• ETRI Journal
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• 제32권3호
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• pp.447-456
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• 2010

Asymmetric regulation as applied to mobile termination rates refers to regulatory arrangements in which different mobile operators charge different termination rates, even though the services provided are essentially identical. The asymmetric regulation has been frequently used as a regulatory tool to support new entrants to a mobile market. This paper examines the economic effects of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates using a theoretical model and its simulation. The result shows that when there is no noticeable difference in brand loyalty between mobile operators with the high degree of substitutability between services provided by mobile operators, and the costs of new entrants are low, a reduction in the asymmetry of mobile access prices results in an enhancement of consumer welfare. These findings provide positive evidence for the argument that in certain situations asymmetric pricing of mobile access services may be counterproductive for consumer welfare.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제40권6호
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• pp.609-617
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• 2014

Lately there are many approaches for decreasing the retail prices for mobile telecommunication in response to higher demand of the consumer welfare. Related on this perspective, there have been many disputes how the MTR (mobile termination rate)s from the whole market has influences on the consumer prices at the retail market. Therefore, we need a timely review about the possibility of the reduction of retail prices with MTR policies. The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between MTR and retail prices. For this purpose, we can identify three kinds of arguments by reviewing the previous literatures. We empirically analyze the relationship with latest European data and Korean annual data. Furthermore, we also examine whether the relationship would depend on the competition structure. The results imply that decreasing MTR would result in reduction of the retail prices but the effect would be enhanced by improvement of market concentration.