• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.59-76
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• 2018

What are the conditions make a being x a moral agent? Can an artifact be moral agent? A moral agent is considered to be a rational being capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. This study critically analyzed Davidson's position on the condition of the rational being and argued that the network of beliefs with propositional attitude and the beliefs as their background cannot be a requisite for the rational being. Later, it proves that the conditions proposed by $Proke{\check{s}}ov{\acute{a}}$ are merely paratactically listed superficial elements. The moral agent in this study includes the rational agent and it is proven that the strong first person viewpoint is the necessary and sufficient condition for rational agent and moral agent. In conclusion, it suggested a the sketch of moderate skepticism which sets the tentative limit on the agent potential in an artifact by suggesting conditions for moral agent instead of intense skepticism that strongly denies the potential as the moral agent.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.23-51
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• 2014

Christine M. Korsgaard believes that constructivism can respond to moral skepticism without depending upon moral realism. The purpose of this paper is to examine Korsgaard's kantian constructivism and her positions on moral realism. According to Korsgaard moral realism cannot answer normative questions in that it sees the function of moral concepts as describing the reality and so accepts the model of applied knowledge for action. In contrast Korsgaard insists that constructivism is better at justifying normativity since it regards moral concepts as representing the solutions to practical problems and so shows that moral principles are necessarily involved in the practical problems of agency. Korsgaard's constructivism has antirealistic elements such as pure proceduralism, the constitutive model to exclude ontological, metaphysical meanings, and the account of human beings as the sources of values. In spite of those antirealistic elements it is difficult to jump to a conclusion that Korsgaard's constructivism is antirealism. Korsgaard, in the early book, The Sources of Normativity, says that kantian constructivism has something to do with a form of realism, or procedural moral realism. And in the following books she argues that constructivism is compatible with realism although she pays attention to the practical implications of constructivism and then sets aside its ontological relevance. That is, Korsgaard does not want that her constructivism results in antirealism. Korsgaard's realism, however, is too weak to be called as realism. There is, also, a question why one would rather take a constructivist approach if one holds on to realism.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.379-407
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• 2012

The main purpose of this paper is to make a case for the availability of pragmatist ethics by showing the differences between utilitarianism and pragmatism. In this paper, drawing on Dewey's view, I show that Bentham and Mill were doomed to failure because they both regarded moral conduct not as a process but as a fixed act, the remarkable differences between their views notwithstanding. Besides, I also show that pragmatism distinguishes itself from utilitarianism by its focus on the aspect of the amendment of a conduct rather than its attainment. Pragmatist ethics works on the assumption that moral conduct arises only in conscious experience. What pragmatists mean by consciousness is not an ability just given to haman, but a function emerging from the human interaction with his environment. Therefore, morality is extended from and restricted by experience, because it is grounded in concrete experience, but not in the transcendental nor a priori realm. Since pragmatism suggests the possibility of "ethics without principles" in that it works through the way which successfully rejects the traditional absolutist ethics, while avoiding the downslide to a nihilistic form of skepticism. Thus, it may serve as a third view that overcomes a seriously divergent situation of the current ethical arguments. In other words, starting from the very nature of experience, pragmatist ethics offers a 'bottom-up' ethics, instead of a 'top-down' one. This reconstructive reading of pragmatism away from utilitarianism is expected to offer a more comprehensive account of our moral experience in the pluralistic world of diverged values.

• Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.135-145
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• 2018

In this study, we investigated the argumentations of group and classroom discussions in socioscientific issues (SSI) discussion classes. Twenty-seven high school students participated in the SSI discussion classes on nuclear power generation. We observed and recorded the classes and also conducted semi-structured interviews. For the analyses, we revised a previous framework that was developed to analyze dialogic argumentations in the context of SSI. The analyses of the results indicated that there were more discourse schemes in the classroom discussions than the group discussions which are related to awareness and openness to multiple perspectives, evidence based reasoning, and on-going inquiry and skepticism. And there were few discourse schemes related to moral and ethical sensitivity in the group and classroom discussions. Various grounds, data, and information were presented in the classroom discussions. Students concentrated on carrying their claims and were not able to sympathize with and accept other opinions. Therefore, there were few discourse schemes to reach consensus. In addition, they perceived classroom discussions as competitive and actively rebutted other claims or grounds. The levels of argumentation were also high in the classroom discussions. The group discussions were held in relaxed atmosphere, and they asked the opponents more for clarification or additional information and evidences. However, classroom discussions were held in serious atmosphere, and they actively queried the validity of the claims or grounds. Based on the results, some suggestions to implement SSI discussion classes were discussed.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.323-347
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• 2017

In the 1980s, traditional analytic epistemology was abuzz with proposed solutions to the Gettier problem, responses to skepticism, newly minted objections to a variety of internalist and externalist theories of justification, and enthusiastic criticisms of foundationalism and coherentism. Debates over competing analyses of knowledge and justification raged. Since then, virtue epistemology has become a diverse and increasingly well-established field. I think that most researchers in Korea will feel the name "virtue epistemology" itself as strange or unfamiliar. It is primarily because virtue epistemology has a brief history. So, virtue epistemology did not present many opportunities for its introduction to Korean researchers. Another reason is that the name of "virtue epistemology" itself has a strangeness or unfamiliarity. Since the concept of "virtue" has mainly been used in moral or ethical contexts, virtue ethics is very familiar to most people. In contrast, the name of "virtue epistemology", combining "virtue" with "epistemology", is strange to many people. This paper primarily aims to introduce virtue epistemology in our philosophical society. What is it? How is virtue epistemology different from traditional analytic epistemology? What is the nature of virtues in virtue epistemology? What are the advantages, urgent tasks, and prospects of virtue epistemology? Focusing on these questions, I seek to understand the background to the rise of virtue epistemology, the differences and relations between virtue epistemology and traditional epistemology, and the nature of virtue and the main theories in virtue epistemology.