• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.59-85
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• 2014

This paper analyses an impact of wage scheme and transparency of performance evaluation on the productivity. The main findings in this paper are as follows: First, the effect of wage scheme based on seniority system on the productivity is worse off than the performance pay. Second, there is a positive relationship between an incentive and the productivity, but, in the case of firms which individually informs the results of performance evaluation to their workers, it shows the hump-shaped relationship. Third, though the wage scheme is based on the performance, if the evaluation system is not transparent, the impact of incentive on the productivity is disappeared. Consequently, this paper implies that the appropriate incentive and the transparent performance evaluation system are required so as to improve the productivity.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea TC
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• v.48 no.7
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• pp.1-8
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• 2011

Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) is a special form of Mobile Ad-hoc Network designed to provide communications among nearby vehicles without communications infrastructure. Some characteristics in VANET environment such as high mobility, dynamic topology and selfishness of nodes can cause degradation of network quality. In this paper, we propose an adaptive incentive/topology control scheme to improve network quality in VANET by stimulating real time data forwarding and reporting changes of network topology. In the proposed scheme, an incentive suggested by the source node is updated in real time simultaneously with data transmission to stimulate real time data forwarding. In addition, when the order of the nodes in the path is changed, nodes which report the changes of network topology will get an additional incentive. By computer simulation, it is shown that the proposed incentive/topology control scheme outperforms the conventional schemes with respect to data delivery time and data delivery ratio.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.139-154
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• 2016

The port incentive scheme currently implemented in various Korean ports is used as a marketing tool to increase price competitiveness. Typically, ports implement piecemeal imitation strategies to enhance their competitiveness, rather than a precisely designed system. A precise analysis of the effectiveness of a port's system and scheme redesign are lacking because budget allocation is done without input from customers and freight groups. This study models the incentives faced by ports using a linear programming model. We use the Gwangyang port as the base case. Our analysis of the Gwangyang port reveals that there are insufficient incentives implemented when a traditional qualitative analysis is used. We also identify any excess, deficiency, or absence of the incentive effect for each type of customer and freight group. We find the overall budget of the incentive scheme to be more rational when ports allocate funds to minimize port mileage, and allocate 61.77 percent and 38.23 percent of the budget on existing and new (or increased) cargo inventory, respectively. Future studies can build on our work by further considering basic inputs, and by adding a system to estimate the input data of our model to identify constraints and thus provide a more accurate incentive scheme.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.152-171
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• 2019

In opportunistic networks, nodes may appear some selfishness while transmitting the message, however, most of the existing research works consider the individual selfishness or social selfishness respectively, and these two types of selfishness may coexist in opportunistic networks. In this paper, we propose an Incentive Aware Routing based on Game Theory for selfish OPPNETs, named IAR-GT, which uses Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game model to incentivize selfish nodes cooperation in data forwarding. IAR-GT scheme not only considers the resources of nodes, but also uses a new method to calculate the social ties between them. Trace-driven simulations show that our incentive aware routing scheme achieves better performances than comparing schemes under two types of selfishness coexistence environments.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.59-75
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• 1998

This paper presents an incentive system to reduce response time from a supplier. The incentive system is expressed as a contract between an assembler and a supplier who have a long-term relationship. We produce the optimal payment scheme and expected total cost, when the assembler is farsighted. We show that the farsighted assembler obtains higher effort level from the supplier than the myopic assembler. We also show that the expected total cost of the farsighted assembler is smaller in the long run, although it is initially higher than that of the myopic assembler.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2004.11b
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• pp.266-268
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• 2004

This paper presents the greenhouse gas emission trading scheme which is under progress as a pilot project at the power sector in preparation for UNFCCC. By referring UK's, Emission Trading is introduced incentive auction to maximize the reduction of greenhouse gas emission. At the 1st step, from year 2006 to 2008, only CO2 is regarded as an objective target to decrease but emission credit is excluded with an assumption and only 5 Generation company take part in as participants. The market operating procedure is composed of participants' registration, baseline verification, incentive auction, the registration of initial and yearly allocation, emission trading, yearly emission verification & approval, yearly obligation conformity, carry forward & incentive grant. It can be serve a guideline the whole aspects of emission trading which will start in 2006 including operation, verification and profit sharing.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.5 no.11
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• pp.1909-1928
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• 2011

Node cooperation during packet forwarding operations is critically important for fair resource utilization in Community Wireless Mesh Networks (CoWMNs). In a CoWMN, node cooperation is achieved by using fairness protocols specifically designed to detect and isolate malicious nodes, discourage unfair behavior, and encourage node participation in forwarding packets. In general, these protocols can be split into two groups: Incentive-based ones, which are managed centrally, and use credit allocation schemes. In contrast, reputation-based protocols that are decentralized, and rely on information exchange among neighboring nodes. Centrally managed protocols inevitably suffer from scalability problems. The decentralized, reputation-based protocols lacks in detection capability, suffer from false detections and error propagation compared to the centralized, incentive-based protocols. In this study, we present a new fairness protocol management scheme, called Hybrid FPMS that captures the superior detection capability of incentive-based fairness protocols without the scalability problems inherently expected from a centralized management scheme as a network's size and density grows. Simulation results show that Hybrid FPMS is more efficient than the current centralized approach and significantly reduces the network delays and overhead.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-8
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• 2019

In this paper, we design a new mobile crowdsourcing control scheme based on the incentive mechanism. By using a novel incentive mechanism, mobile nodes can get the maximum payoff when they report their true private information. As mobile nodes participate in the overlapping coalition formation game, they can effectively invest their resource while getting the higher reward. Simulation results clearly indicate that the proposed scheme has a better performance than the other existing schemes under various mobile crowdsourcing environments.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.38-51
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• 2004

Over the years, most or many companies have focused their attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of their business units. As a new way of doing business, these companies have begun to realize the strategic importance of planning, controlling, and designing their own supply chain system. This paper analyzes the coordination issues in supply chains that consist of one manufacturer and multiple retailers operating under uncertain end customer demand and delivery lead-time. We use the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to determine the appropriate ordering and inventory level at which the manufacturer and multiple retailers can maximize the profit of the chain. This is performed under three controlling policies: the traditionally centralized controlling policy under the manufacturer's perspective, the entire chain’s perspective, and lastly the coordinating controlling policy with an incentive scheme. The outcome from the study reveals that the coordinating controlling policy with an incentive scheme can outperform the traditional centralized controlling policies by creating a win-win situation in which all members of the chain benefit from higher profit, thus resulting in more willingness from all members to join the chain.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.67 no.8
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• pp.1009-1018
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• 2018

As the generation of renewable energy increases rapidly, the stability of the grid due to its intermittency becomes a problem. The most appropriate way to solve this problem is to combine and operate the renewable generators with the ESS(Energy Storage System). However, since the revenues of operating the ESS are less than the investment cost, many countries are implementing various incentive policies for encouraging investment of the ESS. In this paper we estimated optimal capacity of the ESS to maximize profits of renewable energy generation businesses under the incentive policy of Korea and analyzed the impact of the incentive policy on the future electric power system of Jeju island. The simulation results show that the incentive policy has significantly improved the profitability of the renewable energy businesses generation business. But the volatility of the net demand has increased as the energy stored in the ESS is discharged intensively at the time of the incentive application.