• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.31-68
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• 1990

The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

• Industry Promotion Research
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.43-49
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• 2022

This study aims to study Esping-Anderson's theory of welfare state system, develop a model of welfare state suitable for Korea's situation, and apply it to reality. In this research method, basic research and analysis of ideology is used, focusing on Esping-Anderson's welfare state system theory, and applying it appropriately to the Korean situation. Studies on the model of the welfare state have been studied after the classification of complementary and institutional models asserted by Willensky and Lebo in 1965. In addition, Esping-Andersen asserts three things as a model of the welfare state according to ideology. First, the role of the market is central to the liberal welfare system that best fits the image of classical capitalism, and individualistic solidarity through the market. The role of the state or family, which can be a hindrance, is actually marginalized. In addition, in order to maximize individualistic solidarity through the market, de-commodification in the national domain tends to be minimized. Second, the conservative welfare system has a strong familistic element, so the source of social solidarity is the family, and the state plays a role of supporting and supplementing the characteristics of this family. In the conservative system, de-commodification appears to be high among household heads, or the welfare system takes on a corporatist and nationalistic form, it can be said that these characteristics are reflected. Third, in the social democratic welfare system, the source of social solidarity is the state. Therefore, the role of the state is large, the state has a high possibility of decommodification, and it has the characteristics of substitutes for the family and the market through universalist intervention. This study applies Esping-Anderson's three welfare state models to study a model suitable for the Korean situation. In conclusion, Esping-Anderson's three welfare state models can be classified into a market-oriented model based on a liberal welfare system, a status-oriented model based on a conservative corporatist welfare system, and a solidarity-oriented model based on a social-democratic welfare system, presented a compromise between liberalism and conservatism as a Korean model.

• Journal of Venture Innovation
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.57-70
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• 2022

In modern industrial capitalism, the relationship between the provision of work and the receipt of wages has become an important principle governing society. According to the labor contract, the wages provided by entrusting the right to dispose of one's labor to the employer are directly compensated, and human life should be guaranteed and reproduced with proper rest. The establishment of labor relations under free contracts represents a problem in protecting workers, and accordingly, the maximum of working hours is set as a minimum right for workers, and the standard for minimum rest is set and assigned. The reduction of working hours is very important in terms of the quality of life of workers, but it is also an important issue in efficient corporate activities. As of 2020, Korea has 1,908 hours of annual working hours, the third lowest among OECD 37 countries in the happiness index surveyed by the Sustainable Development Solution Network(SDSN), an agency under the United Nations. Accordingly, the necessity of reducing working hours has been recognized, and the maximum working hours per week has been limited to 52 hours since 2018. In this situation, various working hours are legally excluded as a way to maintain the company's value-added creation and meet the diverse needs of workers, and Korea's Labor Standards Act restricts flexible working hours within three months, flexible working hours exceeding three months, selective working hours, and extended working hours. However, in the discussion on the application of the revised flexible working hours system in 2021 and the expansion of the settlement unit period recently discussed, there is a problem with the flexible working hours system, which needs to be improved. Therefore, this paper aims to examine the problems of the flexible working hours system and improvement measures. The flexible working hours system is a system that does not violate working hours even if the legal working hours are exceeded on a specific day or week according to a predetermined standard, and does not have to pay additional wages for excessive overtime work. It is mainly useful as a form of shift work in manufacturing, sales service, continuous business or electricity, gas, water, and transportation for long-term operations. It is also used as a way to shorten working hours, such as expanding holidays through short working days. However, if the settlement unit period is expanded, it is disadvantageous to workers as the additional wages that workers can receive will not be received. Therefore, First, in order to expand the settlement unit period currently under discussion, additional wages should be paid for the period expanded from the current standard. Second, it is necessary to improve the application of the flexible working hours system to individual workers to have sufficient consultation with individual workers in a written agreement with the worker representative, Third, clarify the allowable time for extended work during the settlement unit period, and Fourth, limit the daily working hours or apply to continuous rest. In addition, since the written agreement of the worker representative is an important issue in the application of the flexible working hours system, it is necessary to secure the representation of the worker representative.