• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.131-149
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• 2016

The main purpose of this paper is to inquire into Johnson's defence of naturalistic ethics, and show how it could escape the intractable conundrum that has bothered moral philosophy ever since the early 20th century. Johnson shares the deconstructivist stance in claiming that moral theories are largely metaphorical constructs, and thus their claim to absoluteness is ungrounded. However, Johnson breaks with deconstructivist philosophers by offering a need for a constructive inquiry into "moral understanding." Then, Johnson's recent discussions are more concerned with moral fundamentalism in which he argues, is not only cognitively incorrect but immoral. It is incorrect in that it relies on the false assumptions on human cognition, and is immoral in that it shuts off any moral discussions. Instead, Johnson sees moral experience as a matter of moral deliberation in which we attempt "dramatic rehearsals" in Dewey's terms. Johnson's constructive offer in moral philosophy reminds us of "the size of moral theory," which fits human moral understanding as an embodied being, and this presents a third constructive way over the dichotomous conundrum of moral philosophy between traditional absolutism and nihilistic deconstructivism.