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As the complexity of a 3D game is increased by various factors of the game scenario, it has a problem for controlling the interrelation of the game objects. Therefore, a game system has a necessity of the coordination of the responses of the game objects. Also, it is necessary to control the behaviors of animations of the game objects in terms of the game scenario. To produce realistic game simulations, a system has to include a structure for designing the interactions among the game objects. This paper presents a method that designs the dynamic control mechanism for the interaction of the game objects in the game scenario. For the method, we suggest a game agent system as a framework that is based on intelligent agents who can make decisions using specific rules. Game agent systems are used in order to manage environment data, to simulate the game objects, to control interactions among game objects, and to support visual authoring interface that ran define a various interrelations of the game objects. These techniques can process the autonomy level of the game objects and the associated collision avoidance method, etc. Also, it is possible to make the coherent decision-making ability of the game objects about a change of the scene. In this paper, the rule-based behavior control was designed to guide the simulation of the game objects. The rules are pre-defined by the user using visual interface for designing their interaction. The Agent State Decision Network, which is composed of the visual elements, is able to pass the information and infers the current state of the game objects. All of such methods can monitor and check a variation of motion state between game objects in real time. Finally, we present a validation of the control method together with a simple case-study example. In this paper, we design and implement the supervised classification systems for high resolution satellite images. The systems support various interfaces and statistical data of training samples so that we can select the most effective training data. In addition, the efficient extension of new classification algorithms and satellite image formats are applied easily through the modularized systems. The classifiers are considered the characteristics of spectral bands from the selected training data. They provide various supervised classification algorithms which include Parallelepiped, Minimum distance, Mahalanobis distance, Maximum likelihood and Fuzzy theory. We used IKONOS images for the input and verified the systems for the classification of high resolution satellite images.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the empirical results of Analytic Hierarchy Process/Data Envelopment Analysis-Assurance Region(AHP/DEA-AR) by using multiple regression analysis during the period of 2009-2012 with 5 inputs (number of gantry cranes, number of berth, berth length, terminal yard, and mean depth) and 2 outputs (container TEU, and number of direct calling shipping companies). Assurance Region(AR) is the most important tool to measure the efficiency of seaports, because individual seaports are characterized in terms of inputs and outputs. Traditional AHP and multiple regression analysis techniques have been used for measuring the AR. However, few previous studies exist in the field of seaport efficiency measurement. The main empirical results of this study are as follows. First, the efficiency ranking comparison between the two models (AHP/DEA-AR and multiple regression) using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Mann-Whitney signed-rank sum test were matched with the average level of 84.5 % and 96.3% respectively. When data for four years are used, the ratios of the significant probability are decreased to 61.4% and 92.5%. The policy implication of this study is that the policy planners of Korean port should introduce AHP/DEA-AR and multiple regression analysis when they measure the seaport efficiency and consider the port investment for enhancing the efficiency of inputs and outputs. The next study will deal with the subjects introducing the Fuzzy method, non-radial DEA, and the mixed analysis between AHP/DEA-AR and multiple regression analysis.
With rapid technological and market change, new product development (NPD) complexity is a significant issue that organizations continually face in their development projects. There are numerous factors, which cause development projects to become increasingly costly & complex. A product is more likely to be successfully developed and marketed when the complexity inherent in NPD projects is clearly understood and carefully managed. Based upon the previous studies, this study examines the nature and importance of complexity in developing new products and then identifies several issues in managing complexity. Issues considered include: definition of complexity : consequences of complexity; and methods for managing complexity in NPD projects. To achieve high performance in managing complexity in development projects, these issues need to be addressed, for example: A. Complexity inherent in NPD projects is multi-faceted and multidimensional. What factors need to be considered in defining and/or measuring complexity in a development project? For example, is it sufficient if complexity is defined only from a technological perspective, or is it more desirable to consider the entire array of complexity sources which NPD teams with different functions (e.g., marketing, R&D, manufacturing, etc.) face in the development process? Moreover, is it sufficient if complexity is measured only once during a development project, or is it more effective and useful to trace complexity changes over the entire development life cycle? B. Complexity inherent in a project can have negative as well as positive influences on NPD performance. Thus, which complexity impacts are usually considered negative and which are positive? Project complexity also can affect the entire organization. Any complexity could be better assessed in broader and longer perspective. What are some ways in which the long-term impact of complexity on an organization can be assessed and managed? C. Based upon previous studies, several approaches for managing complexity are derived. What are the weaknesses & strengths of each approach? Is there a desirable hierarchy or order among these approaches when more than one approach is used? Are there differences in the outcomes according to industry and product types (incremental or radical)? Answers to these and other questions can help organizations effectively manage the complexity inherent in most development projects. Complexity is worthy of additional attention from researchers and practitioners alike. Large-scale empirical investigations, jointly conducted by researchers and practitioners, will help gain useful insights into understanding and managing complexity. Those organizations that can accurately identify, assess, and manage the complexity inherent in projects are likely to gain important competitive advantages.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70