• Title/Summary/Keyword: general pareto distribution

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Money and Capital Accumulation under Imperfect Information: A General Equilibrium Approach Using Overlapping Generations Model (불완전(不完全)한 정보하(情報下)의 통화(通貨)의 투자증대효과분석(投資增大效果分析): 중복세대모형(重複世代模型)을 이용한 일반균형적(一般均衡的) 접근(接近))

  • Kim, Joon-kyung
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.14 no.1
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    • pp.191-212
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    • 1992
  • This paper discusses the role of money in the process of capital accumulation where financial markets are impeded by contract enforcement problems in the context of overlapping generations framework. In particular, in less developed countries (LDCs) creditors may know little about the repayment capability of potential debtors due to incomplete information so that financial instruments other than money may not acceptable to them. In this paper the impediments to the operation of the private finanical markets are explicitly modelled. We argue that creditors cannot observe actual investment decisions made by the potential borrowers, and as a result, loan contracts may not be fully enforceable. Therefore, a laissez-faire regime may fail to provide the economy with the appropriate financial instruments. Under these circumstances, we introduce a government operated discount window (DW) that acts as an open market buyer of private debt. This theoretical structure represents the practice of governments of many LDCs to provide loans (typically at subsidized interest rates) to preferred borrowers either directly or indirectly through the commercial banking system. It is shown that the DW can substantially overcome impediments to trade which are caused by the credit market failure. An appropriate supply of the DW loan enables producers to purchase the resources they cannot obtain through direct transactions in the credit market. This result obtains even if the DW is subject to the same enforcement constraint that is responsible for the market failure. Thus, the DW intervention implies higher investment and output. However, the operation of the DW may cause inflation. Furthermore, the provision of cheap loans through the DW results in a worse income distribution. Therefore, there is room for welfare enhancing schemes that utilize the higher output to develop. We demonstrate that adequate lump sum taxes-cum-transfers along with the operation of the DW can support an allocation that is Pareto superior to the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation.

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A Study on the Agency Theory and Accounting (에이전시이론과 회계감사에 관한 연구)

  • 공해영
    • Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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    • v.12 no.20
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    • pp.123-138
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    • 1989
  • The primary objective of the agency research in the game theory lives in the maintenance of Pareto is optimal condition for the optimal incentive contract. The basic concepts which are related to this objective are reviewed in connection with the general assumptions to model it, the moral hazard and adverse selection which arised from the information asymmetry, and finally the problem of risk distribution. The demand for auditing and the role of auditor have been addressed by ASOBAC. Issues which an auditor is explicitly introduced in a principal-agent framework have been addressed in this paper. These issues must be confronted to appropriately with the auditor, and to achieve an adequate understanding of optimal confronting arrangement with the auditor. The first step in introducing an auditor into this analysis is to examine the game-theoretic foundation of such a expended agency model. The Mathematical program formulated may not yield solution that are resonable. This arises because the program may call for the auditor and manager to play dominated Nash equilibra in some subgame. The nontrivial natures of the subgame implies that randomized strategies by the auditor and manager nay be of crucial importance. The possibilities for overcoming the randomized strategy problem were suggested; change the rule of the game and or impose covexity condition. The former seems unjustifiable in on auditing context, and the latter promising but difficult to achieve. The discussion ended with an extension of the revelation principle to the owner manager-auditor game, assuming strategies. An examination of the restriction and improvement direction of the basic concept of agency theory was addressed in the later part of this paper. Many important aspects of auditor incentives are inherently multiple-agent, multiple-period, multiple-objectine, phenomena and require further analyses and researches.

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