• Title/Summary/Keyword: example-based dialogue system

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An Example-Based Natural Language Dialogue System for EPG Information Access (EPG 정보 검색을 위한 예제 기반 자연어 대화 시스템)

  • Kim, Seok-Hwan;Lee, Cheong-Jae;Jung, Sang-Keun;Lee, Gary Geun-Bae
    • Annual Conference on Human and Language Technology
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    • 2006.10e
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    • pp.65-70
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    • 2006
  • 본 논문에서는 EPG 정보 검색을 위한 자연어 대화 시스템에 대해 논한다. 자연어 대화 시스템 구축을 위한, 대화 예제를 이용한 상황 기반 대화 관리 방법론은, 효율적이고 실용적인 대화 시스템 구축을 가능하게 한다. 대화 시스템은 사용자 발화에 대해 적합한 시스템응답 발화를 출력하는 과정으로 진행되며, 이를 위해, 사용자 발화 의미 분석, 대화 관리, 시스템 응답 발화 생성의 과정을 거친다. 정확하고 신속한 정보의 전달이 중요한 EPG 정보 검색 도메인의 특성상 EPG 데이터베이스의 관리 및 갱신이 중요한 요소로 작용한다. 이를 위해 웹마이닝 기반의 EPG 데이터베이스 관리자를 구현함으로써 데이터베이스 구축에 필요한 비용을 최소화하고, 신속하고 정확한 정보를 제공할 수 있었다.

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South Korea's strategy to cope with local provocations by nuclear armed North Korea (핵위협하 국지도발 대비 대응전략 발전방향)

  • Kim, Tae-Woo
    • Strategy21
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    • s.31
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    • pp.57-84
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    • 2013
  • North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

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