. By taking the risk of choosing Airline Control System which no airlines has yet implemented CRS with, Asiana Airlines was able to shorten development time considerably as well as integrate CRS with internal management information systems. This enhances system flexibility greatly. It is initially viewed that developing CRS is not to get competitive advantage but to overcome competitive disadvantage at Asiana Airlines. The paper also surveys the changing environment of CRS in general and the future implementation plan for ARTIS(Asiana Airline Reservation and Travel Information System) to be more of a competitive weapon in increasingly competitive international air travel market.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.15 no.6
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• pp.62-72
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• 2015

The purpose of this study is to discuss new entrants' role in a business ecosystem and to analyze growth strategies of a new entrant in the movie industry. When participants of a business ecosystem complement one another with their own unique capabilities, they can coevolve and develop the business ecosystem. Especially, new entrants armed with competitive advantages are the key success factor for improving robustness of business ecosystem. Korean movie industry is dominated by a few large enterprises and thereby threatening fair trade. In an effort to encourage new entrants in the industry, this study analyzed success factors of a film distributor, Next Entertainment World(NEW). The success factors include unique criteria in selecting scenarios, quality management, rapid decision making process, and competent management team. Implications for the results and the future study are discussed.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.95-116
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• 2005

The purpose of this study is to analyze the structure of renewable energy market in order to deploy more renewable energy in Korea on the basis of information asymmetry between suppliers and demanders. To attain this purpose we develop the model to analyze and simulate the renewable market using system dynamics. This model is developed not to forecast the accurate size of market but to learn more structure of market using our limited data, mental model and knowledge of market.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.73-103
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• 2015

According to Resource Dependence theory, an organization's behavior and strategy is affected by external resources. An organization has diverse resources interacting with environment. Because organization cannot focus on all those resources, it concentrates on its critical resources. In market environment, firm responds to other firms by controlling their internal critical resources or manages interdependency with environment to get market share. Thus Firm should choose best behavior and strategy when internal and external resources are change. When new brand enters, incumbents might change their strategy to protect their market share depending on critical value. More precisely, incumbents sharing market with entrant respond, but incumbents having competitive internal resources do not. In this article, we study incumbent's responses to a new brand entry and long-term effect. We show that how incumbents change their price strategy in reaction to the new brand' entry and also show these responses vary depending on interdependency of internal resources and external environments and ownership.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.

• Steel and Composite Structures
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.425-438
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• 2013

A new-styrofoam-concrete composite sandwich slab with function of heat insulation is designed. Four full-scale simply supported composite sandwich slabs with different shear connectors are tested. Parameters under study are the thickness of the concrete, the height of profiled steel sheeting, the influence of shear connectors including the steel bars and self-drilling screws. Experimental results showing that four specimens mainly failed in bending failure mode; the shear connectors can limit the longitudinal slippery between the steel profiled sheeting and the concrete effectively and thus guarantee the good composite action and cooperative behavior of two materials. The ultimate sagging bending resistance can be determined based on plastic theory. This new composite sandwich slab has high sagging bending resistance and good ductility. Additionally, these test results help the design and application of this new type of composite sandwich slab.