• Title/Summary/Keyword: national defense strategy

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Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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A Study Consequence Management System of the Terrorism (테러리즘의 대응관리체제에 관한 고찰 - "9. 11 테러"를 중심으로 -)

  • Kim, Yi-Soo;Ahn, Byung-Soo;Han, Nam-Soo
    • Korean Security Journal
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    • no.7
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    • pp.95-124
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    • 2004
  • It can be said that 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' in 2001 were not only the indiscriminate attacks on innocent people but also the whole - political, economical and military - attacks on human life. Also, 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' can be regarded as the significant events in the history of world, which were on the peak of the super-terrorism or new-terrorism that had emerged from the 1980s. However, if one would have analysed the developments of terrorism from the 1970s, they could have been foreknown without difficulty. The finding from this study can be summarized as the followings, First, in spite that the USA responsive system against terrorism had been assessed as perfect before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks', the fragilities were found in the aspects of the response on the new-terrorism or super-terrorism. The previous responsive system before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' had the following defects as the followings: (1) it was impossible to establish the integrated strategy, because the organizations related to the response against terrorism had not integrated; (2) there were some weakness to collect and diffuse the informations related to terrorism; (3) the security system for the domestic airline service in USA and the responsive system of air defense against terrors on aircraft were very fragile. For these reasons, USA government established the 'Department of Homeland Security' of which the President is the head so that the many organizations related to terrorism were integrated into a single management system. And, it legislated a new act to protect security from terrors, which legalized of the wiretapping in spite of the risk of encroachment upon personal rights, increased the jail terms upon terrorists, froze the bank related to terrorist organization, and could censor e-mails. Second, it seem that Korean responsive system against terrors more fragile than that of USA. One of the reasons is that people have some perception that Korea is a safe zone from terrors, because there were little attacks from international terrorists in Korea. This can be found from the fact that the legal arrangement against terrorism is only the President's instruction No. 47. Under this responsive system against terrorism dependent on only the President's instruction, it is expected that there would be a poor response against terrors due to the lack of unified and integrated responsive agency as like the case of USA before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks'. And, where there is no legal countermeasure, it is impossible to expect the binding force on the outside of administrative agencies and the performances to prevent and hinder the terrorist actions can not but be limited. That is to say, the current responsive system can not counteract effectively against the new-terrorism and super-terrorism. Third, although there were some changes in Korean government's policies against terrorism. there still are problems. One of the most important problems is that the new responsive system against terrorism in Korea, different from that of USA, is not a permanent agency but a meeting body that is organized by a commission. This commission is controled by the Prime Minister and the substantial tasks are under the National Intelligence Service. Under this configuration, there can be the lack of strong leadership and control. Additionally, because there is no statute to response against terrorism, it is impossible to prevent and counteract effectively against terrorism. The above summarized suggests that, because the contemporary super-terrorism or new-terrorism makes numerous casualties of unspecified persons and enormous nationwide damages, the thorough prevention against terrorism is the most important challenge, and that the full range of legal and institutional arrangements for the ex post counteraction should be established. In order to do so, it is necessary for the government to make legal and institutional arrangements such as the permanent agency for protection from terrorism in which the related departments cooperates with together and the development of efficient anti-terror programs, and to show its willingness and ability that it can counteract upon any type of domestic and foreign terrorism so that obtain the active supports and confidence from citizens.

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A Critical Discourse Analysis Through Comparisons Between Editorials of The Global Times, Huánqiú Shíbào on the 2018 United States-China Trade War (미·중 무역 분쟁 관련 환구시보(環球時報) 사설 비교를 통한 비판적 담화분석 - 「용타항미원조적의지타대미무역전(用打抗美援朝的意志打對美貿易戰)」 중심으로 -)

  • Choi, Tae-hoon
    • Cross-Cultural Studies
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    • v.52
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    • pp.165-194
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    • 2018
  • Employing Fairclough's critical discourse analysis (CDA), the purpose of this study was to analyze linguistically significant features, intertextuality, and sociocultural practice focusing on selected editorials of The Global Times, $Hu{\acute{a}}nqi{\acute{u}}$ Shíbào on the 2018 United States-China Trade War. The editorial titled "With the strong will of 'the War to Resist America and Aid Chosun,' let us go through the trade war against America" focused on the use of 'war' related vocabulary in the frame of 'war.' First, "Trade War" and "War to Resist America and Aid Chosun" are examples that reveal metaphors and a war frame. Second, "Strategy" is used positively for China but negatively towards America. Third, various war related words are used. Fourth, cases of allusion illustrate war. Intertextuality in terms of discourse practice pertains to two findings. First, The Global Times, $Hu{\acute{a}}nqi{\acute{u}}$ Shíbào repeatedly uses the phrase 'equivalent revenge.' That is because the expression enables China to justify their counterattack and such war that China may wage can be interpreted as just counterattack much like a self-defense mechanism. Second, the expression, 'the counterattack is not intended but it is not fearful' is repeated in several editorials of the newspaper. The reasons are the following: 1) it is used to appeal to the public, 2) by invoking the feeling of fear, the public should be understand why they should unite, and 3) the expression, "it is not fearful" is used to preserve China's global image and "the counterattack is not intended" is used to signal China's will to America. The whole expression is a good example of intertextuality that repetitively illustrates the intended meaning of China in nine editorials in the newspaper within three months, March 23-June 17, 2018. Finally, sociocultural practice is manipulated through the editorial for disseminating the Chinese government's hegemonic ideology. First, it is clear that the core national project, "China Manufacturing 2025" cannot be abandoned. Second, by calling for "War to Resist America and Aid Chosun" the editorial is manipulated to condemn and intimidate America, avoid dissent of the people, appeal to the people, and empower the government. Third, China somehow wants to open up the possibility of negotiation with the United Sates.