• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.36 no.1
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• pp.83-103
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• 2004

The methodological framework of the Level 2 PSA appears to be currently standardized in a formalized fashion, but there have been different opinions on the way the sources of uncertainty are characterized and treated. This is primarily because the Level 2 PSA deals with complex phenomenological processes that are deterministic in nature rather than random processes, and there are no probabilistic models characterizing them clearly. As a result, the probabilistic quantification of the Level 2 PSA CET / APET is often subjected to two sources of uncertainty: (a) incomplete modeling of accident pathways or different predictions for the behavior of phenomenological events and (b) expert-to-expert variation in estimating the occurrence probability of phenomenological events. While a clear definition of the two sources of uncertainty involved in the Level 2 PSA makes it possible to treat an uncertainty in a consistent manner, careless application of these different sources of uncertainty may produce different conclusions in the decision-making process. The primary purpose of this paper is to characterize typical sources of uncertainty that would often be addressed in the Level 2 PSA and to provide a formal guidance for quantifying their impacts on the PSA Level 2 risk results. An additional purpose of this paper is to give a formal approach on how to combine random uncertainties addressed in the Level 1 PSA with subjectivistic uncertainties addressed in the Level 2 PSA.

• Radiation Oncology Journal
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.136-140
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• 1999

Purpose : Prostate specific antigen (PSA) is a useful tumor marker, which is widely used as a diagnostic index and predictor of both treatment and follow-up result in prostate cancer. A prospective analysis was carried out to obtain the period of PSA normalization and the half life of PSA and to analyze the factors influencing the period of PSA normalization. The PSA level was checked before and serially after radical radiotherapy. Materials and Method : Twen쇼 patients with clinically localized prostate cancer who underwent radical external beam radiotherapy were enrolled in this study. Accrual period was from April 1993 to May 1998. Median follow-up period was 20 months. Radiotherapy was given to whole pelvis followed by a boost to prostate. Dose range for the whole pelvis was from 45 Gy to 50 Gy and boost dose to prostate, from 14 Gy to 20 Gy. The post-irradiation PSA normal value was under 3.0 ng/ml. The physical examination and serum PSA level evaluation were performed at 3 month interval in the first one year, and then at every 4 to 6 months. Results : PSA value was normalized in nineteen patients (95%) within 12 months. The mean period of PSA normalization was 5.3 (${\pm}$2.7) months. The half life of PSA Of the nonfailing patients was 2.1 (${\pm}$0.9) month. The nadir PSA level Of the nonfailing Patients waS 0.8 (${\pm}$0.5) ng/ml. The period of PSA normalization had the positive correlation with pretreatment PSA level (R$^{2}$=0.468). The nadir PSA level had no definite positive correlation with the pretreatment PSA level (R$^{2}$=0.075). The half life of serum PSA level also had no definite correlation with pretreatment PSA level (R$^{2}$=0.029). Conclusion :The PSA level was mostly normalized within 8 months (85%). If it has not normalized within 12 months, we should consider the residual disease in prostate or distant metastasis. In 2 patients, the PSA level increased 6 months or 20 months before clinical disease was detected. So the serum PSA level can be used as early diagnostic indicator of treatment failure.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.50 no.8
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• pp.1234-1245
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• 2018

The risk of multi-unit nuclear power plants (NPPs) at a site has received considerable critical attention recently. However, current probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) procedures and computer code do not support multi-unit PSA because the traditional PSA structure is mostly used for the quantification of single-unit NPP risk. In this study, the main purpose is to develop a multi-unit Level 2 PSA method and apply it to full-power operating six-unit OPR1000. Multi-unit Level 2 PSA method consists of three steps: (1) development of single-unit Level 2 PSA; (2) extracting the mapping data from plant damage state to source term category; and (3) combining multi-unit Level 1 PSA results and mapping fractions. By applying developed multi-unit Level 2 PSA method into six-unit OPR1000, site containment failure probabilities in case of loss of ultimate heat sink, loss of off-site power, tsunami, and seismic event were quantified.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.49 no.2
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• pp.426-433
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• 2017

This paper describes the development process, the innovative techniques used and insights gained from the latest integrated, full scope, multistate Level 2 PSA analysis conducted at the Leibstadt Nuclear Power Plant (KKL), Switzerland. KKL is a modern single-unit General Electric Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/6) with Mark III Containment, and a power output of $3600MW_{th}/1200MW_e$, the highest among the five operating reactors in Switzerland. A Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) analyses accident phenomena in nuclear power plants, identifies ways in which radioactive releases from plants can occur and estimates release pathways, magnitude and frequency. This paper attempts to give an overview of the advanced modeling techniques that have been developed and implemented for the recent KKL Level 2 PSA update, with the aim of systematizing the analysis and modeling processes, as well as complying with the relatively prescriptive Swiss requirements for PSA. The analysis provides significant insights into the absolute and relative importances of risk contributors and accident prevention and mitigation measures. Thanks to several newly developed techniques and an integrated approach, the KKL Level 2 PSA report exhibits a high degree of reviewability and maintainability, and transparently highlights the most important risk contributors to Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) with respect to initiating events, components, operator actions or seismic component failure probabilities (fragilities).

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.58-74
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• 1998

A PC window-based computer code, CONPAS (CONtainment Performance Analysis System), has been developed to integrate the numerical, graphical, and results-operation aspects of Level 2 probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) for nuclear power plants automatically. As a main logic for accident progression analysis, it employs a concept of the small containment phenomenological event tree (CPET) helpful to trace out visually individual accident progressions and of the detailed supporting event tree (DSET) for its detailed quantification. For the integrated analysis of Level 2 PSA, the code utilizes five distinct, but closely related modules. Its computational feasibility to real PSAs has been assessed through an application to the UCN 3&4 full scope Level 2 PSA. Compared with other existing computer codes for Level 2 PSA, the CONPAS code provides several advanced features: (1) systematic uncertainty analysis / importance analysis / sensitivity analysis, (2) table / graphical display & print, (3) employment of the recent Level 2 PSA technologies, and (4) highly effective user interface. The main purpose of this paper is to introduce the key features of CONPAS code and results of its feasibility study.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.34 no.4
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• pp.331-343
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• 2002

We performed an importance analysis of In-Service Testing (157) components for Ulchin Unit 3 using the integrated evaluation method for categorizing component safety significance developed in this study. The developed method is basically aimed at having a PSA expert perform an importance analysis using PSA and its related information. The importance analysis using the developed method is initiated by ranking the component importance using quantitative PSA information. The importance analysis of the IST components not modeled in the PSA is performed through the engineering judgment, based on the expertise of PSA, and the quantitative and qualitative information for the 157 components. The PSA scope for importance analysis includes not only Level 1 and 2 internal PSA but also Level 1 external and shutdown/low power operation PSA. The importance analysis results of valves show that 167 (26.55%) of the 629 IST valves are HSSCs and 462 (73.45%) are LSSCs. Those of pumps also show that 28 (70%)of the 40157 pumps are HSSCs and 12 (30%) are LSSCs.

• Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention
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• v.16 no.13
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• pp.5261-5264
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• 2015

Purpose: To examine the effectiveness of serum free-to-total prostate specific antigen ratio (%fPSA) for the detection of prostate cancer (PCa) in men with different serum total PSA (tPSA) categories. Materials and Methods: From January 2010 to December 2013, a total of 225 patients with lower urinary tract symptoms (LUTS) underwent tPSA and %fPSA measurements. Histological examination with calculation of Gleason score and whole body bone scans were performed in identified cases of PCa. Results: PCa was diagnosed in 44 (19.6%) patients and the remaining 181 patients had benign prostate disease. PCa was detected in 5 (23.8%), 13 (8.7%) and 26 (47.3%) cases with tPSA level ranges ${\leq}4ng/ml$, 4 to 10 ng/ml and >10 ng/ml, respectively. The average Gleason score was $7.2{\pm}0.2$. Some 6 (13.6%) out of 44 PCa patients had bone metastases. The sensitivity was 80% and specificity was 81.3% at the cut-off %fPSA of 15% in PCa patients with a tPSA level below 4 ng/mL. A lower %fPSA was associated with PCa patients with Gleason score ${\geq}7$ than those with Gleason score ${\leq}6$ ($11.7{\pm}0.98$ vs. $16.5{\pm}2.25%$, P=0.029). No obvious relation of %fPSA to the incidence of bone metastasis was apparent in this study. Conclusions: The clinical application of %fPSA could help to discriminate PCa from benign prostate disease in men with a tPSA concentration below 4 ng/mL.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 1999.05a
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• pp.206-206
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• 1999

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.51 no.5
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• pp.1297-1306
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• 2019

Probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) have been used for several decades to visualize the risk level of commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs). Since the role of a human reliability analysis (HRA) is to provide human error probabilities for safety critical tasks to support PSA, PSA quality is strongly affected by HRA quality. Therefore, it is important to understand the underlying limitations or problems of HRA techniques. For this reason, this study conducted a survey among 14 subject matter experts who represent the HRA community of domestic Korean NPPs. As a result, five significant HRA issues were identified: (1) providing a technical basis for the K-HRA (Korean HRA) method, and developing dedicated HRA methods applicable to (2) diverse external events to support Level 1 PSA, (3) digital environments, (4) mobile equipment, and (5) severe accident management guideline tasks to support Level 2 PSA. In addition, an HRA method to support multi-unit PSA was emphasized because it plays an important role in the evaluation of site risk, which is one of the hottest current issues. It is believed that creating such a catalog of prioritized issues will be a good indication of research direction to improve HRA and therefore PSA quality.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.5
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• pp.975-983
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• 2020

Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, concerns for the safety of multi-unit Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) sites have risen. This is because more than 70% of NPP sites are multi-unit sites that have two or more NPP units and a multi-unit accident occurred for the first time. After this accident, Probability Safety Assessment (PSA) has been considered in many countries as one of the tools to quantitatively assess the safety for multi-unit NPP sites. One of the biggest concerns for a multi-unit accident such as Fukushima is that the consequences (health and economic) will be significantly higher than in the case of a single-unit accident. However, many studies on multi-unit PSA have focused on Level 1 & 2 PSA, and there are many challenges in terms of public acceptance due to various speculations without an engineering background. In this study, two kinds of multi-unit Level 3 PSA for multi-unit site have been carried out. The first case was the estimation of multi-unit risk with conservative assumptions to investigate the margin between multi-unit risk and QHO, and the other was to identify the effect of time delays in releases between NPP units on the same site. Through these two kinds of assessments, we aimed at investigating the level of multi-unit risk and understanding the characteristics of risk in a multiunit context.