• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.129-167
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• 2021

The emission trading system is an essential policy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and converting low-carbon society. EU ETS is a good benchmark that is ahead of Korea's emission trading system in terms of operating period and design know-how. Therefore, this study focused on the key design elements of EU ETS phase 4 such as total emission allowances issued (Cap), free allocation method, carbon leakage list, market stability reserve, and innovation supporting system. In addition, we analyzed the impact of key design elements and their changes during EU ETS Phase 1 to 4 on the design and operation of Korea emission trading system in the future. First of all, the expected impact on the design of Korea emission trading system is to increase three demands: preparing benchmark renewal plans, establishing criteria for selecting free allocation industries that reflect domestic industrial structure and characteristics and introducing two-stage evaluations for free allocation industries, and preparing specific plan to support innovation and industries using allowance auction revenues. The next three impacts on the operation of Korea emission trading system are the increased needs for objective and in-depth impact assessment of plan and amendments, provision of system stability and response opportunities by quickly confirming plan and amendments prior to the implementation, and coordination of the emission trading system governance and stakeholder participation encouragement.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.261-290
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• 2022

Although market stabilization measures have been triggered in the K-ETS, carbon price is still under uncertainty. Considering Korea's 2030 enhanced reduction target announced in October 2021, it is crucial to have practical stabilization measures to appropriately deal with price uncertainty. This study examines the quantitative effects of a price collar, which is considered as a means of alleviating price uncertainty, on expected cumulative emissions and abatement costs. There are three main scenarios: carbon tax, emissions trading system, and emissions trading system with a price collar. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted to reflect uncertainty in emission. There are several results as follows: 1) In a price collar, domestic emission target is likely to be achieved with a lower expected abatement cost than other scenarios. In addition, there is a small amount of excess emissions in this research and it would be not critical(0.1% excess than target); 2) Prohibiting banking increases the expected abatement cost. This is because firms can not intertemporally reallocate allowances to match the firm's optimal emissions path; 3) With the adoption of a price collar, government's net revenue can be positive even if the government's purchase volume of emissions allowances is more than sales volume. This is because the government sells them at price ceiling and purchases them at price floor.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.41-73
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• 2015

The Korea Emissions Trading System that was launched in Jan. 2015 is expected to be a crucial policy measure to abate domestic $CO_2$ emission. For accomplishing its purpose, prior information on the price discovery process needs to be presented in order to facilitate the trading of spot allowances with different vintages. We develope a customized pricing method for Korean ETS using the concept of term structure and the cost of carry model.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.95-124
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• 2009

This study aims to introduce greenhouse gas emission trading in Korea as a highly cost-effective mechanism for controlling emissions. The Basic Act on Low-Carbon Green Growth will cover methods of emissions allocation, national inventory, and trading systems (i.e. emissions trading platforms, national registry,and clearing and settlement platforms). The Korean emission scheme will be based on the Korean Climate Change Act proposed by the National Assembly and Government with a cap-and-trade scheme. The national allowances will be allocated by the hybrid system. To establish the national inventory, TRADEMARKS (Telemetering System) and emissions factors are effective for greenhouse gas emissions measurement. It will likewise be effective for the national registry to be implemented via a Korean Integrated Registry, the emissions trading platform via the KRX (Korean Exchange), and the clearing and settlement platform via the KSD (Korean Securities Depository). In other words, the KRX will manage product development and marketing for Korean Carbon Financial Instruments (including commodities, futures, and options contracts) listed and admitted to trading on the KRX. All emissions trades will be standardized and cleared by the KSD.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.403-419
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• 2016

Cap-and-trade policies that allow firms to trade emission allowances are designed to reduce emissions at least cost and are shown to be efficient when there is no uncertainty over emissions. This paper examines how uncertainty in emissions affects firms' decisions about permit purchase and abatement. The results show that whether firms abate more under uncertainty compared to a case with no uncertainty depends on the expected penalty cost and marginal abatement cost. If the expected marginal penalty cost is greater than the marginal abatement cost, the firm will choose to reduce emissions and abate more under uncertainty. When the expected marginal penalty is greater than the marginal cost of abatement, increases in uncertainty result in reduced emissions. This paper also examines whether the order of abatement and permit trading and the realization of uncertainty affect firms' decisions. The results show that total expected emissions are the same regardless of the order of moves.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.591-642
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• 2006

This paper intends to analyze economic impacts of commitment period and initial allocation in emissions trading using computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling. The fully dynamic CGE model with perfect foresight assumption is employed to illustrate (i) how a model displays economic impact of $CO_2$ regulation upon different commitment periods: one-year budget clearing vs. 5-year commitment period, (ii) how major 8 energy-intensive industries respond to different ways to allocate initial allowances. According to the results of the analysis, it IS found that market players are motivated to bank the permits and tend to sell permits in earlier stage and to buy permits in later stage of commitment period. This implies that banking allows permit trading within a commitment period, which supports the conclusions of Kling and Rubin (1997). Other findings are related to efficiency. That is, emissions trading surpasses command and control, in terms of economic efficiency and longer terms of commitment period converge on lower permit price, In long term, initial allocation based on value-added performs the lowest GDP loss among different initial allocations.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.3-26
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• 2010

The European Union(EU) has recently introduced its Directive 2008/101/EC to include aviation in the EU ETS(emissions trading system). As an amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC that regulates reduction of the green house gas(GHG) emissions in Europe in preparation for the Kyoto Protocol, 1997, it obliges both EU and non-EU airline operators to reduce the emission of the carbon dioxide(CO2) significantly in the year 2012 and thereafter from the level they made in 2004 to 2006. Emission allowances allowed free of charge for each airline operator is 97% in the first year 2012 and 95% from 2013 and thereafter from the average annual emissions during historical years 2004 to 2006. Taking into account the rapid growth of air traffic, i.e. 5% in recent years, airlines operating to EU have to reduce their emissions by about 30% in order to meet the requirements of the EU Directive, if not buy the emissions right in the emissions trading market. However, buying quantity is limited to 15% in the year 2012 subject to possible increase from the year 2013. Apart from the hard burden of the airline operators, in particular of those from non-European countries, which is not concern of this paper, the EU Directive has certain legal problems. First, while the Kyoto Protocol of universal application is binding on the Annex I countries of the Climate Change Convention, i.e. developed countries including all Member States of the European Union to reduce GHG at least by 5% in the implementation period from 2008 to 2012 over the 1990 level, non-Annex I countries which are not bound by the Kyoto Protocol see their airlines subjected to aircraft emissions reductions scheme of EU when operating to EU. This is against the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol dealing with the emissions of GHG including CO2, target of the EU Directive. While the Kyoto Protocol mandates ICAO to set up a worldwide scheme for aircraft emissions to contribute to stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, the EU ETS was drawn up outside the framework of the international Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO). Second, EU Directive 2008/101 defines 'aviation activities' as covering 'flights which depart from or arrive in the territory of a Member State to which the [EU] Treaty applies'. While the EU airlines are certainly subject to the EU regulations, obliging non-EU airlines to reduce their emissions even if the emissions are produced during the flight over the high seas and the airspace of the third countries is problematic. The point is whether the EU Directive can be legally applied to extra-territorial behavior of non-EU entities. Third, the EU Directive prescribes 2012 as the first year for implementation. However, the year 2012 is the last year of implementation of the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I countries including members of EU to reduce GHG including the emissions of CO2 coming out from domestic airlines operation. Consequently, EU airlines were already on the reduction scheme of CO2 emissions as long as their domestic operations are concerned from 2008 until the year 2012. But with the implementation of Directive 2008/101 from 2012 for all the airlines, regardless of the status of the country Annex I or not where they are registered, the EU airlines are no longer at the disadvantage compared with the airlines of non-Annex I countries. This unexpected premium for the EU airlines may result in a derogation of the Kyoto Protocol at least for the year 2012. Lastly, as a conclusion, the author shed light briefly on how the Korean aviation authorities are dealing with the EU restrictive measures.