• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.109-141
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• 2005

In this paper, I raise an objection to "sensitivism" about "know", according to which knowledge ascription is sensitive to contexts of utterance or subjects. While Peter Unger once proposed insensitivism about "know" in terms of insensitivism with respect to absolute terms, David Lewis provided sensitivism about "know" in terms of sensitivism with respect to absolute terms, on the common ground that "know" belongs to a class of absolute terms. On the one hand, I object to Unger-style insensitivism about 'know,' for, I claim, we have reason to opt for sensitivism rather than insensitivism with respect to absolute terms in virtue of the maxim that I call "semantic razor." On the other hand, I also object to sensitivist approaches to "know," for, on reflection, there is such a deep difference between "know" and absolute terms (or, sensitive terms altogether) that "know" cannot be taken to sensitive to contexts as opposed to absolute terms (or, sensitive terms altogether). These claims jointly indicate that "know" should be thought of as an insensitive term even though sensitivism has enjoyed wide acceptance in many other cases.