• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.231-252
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• 2021

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a key technology that will change the future the most. It affects the industry as a whole and daily life in various ways. As data availability increases, artificial intelligence finds an optimal solution and infers/predicts through self-learning. Research and investment related to automation that discovers and solves problems on its own are ongoing continuously. Automation of artificial intelligence has benefits such as cost reduction, minimization of human intervention and the difference of human capability. However, there are side effects, such as limiting the artificial intelligence's autonomy and erroneous results due to algorithmic bias. In the labor market, it raises the fear of job replacement. Prior studies on the utilization of artificial intelligence have shown that individuals do not necessarily use the information (or advice) it provides. Algorithm error is more sensitive than human error; so, people avoid algorithms after seeing errors, which is called "algorithm aversion." Recently, artificial intelligence has begun to be understood from the perspective of the augmentation of human intelligence. We have started to be interested in Human-AI collaboration rather than AI alone without human. A study of 1500 companies in various industries found that human-AI collaboration outperformed AI alone. In the medicine area, pathologist-deep learning collaboration dropped the pathologist cancer diagnosis error rate by 85%. Leading AI companies, such as IBM and Microsoft, are starting to adopt the direction of AI as augmented intelligence. Human-AI collaboration is emphasized in the decision-making process, because artificial intelligence is superior in analysis ability based on information. Intuition is a unique human capability so that human-AI collaboration can make optimal decisions. In an environment where change is getting faster and uncertainty increases, the need for artificial intelligence in decision-making will increase. In addition, active discussions are expected on approaches that utilize artificial intelligence for rational decision-making. This study investigates the impact of artificial intelligence on decision-making focuses on human-AI collaboration and the interaction between the decision maker personal traits and advisor type. The advisors were classified into three types: human, artificial intelligence, and human-AI collaboration. We investigated perceived usefulness of advice and the utilization of advice in decision making and whether the decision-maker's personal traits are influencing factors. Three hundred and eleven adult male and female experimenters conducted a task that predicts the age of faces in photos and the results showed that the advisor type does not directly affect the utilization of advice. The decision-maker utilizes it only when they believed advice can improve prediction performance. In the case of human-AI collaboration, decision-makers higher evaluated the perceived usefulness of advice, regardless of the decision maker's personal traits and the advice was more actively utilized. If the type of advisor was artificial intelligence alone, decision-makers who scored high in conscientiousness, high in extroversion, or low in neuroticism, high evaluated the perceived usefulness of the advice so they utilized advice actively. This study has academic significance in that it focuses on human-AI collaboration that the recent growing interest in artificial intelligence roles. It has expanded the relevant research area by considering the role of artificial intelligence as an advisor of decision-making and judgment research, and in aspects of practical significance, suggested views that companies should consider in order to enhance AI capability. To improve the effectiveness of AI-based systems, companies not only must introduce high-performance systems, but also need employees who properly understand digital information presented by AI, and can add non-digital information to make decisions. Moreover, to increase utilization in AI-based systems, task-oriented competencies, such as analytical skills and information technology capabilities, are important. in addition, it is expected that greater performance will be achieved if employee's personal traits are considered.

• KOREAN JOURNAL OF CROP SCIENCE
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• v.3
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• pp.49-82
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• 1965

For the stable and high yields of low-land rice in Korea, the characteristics of rice plant for the vegetative and physiological responses, plant type formation, and yield components have been studied in order to obtain the fundamental data for the improvement of cultural practices, especially for the ideal fertilizer application. Furthermore the environmental conditions in Korea including temperatures, light, precipitation, and soil conditions have been compared in the broad sense with those in Japan, and the application of nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, silicate and other micro-nutrients were described in relation to the characteristics of environmental conditions for the improvement of fertilizer application. 1. The average yield of polished-rice per 10 are in Korea is about 204 kg and this values are much less than those in Japan and Taiwan where they produce 77% to 13% more than in Korea. The rate of yield increase a year in Korea is 4.2 kg, but in Japan and Taiwan the rates of yield increase a year are 81 % and 62%, respectively. It was also found that the coefficient of variation of yield is 7.7% in Korea, 6.7% in Japan and 2.5% in Taiwan. This means that the stability of producing rice in Korea is very low when compared with those in Japan and Taiwan. 2. It was learned from the results obtained from the 'annual yield estimation experiment' that there are big differences in the respect of plant type formations between rice crops grown in Japan and Korea. The important differences found were as follows: (1) The numbers of spikelets per 3.3 square meters are 891 in Korea and 1, 007 in Japan(13% more than in Korea). (2) The numbers of tillers per 3.3 square meters at the stage of maximum tillering are 1, 150 in Korea, but in Japan they showed 19% more than in Korea. (3) The ratio of effective tillers to total tillers is 77.5% in Korea and 74.7% in Japan, which seems to be higher in Korea than in Japan. But the ratio in Korea is very low when considered the numbers of total tillers in both countries. (4) The ratio of grain to straw is 85.4% in Korea and 96.3% in Japan. 3. The average temperatures during the growing season at the area of Suwon, Kwangjoo and Taegu are almost same as those in the district of Jookokoo(Fookoo yama) in Japan, i.e., the temperatures during the rice-growing season in Korea are similar to those in the southern-warm regions of Japan. 4. Considering the minimum temperatures at the stage of limiting transplanting, 13$^{\circ}C$, the time of transplanting might be 30 to 40 days earlier than presently practicing transplanting time, which comes around June 10. 5. The temperatures during the vegetative growth in Korea were higher than those temperatures that needed in the protein synthesis which ate the main metabolism during this stage. However, the temperatures at the time of reproductive growth was lower than the temperatures that needed in the sugar assimilation which is main metabolism in this stage. In this point of view, it might be considered that the proper time of growing rice plant in Korea would be rather earlier. 6. The temperatures and the day light conditions at the time of first tillering stage of rice plant, when planted as presenting transplanting practices, are very satisfactory, but the poor day light length, high temperatures and too wet conditions in the time of last-tillering stage(mid or last July) might cause the occurrence of disease such as blast. 7. The heading stage of rice plants at each region through nations when planted as presently practicing method comes when the day light length is short. 8. It was shown that the accumulated average air-temperature at the time of maturing stage was not enough and the heading time was too late, when considered the annual deviations of mean temperatures and low minimum temperatures. 9. The nitrogen content of each plant part at the each growing stage was very high at the stage of vegetative growth when compared with the nitrogen content at the stage of reproductive growth after heading. In this respect it was believed to be important to prevent the nutrient shortages at the reproductive stages, especially after the heading. 10. The area of unsatisfactory irrigation paddy fields and natural rain-fed paddy fields are getting reduced in Korea. The correlation between the rate of reducing unsatisfactory irrigation and natural rain-fed paddy fields and the rate of yield increase were computed. The correlation coefficients(r) between the area of unsatisfactory irrigation paddy fields and yield increase were +0.525, and between the natural rain-fed paddy fields and yield increase, +0.832 and between the unsatisfactory irrigation plus natural rain-fed paddy fields and yield increase, +0.84. And there were. highly significant positive correlations between natural rain-fed paddy fields and yield increases indicating that the less the area of natural rain-fed paddy fields, the greater the yields per unit area. 11. The results obtained from the fertilizer experiments (yield performance trials) conducted in both Korea and Japan showed that the yield of non-fertilized plots per 10 are was 231 kg in Korea and 360 kg in Japan. On the basis of this it might be concluded that the fertility of soil in Korea is lower than that in Japan. Furthermore it was. also found that the yields of non-nitrogen applied plots per 10 are were 236 kg in Korea and 383 kg in Japan. This also indicates that the yields of rice in Korea are largely depending on the nitrogen content in the soil. 12. The followings were obtained when the chemical natures of soils in both Korea and Japan were compared. (1) The content of organic matter, total nitrogen, exchangeable calcium, and magnesium in Korea were no more than the half those in Japan. (2) The content of N/2 chloride and soluble silicate in low-land soil were on the average lower in Korea. (3) The exchange capacity of bases in Korea was no more than half that in Japan. 13. It was also observed by comparing the soil nature of the soil with high yielding capacity with the soil with low yielding capacity that the exchange capacity of bases, exchangeable calcium and magnesium, potassium, phosphorus, manganese, silicate and iron were low in the soil with low yielding capacity. 14. The depth of furrow slice was always deeper in the soil with high yielding capacity, and the depth of furrow slice in Korea was also shallower than that in Japan. 15. Summarizing the various conditions mentioned previously and considering the effects of silicate and trace elements such as manganese and iron besides three elements on the physiological and plant type formation of rice crops, more realistic and more ideal fertilizing practices were proposed. proposed.